January 24, 2017

 Dr.. Mohammed Abu Rumman

 There is confusion on more than one level in which politicians, researchers and media professionals fall into when they approach and approach the Salafist phenomenon in Jordan.

First, confusing the various and diverse Salafi trends, and dealing with them as a single deaf bloc, and this is a big mistake, as there are great differences and differences between them, especially those that adopt radical action and those that adopt peaceful action or those that do not interfere in politics and consider that their mission is to support governments.

Secondly, the confusion between kinetic Salafi trends, in general, that is, embodied through groups and groups with social and cultural goals, and Salafism as a religious culture that has spread in Jordanian society for nearly three and a half decades, specifically with the oil boom in Saudi Arabia and its activity in spreading the Salafist call in the world, and in the Arab region in particular.

Therefore, this paper seeks to present a systematic approach to the Salafist phenomenon in Jordan, by first referring to the historical approach and the spread of Salafism in the country and the stages it has gone through, and secondly, distinguishing between Salafism as a socio-religious movement and as a culture and general thought, and then we address the various Salafi currents and the ideas governing each Including, and indicators related to its current state, then trying to extrapolate the conditions affecting its development and future transformations.

 1- Salafi crossing

   Historically, and until the seventies of the last century, Jordan was distinguished by its belonging to the Levantine, Sufi, Hanafi or Shafi’i culture, and to the official religious institutions, including the Ifta Institution in the Jordanian army or even the current Ifta Institution, or to ancient systematic religious books or to prominent sheikhs. In the previous decades until the beginning of the eighties; He will find that the dominant culture was closer to Sufism and Shafi’i, while Salafism until the beginning of the eighties was represented by a group of individuals influenced by the Salafi school, without having a prominent presence or a significant influence in society, nor a movement carrying this religious thought. [1]

   The major turning point was in the early eighties, when one of the most prominent contemporary Salafist figures, Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, settled in Jordan, after he disagreed with Salafist scholars in Saudi Arabia on jurisprudential issues. .

   Although the Jordanian authorities prevented Al-Albani from giving lessons in mosques and public forums, under the pressure of the influential Sufi and Shafi’i current at the time, his followers and disciples began to multiply and declare themselves and their ideas more frankly, and his private house was turned into a center for education and the dissemination of Salafi thought throughout the country. [2]

    The influence of Al-Albani and his group was reinforced by the atmosphere of the eighties (1980-1989), as it began with the Afghan war, the assassination of Sadat, the Iranian revolution in the region, and the accelerating rise of the so-called Islamic awakening in the region, in conjunction with the events of Hama in Syria and the refuge of a large proportion of the Syrian Salafist movement to Jordan, until Among those Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, who were divided between a Sufi school and a Salafi school in their intellectual and religious affiliations.

    This and that with the oil revolution and the increase in the number of Jordanians working in the Gulf (where the Salafist call enjoys strength, presence and great social impact) and students taught by the Saudi government in its universities Sharia sciences according to the Salafi curriculum, and the increase in the activity and influence of Saudi Salafi preachers through brochures, tapes and speeches with the flourishing of Hajj trips Umrah from Jordan to Saudi Arabia.

   The eighties was the golden decade for the crossing of Salafism into Jordanian society and its rapid spread and emergence in society, an emergence that came through successive successive stages that began with the spread of a group of preachers, sheikhs and preachers who preached the ideas of Salafism religiously, and their interests in the beginning were purely jurisprudential and religious, such as how to pray and how to pray. The dress of men and women, the beard, the way of imitating the Prophet Muhammad, and other various religious rituals.

    The new Salafi concepts clashed with the Sufi trend in the country, which launched a counterattack in sermons and sermons against the Salafis, and well-known Sufi sheikhs such as Ali al-Faqir, who was at the time in the military fatwa, entered into a clash with the Salafis, and differences emerged in the mosques between the two parties.

    Previous circumstances helped the Salafis spread their ideas and beliefs, and they did not appear as a community movement, but as a new ideas and culture, and this culture penetrated even a group such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which a large number of its members were studying or working in Saudi Arabia, and there was a great influence on Salafism in general, and from It is noticeable that this influence coincided – that is, in the eighties – and was combined with the influence of Saudi Salafism in that period with Brotherhood ideas, as a result of the role played by the Syrian and Egyptian brothers in teaching and education in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, such as Muhammad Qutb, Muhammad bin Nayef Surur Zain al-Abidin, Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq and others. What generated in the Arab Gulf a trend that combines Salafism, creed, Sharia and the Brotherhood’s political vision, a trend that was called the Harki-or reformist, and its appearance was delayed in Jordan until the beginning of the nineties. [3]

     With the end of the eighties, there was a noticeable presence of the Salafi movement on more than one level. The first was the students of Sheikh Nasser al-Din al-Albani, some of whom became famous and well-known in religious circles at home and abroad, and they began to spread Salafi knowledge and have followers in many countries of the world, such as Muhammad Ibrahim Shakra, Ali Al-Halabi, Mashhour Hassan, Salim Al-Hilali, Hussein Al-Awaysha and others.

   The second level is the Salafi culture, which is no longer new or strange, so it was able, within a short period of the conquest of Jordanian society and its establishment and radicalization, until it became the dominant culture, while the Sufi presence declined and dissipated, with the decline of the role of traditional religious institutions, especially fatwas in the armed forces, and the presence Salafis are also prominent in the Ministry of Islamic Endowments and within other Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Brotherhood leaders with clear Salafi tendencies have emerged, such as Dr. Omar Al-Ashkar, Dr. Muhammad Suleiman Al-Ashqar, Dr. Muhammad Abu Fares, Dr. Hammam Saeed, and other dozens of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and academics, who adopt Salafi interpretations of Sharia, as well as the case for elite professors who studied in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, or even in other countries and became independent Salafis, such as Dr. Muhammad Abu Rahim, Dr. Marwan Al-Qaisi and Dr. Abdul Razzaq Abu Al-Basal, and Dr.

2- The conflict between the “Salafis”;

    The 1990s coincided with the emergence of new Salafist trends in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, with Saddam Hussein’s entry into Kuwait and the Gulf War in 1991, and the stormy discussions it provoked among Saudi Salafists, between supporters and opponents of the use of American forces. The Saudi Salafist movement was divided into three sections. chief; The first is the traditional and is represented by the Council of Senior Scholars, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz and Ibn al-Uthaymeen, and he was with the help of Western forces. He was called al-Jami (after his sheikh, Muhammad Aman al-Jami), and he is a hardliner in his hostility to other Islamic currents and in emphasizing the prohibition of politics and the necessity of obedience to rulers. [4]

     The Saudi Salafi differences moved to Jordan, and appeared at first through the difference between Sheikh Nasser Al-Albani and his followers on the one hand, and the new Salafi youth who is influenced by the reform movement in Saudi Arabia. Society and public work, and not only spreading religious teachings in mosques and science lessons. [5]

    At a later stage, in the mid-nineties, and as one of the other setbacks to the 1991 Gulf War, the entry of Arabs into peace negotiations, and the decline of the democratic process that began in many Arab countries, then later relapsed, as happened in Algeria after 1992, and Jordan smoothly with legislation And laws passed to reduce the great power of Islamists in the street, all of this led to the rise of radical groups and trends that were initially influenced by the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, and by the ideas of the reformist Saudi Salafism. The Salafi-jihadi trend of crystallization, formation, and rise in Jordan.

   Al-Maqdisi, who came from Kuwait following the Gulf events in 1990, had a revolutionary Salafist ideology on governments and rulers, and what he offers has become like water that quenches the radical thirst of angry and frustrated youth at what is happening in the region, and from Jordan’s entry into peace negotiations. The discovery of his order and his arrest along with his close student, Ahmad al-Khalayleh (nicknamed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) and another group called the “Allegiance of the Imam” organization did not affect the spread of the movement, but rather strengthened its spread in prison and outside prison, and there were hundreds of followers of the Salafi-jihadi disciples. [6]

    In the second half of the nineties we had three ancestral trends!

   The first trend is the followers of Sheikh Nasser al-Din al-Albani, who are called traditional Salafis, conservatives or Albanians, and they refuse to engage in political and partisan work, and limit their work to the scientific and advocacy aspect, and their clear principle in this is “purification and education,” that is, the revision of religious sciences and education. People are on it. As for their position on political action, it can be summed up in a famous phrase of their Sheikh Al-Albani, which is “It is politics not to talk about politics.”

   The second trend, which is the reformist Salafi, is represented by the Association of the Book and the Sunnah, which is a Salafi trend in its religious belief and interpretation of religion, but it believes in the organization and does not fight the Islamists, and is closer to the mood of opposition to the policies of the state, but does not believe in armed action.

    The third trend is the rising radical trend influenced by the ideas of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi, and believes that the Arab political system is an infidel, and that the only way is armed confrontation between the two parties (the jihadists and the regimes), and rejects the peaceful and advocacy ways of other groups for change. [7]

3- The cleavages “within the predecessors” themselves;

    With the beginning of the new millennium (2000) the differences and fissures within each of the previous Salafist currents began to emerge, for the current itself to split or split against itself, and the Salafist trends spread into a more complex and diversified map.

   The conservative movement witnessed the death of its sheikh Nasir al-Din al-Albani in the year 2000, which led to a conflict between the poles over the inheritance of the sheikhdom, in a current whose relationship between its members is based on the logic of the sheikh and the students. Despite the establishment of the Al-Albani Center for Islamic Studies, differences continued to emerge, and led to the exclusion of a number of the most prominent well-known leaders and close students of Sheikh Al-Albani, and Ali Al-Halabi and Mashhour Hassan became the known leaders of this movement, but Al-Halabi also entered into an intellectual conflict with A group of sheikhs of the Saudi Salafi movement. [8]

    The reformist current, that is, the Association of the Book and the Sunnah, suffered from the loss of identity and confusion, between a Salafi-jihadi group that entered under the cloak of the association and another group that believed in peaceful work. Discrepancies appeared in the association’s discourse and internal differences affected its identity and stability, and the government almost closed it more than once. The presence of pro-Salafist jihadist elements among the association and its supporters.

     But the association was able to get out of this confusion later, define its identity in a more forceful and strict way, and got rid of centers and people close to the jihadist Salafi line, and began to work within the scope of peaceful charitable work more. [9]

   The third current that suffered from schism and internal division is the Salafi-jihadi current. Al-Maqdisi and Al-Zarqawi were released from prison in late 1999, with a royal pardon, but Al-Zarqawi preferred to travel to Afghanistan, to oppose from abroad and form his group there, and then he moved to Iraq with the start of the occupation The American in 2003, and established his group known as Al-Tawhid and Jihad, and joined his group to al-Qaeda in 2004, and became one of the most wanted by the United States of America, and planned the hotel bombings in Amman in 2005, but he was killed in 2006 by an American raid.

   Al-Zarqawi’s group did not die after him, and it became what we see today as the “Islamic State Organization” (ISIS), which remained faithful to Al-Zarqawi’s ideas and his extremist approach more than Al-Qaeda itself.

    In general, differences within this movement began to appear at an early stage in prison between Al-Zarqawi and Al-Maqdisi, but they were not revealed to the public until after Al-Maqdisi issued his famous letter (in 2005), entitled Al-Zarqawi’s Advocacy and Advise, in which he mentioned sharp criticism of Al-Zarqawi, and later after the killing of Al-Zarqawi. Al-Maqdisi became bolder in expressing the deep differences between him and Al-Zarqawi, which led to the split of the current into two parts. Al-Maqdisi’s followers and Al-Zarqawi’s followers. [10]

 4- Salafis in the era of the Arab Spring and beyond;

  The era of the Arab Spring, that is, the popular revolutions that erupted since 2011, brought remarkable changes and transformations in the reality of the previous Salafist currents. The popular revolutions – which erupted in many Arab countries and later led to the overthrow of two Arab leaders, Hosni Mubarak and Zain al-Abidin – blew up the ideological structure of both The jihadists and the conservatives alike, this structure that was hostile to democracy and did not see that peaceful revolutions could bring a result, and moved away from public political action.

   Both conservatives and radicals were shocked by the popular revolutions. The conservatives who used to say that peaceful change is not possible, and that the harms as a result of trying to break with the ruler are greater than the benefits that may result from a peaceful exit, and defended their theory that the ruler must be obeyed and not interfere in politics, they found themselves outside the general popular context, especially after the general Salafi trend decided In Egypt, access to partisan and political work, and Salafist forces met in Istanbul in December 2011 and decided to make a shift in the path of Salafi political work by invading party life and elections.

    أما الجهاديون فكانت أيديولوجيتهم تقوم على عدم جدوى العمل السلمي أيضاً، لكن النتيجة وفق هذا المنظور لم تكن طاعة الحكام، بل على النقيض من ذلك تماماً الثورة عليهم والخروج المسلح والمنازلة العسكرية مع الأنظمة العربية إلى أن تسقط. بالطبع جاءت الثورات الشعبية بأخبار مختلفة تماماً، في البدايات، فأثبتت الثورات السلمية نجاعتها في مواجهة الحكام، من جهة، وتبين أنّ المطالب الشعبية هي بإقامة الديمقراطية والعدالة والحرية، وليس نظاماً أصولياً على غرار ما تحلم به الحركات السلفية الجهادية.

     Only the reformist Salafis found that the popular revolutions confirm what they call for the necessity of integrating into political and partisan work and the possibility of peaceful change in the Arab world. The state’s unwillingness to give birth to a Salafist partisan experience, and thirdly, their failure to reach the stage in which they fully embrace democracy.

    5- Conservatives: destabilization of the leadership and new generations;

     The popular revolutions created uproar and confusion among conservative Salafi circles, especially with the establishment of political parties by Egyptian Salafis. The sheikh of the Jordanian conservative Salafis, Ali al-Halabi, wrote books about the impermissibility of demonstrations, and wrote about the inadmissibility of engaging in the transition to political action and insisted on his ideological and intellectual position, and thus the leadership of this movement sided with adhering to its previous choices.

   At the same time, the size of the rebellion increased, and the differences continued to appear in the circles of the current, and doubts began to affect the legitimacy of the current leadership, which led to major cracks in the unity of the current.

   On the other hand, a new generation of the academic leadership in the movement began to emerge, bearing different ideas and more affected by the moment of the Arab Spring, and it began to approach the reformist movement’s view of the need to engage in political and public action and to break away from the confinement to scientific lessons in mosques.

    The new generation of those who hold a doctorate in Islamic law and graduate students, and of young people who feel more liberated in expressing unpalatable opinions in the current circles, which has reinforced the state of internal dispersion and the absence of a clear horizon for the next stage, and it is expected that this situation will continue during the period The coming generation, but with a greater expansion of the new generation, who believes in the necessity of making a diversion in the general course of the current.

      It is also expected that the cracks in the circles of the conservative movement will lead to its further fragmentation and the emergence of two main trends within it. The first is associated with the well-known traditional sayings of non-interference in politics, but this trend, in turn, with the emergence of differences between leaders, may enhance the transformation of the current into isolated islands represented by disciples who gather around each sheikh and whose interest is limited to the scientific issue.

       As for the second trend, which is related to the new generation, it is expected that it will continue its march towards the transformation into the reformist and organizational summer, and it is trying to express itself with a new proposal and a different discourse, oriented towards the political and general reform path, and it may approach with some segments of the reformist Salafi current. [11]

 6- The reformists.. Lack of leadership and confusion of priorities

      At first, the reformist current interacted with the Arab popular revolutions, so some activists tried to imitate the Egyptian Salafist experience by establishing a political party, but the authorities’ conservative stance on the new experience prompted them to retreat from the idea. Instead, those in charge of the Kitab al-Sunnah Association found themselves in direct contact with the Syrian revolution, especially the issue of refugees. The association devoted its priorities and interests to charitable work related to helping Syrian refugees, and shifted the main and major part of its work to this field.

     The work of Al-Kitab wa Al-Sunnah Association expanded in the years 2011-2015 and opened multiple centers, and expanded its cooperative network on a regional level, to open the door for donations and organization of relief work related to refugees, and cooperated with official Jordanian institutions specialized in relief, and became practically linked to this vital field.

     In addition to this interest, the association still has intellectual interests in teaching Salafi sciences, and in devoting part of its discourse and publications to responding to the Shiites and warning against Iranian influence in the Arab region. At the present moment, the idea of ​​moving to establishing a Salafi political party in Jordan has been absent, especially with the deterioration of the path The Egyptian revolution, after the military coup on June 3, 2013.

    Although the association has achieved tangible success in terms of charitable work and spread during the last period, it is facing more than one challenge; The first is the absence of leaders who represent a major reference for the movement, as is the case in other Salafi currents. There are many active and educated youth, but there is no general agreement on a leader within the movement, who represents a scientific or intellectual reference. Therefore, the references of the members of the movement abroad vary. And inside, between different sheikhs.

     The second challenge is that in contrast to the success of the current in the relief work, it is not yet clear the horizon of the next trend, will it remain focused on this aspect, and if the financial support for the refugee issue declines, is there any consideration of other concerns and priorities, and what are these priorities? Will public work or founding a political party or even entering the political game as a pressure group be rethought?

    Therefore, the future picture of this current does not seem clear yet, although there is a high probability that the voices of the new youth from the conservative movement, whose tendency we talked about earlier about public action, will gather with the voices of young people from this current to make a detour in the next track, and to gather The Salafist movement is in organizational frameworks in preparation for strengthening its public presence and intrusion into political action. [12]

  7- The Salafi-jihadi current; division and propagation;

   The Salafi-jihadi movement, in turn, has witnessed qualitative developments and transformations since the moment of the Arab Spring, and the first stop in the interaction was its organization of peaceful marches calling for the release of the movement’s detainees, and the improvement of their conditions in prisons. The supporters of the movement were able to organize several marches, in more than one city, in which he participated. hundreds.

   Of course, the marches were not on the agenda of the jihadist movement, but its supporters obtained approval from their sheikh al-Maqdisi, while in prison, to organize the marches, and ideas began to circulate among an elite close to al-Maqdisi talking about the principle of “peaceful da’wah” in Jordan, a qualitative shift in the ideas of the movement Especially the pro-Maqdisi.

   Al-Zarqawi’s supporters did not approve of the marches, and saw that it differs from the method of the current, which believes only in armed action in expressing its positions.

     The scene of the marches was not completed, as a violent clash occurred between security men and supporters of the movement during their march in Zarqa, in mid-April 2011, which led to the arrest and imprisonment of hundreds of them, and their transfer to the State Security Court on charges of assaulting security men with sharp tools, and these marches contributed to aggravating the relationship between State and current more than ever. [13]

     Hundreds of members of the movement began to infiltrate and infiltrate Syria at a later stage, and most of them joined Jabhat al-Nusra at the beginning. Then the dispute between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS moved to Jordan, where the well-known Salafi jihadist sheikhs and ideologues, Abu Qatada al-Filistini and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, supported al-Nusra, while a wide segment of Salafi jihadist sons supported ISIS.

    At a later stage, in 2016, confrontations occurred between ISIS supporters and security forces in the city of Irbid, which resulted in the killing of an officer and a number of wanted persons. Then, an ISIS supporter attacked an intelligence office in Al-Baqa’a and killed a number of its affiliates. Before that, he was an officer in the Jordanian security – it is believed It’s a lone wolf – attacking a police and military training center, at Al Muwaqar Military Center.

     There are many important indicators that indicate that there is a surge in the number of those affected by jihadist Salafism, especially followers of ISIS ideology in Jordanian society, and that there is a new generation that has no known precedent in the Salafi-jihadi movement, whose members belong to the middle class and educated, different in nature from the traditional image of the sons of Jihadist Salafism in general.

    The picture of the future does not seem clearer to this current compared to the other two Salafi currents (conservative and reformist), but there are very important outstanding questions related to it and society in general. Perhaps the first question will be what will be the result or reflection of a possible defeat for ISIS in Iraq and Syria on its supporters and its attractiveness? How will the behavior of the returnees from there? Will the state’s plans succeed in combating extremism and terrorism, and will it wake up to this danger lurking at home by curbing it and limiting its spread and rise?

   The answer to these questions is related to the circumstances and conditions that produce the rise of the current and contribute to its spread, and in a large part of them are objective conditions, political, economic and societal. Politically, geography plays a very big role on more than one level, the first is the Sunni crisis in Iraq and Syria, the regional chaos, and the second is the Palestinian issue Here, geography embraces demography, given the presence of a large percentage (nearly half) of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, which always fuels the question of identity, which is one of the sources of recruitment and propaganda for these groups, in addition to the various economic, social and cultural conditions that contribute in one way and another to strengthening Speech current or scaled down.

 8- State policy towards the Salafists;

 The security-political dimension prevailed in defining the official policy in dealing with Islamic movements in general and Salafist currents in particular. There was no specific enlightenment or religious policy for the state, as much as the important criterion was the extent to which these movements clashed or were compatible with the state’s security considerations and general policies.

    In the phase of the transformation in the relationship between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood, with the decade of the 1990s, the state agencies used the traditional Salafist current to confront the Brotherhood and the rise of Salafi jihadism. This current provided them with fatwas and comfortable stances against the political opposition, whether peaceful or armed.

      On the other hand, the state has taken a strict and strict stance against the Salafi-jihadi movement, since the beginning of its rise, and the number of cases transferred to the State Security Court reached hundreds, and thousands of individuals were arrested, referred to the judiciary and tried.

      In the past two years, there has been a noticeable shift in the state’s policy towards this trend, represented by the distinction between supporters of Jabhat al-Nusra and supporters of ISIS. As the state tried to employ the fatwas and positions of Salafi-jihadi leaders, such as Al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada the Palestinian against ISIS and the current supporting it, and there are undeclared and unwritten understandings between the state and the poles of this current represented in defining the spaces in which they can speak and move through, in exchange for not imprisoning them, and allowing They have a limited range of motion.

     As for the reformist Salafi current, the state agencies have pressured it during the previous periods to get rid of its relationship with the jihadist Salafi current, and these are the attempts that succeeded with the Association of the Book and the Salafi Sunnah, whose relationship with the state seems better than in previous times, even if it is limited within a specific framework of permissible activity. Especially in the religious and charitable fields, with no political or partisan activity allowed until now.

    The other new development at the level of the state’s relationship with these groups is represented in the growing negative conviction in decision centers against Salafi thought in general and holding it responsible for spawning fatwas and extremist ideas, especially with the rise of ISIS and the link between what it is doing and its Salafi intellectual roots, and the organization’s use of the fatwa of the Islamic world, Ibn Taymiyyah (known as a doctrinal and religious reference for the Salafis in general; the radicals and the pacifists) has an active role in supporting the anti-Salafist political voice in general, and there is even confusion about Jordan preventing Ibn Taymiyyah’s books from entering the kingdom.

    The state’s policy has not shifted from the traditional Salafi trend, but there has become an official, political and cultural trend that sees all Salafis flowing into one river, which is the promotion of religious extremism in society. Therefore, there is no longer agreement in decision circles in favoring employing the traditionalists in the face of the jihadists, and the reduction in the importance of the traditional movement for the state has reinforced the divisions within this movement and the internal problems it faces and affected its credibility and the unity of its followers


[1]   The historical Sunni Islamic schools were divided between more than one direction; But the conflict continued between two trends; The first is the Salafi, which represents an extension of those who called themselves “Ahl al-Hadith” in Islamic history, and the second is the Ash’ari Sufi trend, and the difference between them is mainly related to metaphysical and religious differences, in the interpretation of God’s attributes, then in the importance of epistemological and legislative sources – and their importance in Islam. The Salafis give the hadith of the Prophet; That is, what was mentioned about the Prophet is of great importance in the sources of legislation, while the Sufis and Ash’aris give great importance to opinion, and there are of course other differences, such as the interpretation of the Qur’an and religious texts and other religious issues. See more details: see: Muhammad Emara, Currents of Islamic Thought, Dar Al-Shorouk, Cairo, 2nd edition 1997, pp. 125-200. and Hussein Saad, Contemporary Arab Islamic Fundamentalism between the Fixed Text and the Changing Reality, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1, 2005, pp. 79-93.

[2]   See: Muhammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Haniyeh, The Islamic Solution in Jordan: Islamists, the State, and the Challenges of Democracy and Security, Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Amman, 2nd Edition, 2014, pp. 241-243.

[3]   Stéphane Lacroix, The Time of Awakening: Contemporary Islamic Movements in Saudi Arabia, The Arab Network for Research and Publishing, 1st edition 2012, translated by Abdel Haq Al-Zamouri, pp. 61-68.

[4]   See: Mahmoud Al-Rifai, The Reform Project in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Al-Hawali and Return, 1995, pp. 36-57.

[5]   See: Muhammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Haniya, The Islamic Solution in Jordan, previous reference, pp. 244-244.

[6]   Ibid., pp. 296-298.

[7]   See: Muhammad Abu Rumman, I am my Salafi: A Research on the Real and Imagined Identity of the Salafis, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Amman, 1st Edition 2014, pp. 36-40.

[8]   Ibid., pp. 70-75.

[9]   Ibid., pp. 153-158.

[10]   Muhammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Haniya, The Islamic Solution, previous reference, pp. 316-327.

[11]   See Muhammad Abu Rumman, I am my predecessor, pp. 82-104.

[12]   Ibid., pp. 193-195.

[13]  Muhammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Haniyeh, The Islamic Solution, previous reference, pp. 383-389