



THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE POLITICAL REFORM IN JORDAN

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	II
Table of Contents.....	III
List of Tables	IV
List of Figures	V
List of Appendix.....	V
List of Abbreviations	VI
Executive Summary	1
Chapter One: Context, Objectives and Methodology	6
1.1 Project Context: The Jordanian Political Reform Path.....	6
1.2 General Objectives of the Study	11
1.3 The Concept of Civil Society.....	13
1.4 Methodology.....	14
1.4.1 Quantitative Methodology:	14
1.4.2 Qualitative Methodology:.....	16
<u>A</u>) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).....	16
<u>B</u>) Personal Interviews:	17
1.4.3 Obstacles in Researching CSOs in Jordan (Limitations)	18
Chapter Two: The Current Situation of CSOs Participating in the Study	19
2.1 General Vision and Objectives of CSOs.....	19
2.2 Major Target Groups and Program Focus Areas of CSOs	20
2.3 Capacity of CSOs: Structural and Financial	22
2.4 Relationship of CSOs with Government.....	28
2.5 Relationship of CSOs with Each Other	30
2.6 Relationship between CSOs and Donors.....	32
Chapter Three: The Role of CSOs in the Reform Process	38
3.1 The Contribution of CSOs in the Reform Agenda and Process	38
3.1.1 Issues CSOs worked on for the Reform Agenda in Jordan.....	40

3.1.2 Initiatives and Programs by CSOs in the Reform Process in 2011	41
3.1.3 Coalition Building and Emerging Groups towards Reform Ends	42
Chapter Four: Challenges, Issues and Solutions	45
4.1 General Outlook	45
4.2 Structural and Capacity Obstacles	47
4.3 Financial Obstacles	48
4.4 Legislative and Governmental Obstacles	50
Chapter Five: Looking Forward, the Role of CSOs in the Reform Process	54
5.1 Conclusion	54
5.2 Recommendations	58
5.2.1 Civil Society Organization	58
5.2.2 Government	59
5.2.3 Donors	59
Appendix	I

List of Tables

Table 1: Popular Satisfaction and Support for Constitutional Reform (2011)	10
Table 2: Capacity of CSOs' Administrative and Staff Bodies*	22
Table 3: Financial Details of CSOs	26
Table 4: Funding Standards by Donors (as perceived by CSOs)	35

List of Figures

Figure 1: CSO's Vision and Mission	19
Figure 2: Objectives of CSOs in Political Reform.....	20
Figure 3: Number of Programs & Projects CSOs Worked on in 2011-12.....	21
Figure 4: Areas of Involvement of CSOs' Projects.....	21
Figure 5: Branches of CSOs According to Governorates.....	23
Figure 6: Types of Projects by CSOs as Covered within Financial Budget (2011-2012).....	24
Figure 7: Number of Programs in Each Governorate.....	25
Figure 8: Concentration of Programs per Regions in Jordan	25
Figure 9: Type of Funding Sources for CSOs	28
Figure 10: Official Governmental Partnerships (Yes/No)	28
Figure 11: Percentage Brackets of Government Support for CSOs Programs.....	29
Figure 12: CSOs Partnership Fields with Other CSOs.....	31
Figure 13: Type of Programs with Other CSOs.....	32
Figure 14: Percentage Brackets of Donor Support for CSOs' Programs	33
Figure 15: Types of Programs by Donor Funds	34
Figure 16: Type of Programs Related to Issues Raised by CSOs in Reform Process	41
Figure 17: Type of Programs with Coalitions.....	43
Figure 18: Types of Obstacles as Reported by CSOs.....	46
Figure 19: Means of Overcoming Challenges Faced by CSOs from their Perspective	47
Figure 20: Demands from the Government by CSOs.....	51
Figure 21: Future Role sought by CSOs to Increase Impact on Reform.....	57

List of Appendix

Appendix A: Literature Review Material.....	I
Appendix B: List of CSOs	II
Appendix C: Profile of the List of CSOs	III
Appendix D: List of CSOs which Refused to Participate.....	IV
Appendix E: List of Key Experts and Civil Society Leaders	V
Appendix F: Names of International Organizations Partnering with Surveyed CSOs in 2011-2012.....	VI
Appendix G: Calculation Method for Capacity of CSOs' Administrative and Staff Bodies Ex: Average of Administrative Part-time Staff	VII

List of Abbreviations

AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CC	The Constitutional Court
CG	Cyber Groups
CO	Coalitions
CRC	Constitutional Reform Committee
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
EG	Emerging Groups
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
IEC	Independent Election Commission
NDC	National Dialogue Committee
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
PPL	The Political Parties Law

Executive Summary

The year 2011 witnessed major political transformations within the Arab Region. Political revolutions in some and important reforms in other countries emerged from these transformations. Jordan was no exception, as it witnessed continuous public political movements that have led to constitutional amendments. These amendments involved more than 42 articles of the Jordanian Constitution. It also had an impact on changing a number of laws and introducing new ones to the political sphere. Many actors were involved in this movement such as political parties, youth movements and civil society organizations.

The Center for Strategic Studies, in cooperation with the Foundation for the Future conducted a study on civil society organizations. This study focused on the role of civil society organizations in the political reform process for the year 2011/2012, as these organizations had a significant role in the process of political reform.

Although the scope of their impact is still controversial and under discussion, there is no denial of their role in pushing forward the reform process, and expanding their work to include areas outside of Amman. In addition, these organizations had a role in enhancing political awareness and participation among citizens.

Objectives of the Study

In general this study aimed to shed light on the role of civil society organizations in the political reform process within Jordan. Moreover, it aimed to studying the scope of their contribution to that reform. Furthermore, it aimed to understand the constraints and challenges which limit the ability of civil society to contribute to the reform process in its next and upcoming stages. More specifically, the study aimed to achieve the following objectives:

1. The assessment of the current status of civil society organizations by means of understanding the environment in which they work within; the methods used to achieve their goals in the political reform process; as well as clarifying their organizations abilities in influencing the political reform process.
2. Exploring the role of civil society organizations in the 2011 political reform process through the assessment of their programs, initiatives, their relationship with other institutions, and the scope of their involvement in political dialogue along with the most important obstacles they face.

3. Shedding light on the nature of relations between civil society organizations and donors (local, international); and their relation with the government, to see how these relations can be furthermore built-up.
4. Providing practical recommendations.

Methodology

The study was conducted using both qualitative and quantitative method: the CSOs were surveyed, and select key experts were interviewed, along with the formation of focus group discussions, and finally interviewing of some Donors for their assessments as well. This research period took place from May/April to June/July 2012.

There were more than 27 representatives from Civil Society Organizations, Donors, and Experts, in addition to a number of Political and Youth Movements as well as Emerging Groups that participated in this study, upon being selected on specific criteria, which most important of them was their level of involvement in the field of Political Reform in Jordan.

For the Quantitative part of the research, a questionnaire was administered to all participating CSOs in the Study (a total of 19 CSOs), the Questionnaire was divided into 4 separate sections covering the following: CSOs' general background, profile, characteristics, and activities; assessing the role of CSOs in the reform process within Jordan; appraising the potential for their future contribution; assessing CSOs' relations with each other and with Donors.

The Qualitative aspects of the research was completed by means of conducting 4 focus group discussions with representatives of the 19 CSOs inclusive of political movements, emerging groups, experts in civil society and donors. These focus group discussions were distributed to include the Capital Amman, Ajloun and Al-Karak governorates. The questions addressed to the leaders in civil society focused on the role of CSOs in the process of reform, the activeness of CSOs in the past year, assessing EGs and movements that unfolded, the level of CSOs' involvement in Political Reform, participation of CSOs in National Dialogue Committee and other outreach mediums by the government. Additional questions were raised about the impact of programs and initiatives towards achieving any reforms, the relationship with Donors (local and international), the attitude of Donors towards CSOs working on political reform, the attitude of government towards CSOs and relationship of CSOs with the Government, the requirements from CSOs in order to achieve results towards political reform and be more impactful and effective, and the requirements from the Government in order to improve Civil Society and CSOs' initiatives.

Interviews with Donors consisted of questions of their involvement and program support, Donors' relationship with the government, Donors' level of involvement in funding projects related to political reform in Jordan, Donors' criteria in choosing CSOs to fund, Donors' matching of priorities, the sustainability of Donors' activities, the state of CSOs in Jordan and their capacity, and finally providing

recommendations for enhancing the role and contribution of CSOs in the next phase of reforms in Jordan.

Results

- Civil Society Organizations have had numerous contributions preceding the upsurge of political movements in Jordan, by means of various programs and initiatives which revolved around conducting conferences, workshops, and building coalitions towards serving the objectives of the organizations.
- CSOs in Jordan focused their work on the issues pertaining to daily affairs as was observed through their level and types of involvements, in which they have been fairly effective. Despite the challenges facing them, CSOs centered their themes on political reforms that included: constitutional amendments, strengthening the role of women and youth, rule of law, and anti-corruption efforts.
- The year 2011 witnessed the emergence of new and active actors such as the demand-driven movements, and cyber groups that have had a significant impact on public opinion, and have shown strong ability to communicate with a large segment of the society. These emerging groups are not officially registered, and sometimes do not have permanent location, nonetheless they have been active in advancing the process of political reform.
- Registered CSOs lack the public outreach as achieved by the new and active actors/groups, and this possibly could serve as an explanation for the limited role observed by CSOs in extending their impact on society.
- The structural and financial capacity of CSOs remains weak as they require strengthening of their administrative and staff bodies, internal restructuring, and better allocation of resources.
- The majority of CSOs, particularly in the center (Amman), rely almost entirely on funding from international donors, and some government funding, which could affect the nature of CSOs' work.
- CSOs focused their work on one area (the Capital), noting also a lack of coordination between CSOs in Amman and outside Amman.
- CSOs outside Amman were not able to get involved in the political affairs as much, hence opening space for the emerging groups to take the lead in the areas outside the capital and the peripheries.
- There are common challenges facing CSOs that hinder their ability to perform better, these challenges revolved around structural obstacles, as well as legislative and governmental obstacles.

- The study also indicated that CSOs regard their relationship with donors as one wherein they are able to maintain their independence; whilst the majority of the emerging groups refuse building relations with donors and receiving any kind of foreign or local funding, for reasons related to conditionality and the setting of what is perceived by them as foreign agendas.

Recommendations

The results of this research which used a multiple of methodologies revealed many interesting points, and highlighted many important issues and ideas that are worthy of consideration for the recommendations towards enhancing the role of civil society in the next phase of reforms in Jordan. It is important to note that the following recommendations to enhance the role and contribution of civil society in the political reform process are focused on the next phase of the reform process. For the purpose of clarity and focus, the recommendations will be presented in relation to Civil Society Organizations; Government; and Donors, as follows:

Civil Society Organization

1. Forge strong partnership with the government in order to make political reform a success. It should include: developing a shared vision and understanding of objectives and mechanisms for the next stage of reform.
2. Lead the effort in fostering political and civil culture by embodying democratic principles such as the rule of law, citizenship, rights and obligation, and the values of pluralism.
3. Create forums for debate and open discussion for the different stakeholders in the reform process.
4. Capitalize on the CSOs strength and relationship to solidify reports and policy option on specific issues.
5. Establish networks and alliances with other stakeholders such as CSOs, political parties, and international organizations to work for common solutions.
6. Develop networks and alliances with organizations working at the local and regional level in the country.
7. Work as a safeguard or a watchdog for accountability, transparency, and fighting corruption.
8. Create coalitions with other concerned groups to lobby the government and parliament on specific issues.
9. Develop partnership with the private sector that goes beyond financial contributions.

Government

1. Enhance the CSOs access to information and build capacity of government institutions to facilitate access to information for CSOs and remove bureaucratic obstacles.
2. Remove all legal and political obstacles that limit the freedom of speech and action.
3. Empower CSOs by establishing special fund to support CSOs in national priority areas.
4. Take measures to remove mistrust between government institutions and CSOs.

Donors

5. Strengthen CSOs' capacity by increasing funding for infrastructure and program developments.
 6. Diversify and extend support for CSOs at the local level in urban and rural areas outside Amman.
 7. Empower CSOs through capacity building, working with grassroots, building coalitions, and lobbying.
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Chapter One: Context, Objectives and Methodology

1.1 Project Context: The Jordanian Political Reform Path

The Tunisian Revolution formed the beginning of political transitions within the Arab world. It was followed by a series of revolutions in Egypt and Yemen as well as Uprisings in Libya, Yemen, and Syria; which witnessed a change in the regimes of Egypt and Libya, and to a certain extent within Yemen. Meanwhile Syria assumed a militarized form of uprising against the ruling regime, lasting close to 2 years duration.

The Arab Spring did not exclude Monarchies either; in Morocco for example, the King was expedient to enact legislation in support of Constitutional Reform, and conduct Elections which lead to the Al-Nahda Islamic Party's political win. Jordan was no exception, wherein the public dissent and demonstrations existed well before the Parliamentary Elections in 2010, however it picked up momentum following the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions.

Jordan witnessed a widespread dissent movements extending far to the governorates in very short time in 2011. In addition to the dissent movements from political parties and traditional forces, youth movements emerged from varying political factions and conquered their place within the sphere of calling for reforms; they became known as the 'Hirak' movement. Since then, Jordan has witnessed more than five-thousand protests and demonstrations with a multiple of political and economic demands.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that the political reform path in Jordan had its onset in the late-eighties and early-nineties following a period of dormant political life which lasted for about 30 years. Within this period of political revival, Parliamentary Elections resumed, wherein a number of political parties, factions, and unlicensed parties participated. During this revival, Nationalist, Leftist and Islamist parties captured their presence within the Jordanian Parliament. Ever since then Jordan has witnessed political liberalization that brought the country out of a political and economic crisis in the wake of the Gulf War. In 1993 legislation was enacted for a temporary electoral law binding the one-man one-vote system. Despite the conflicting nature of this law, an active political era lasted until 2001; following this year the elections were postponed until 2003. The 2003 elections kept the parliament in place until 2007 and from there on the elections that took place in 200 witnessed many hurdles that shook the trust in the Parliament which lead to its dissolution in 2010. In 2010 there were new Parliamentary Elections on the basis of the new Electoral Laws which was considered controversial, which lead to the boycott of elections by some political forces, leading to the beginning of protests and demonstrations preceding and following the 2010 elections.

It is important to bring to light that the Jordanian government attempted in the past decade to put forth a comprehensive reform strategy as part of the National Agenda. In 2005 His Majesty called upon the Prime Minister Faisal Al-Fayez to form a Royal Committee to devise the Royal vision and will for a comprehensive development plan under the National Agenda. This Committee brought together various factions onto a single platform to unite and serve developmental components such as political, economic, social, and even administrative ones, working in parallel to achieve these sustainable goals.

One of the most important characteristics of the National Agenda (NA) was that it was commissioned as a result of dialogues and exchanges between a large number of political, social, and economic faction. The NA happened to be one of the most important documents that defined the future for Jordan at that time, except that the Strategic Plan that was drawn for the next ten-years faced a variety of obstacles which prevented its implementation.

The political dissent and protests within Jordan had well preceded the Arab Spring and were distinctive for producing three new trends and associations in the non-traditional form within the political platform, these were: the part-time employees movement; the retired military officers; and the preparatory council for teachers union.

With the onset of the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, the level of protests escalated within Jordan; the streets in Jordan witnessed a number of movements that took on a demand-driven nature as result of the tough economic conditions. The kingdom also witnessed its first Arab Spring related demonstration which commenced from the Theeban Locality on 7-1-2011 protesting the economic policies of the Al-Rifai Government. Subsequently, the Kingdom witnessed a series of demonstrations and protests in various governorates of the Kingdom with demands ranging from economic and political reforms to fighting corruption, and rampant price rises.

Peculiar of this period was the emergence of a number of political trends and youth movements, which had benefited from social media networks, as well as having been influenced by the events in neighboring Arab countries in calling for comprehensive reforms and the betterment of living standards. These movements took on different forms such as Students' Rights, Women's Rights; and some which associated comprehensive reforms with fighting corruption and reforming the regime. These groups served alongside the traditional political parties and the non-traditional and communal groups, as well as a number of active CSOs, all of which attempted to a certain extent to bring forth change and transition in Jordan.

Following a series of protests which were executed since the beginning of 2011, the Royal response to the demands came forth with dissolving Al-Rifai's government, shaping and appointing a new government under the auspices of Dr. Maarouf Al-Bakhit in the beginning of February of 2011; with official legislation making for the first time political reform a clear priority, and calling upon the government to develop an electoral law in line with national consensus.¹

In response to the Royal orders and public political invitations to change the Political Parties' Laws and to reach a common-consensus law between the political powers and factions which would participate in

¹ http://www.pm.gov.jo/arabic/index.php?page_type=pages&part=1&page_id=362

the upcoming parliamentary elections, the government formed the National Dialogue Committee (NDC) under the presidency of the Senate's leader Taher Al-Masri. The NDC was commissioned to administer a national dialogue to reach understandings regarding the Elections Laws, Political Parties' Laws, and legislations related to ameliorating the political life in Jordan. In forming this committee, the government took into consideration consolidating between the traditional opposition factions, and the party forces (Public Unity, Communist, Constitutional Nationalism, and the National Trend Movement), and with new groups (Teacher's Movement; Social Leftists; the Retired Military Officers; and National Progressive Movement), as well as with varying activist groups (media; local community; civil society; professional and student unions). Meanwhile the Muslim Brotherhood refused to officially participate in the NDC.

The NDC presented the following 3 major outcomes: the Political Parties' Law; a new Elections Law as per the open-ratios list on a governorate scale, in addition to the national list; and a preamble statute which included introductory principles for political work; a list of suggested constitutional reforms that concentrated on giving immunity to the house of representatives protecting it from dissolution, and enforcing the government that wishes to dissolve it to resign within a week, and binding the duration of dissolving the parliament; outlining the governmental privileges in issuing temporary laws; increasing the duration of the parliamentary cycle up to 6 months; establishing a constitutional court; and granting the legislature privileges to look into parliamentary affairs.

During the works of the National Dialogue Committee, the king appointed Ahmad Al-Lozi as the president of the Royal Committee for Constitutional Reform, which its duties included facilitating a balance between authorities; elevating political parties' and parliamentary tools towards devising a constitution enabling the Parliament to perform its legislative and competitive duties with merit and independence, in addition to allocating the judiciary independent rule within the various authorities and commissions, and on all levels and forms of the Judiciary.

These reforms constituted the largest comprehensive revision to the constitution in the history of the Kingdom wherein it included reforms on almost 42 Articles, nearing 1/3 of the Constitution. These reforms have passed and been enacted through the Parliament; most prominent of these reforms were the following:

- Establishing a Constitutional Court with the duties of monitoring the constitutionality of laws and legislations. This court replaces the higher court overlooking such laws, which was headed by the leader of the Senate, and was generally considered not completely independent.
- Establishing an Independent Commission to monitor the elections in lieu of the Ministry of Interior, meanwhile the electoral objections are transferred to the Judiciary instead of the Parliament.
- Empowering civil liberties, and criminalizing the eradication of rights and public freedoms, sovereignty and sanctity of Jordanians' in their private life, and forbidding torture in its various forms.

- Limiting the governments' powers in issuing temporary laws in the absence of the Parliament (this is what the government used to do before as it wished)
- Limiting from the National Security Court's sphere of authority in cases of highest treason, spying, terrorism; and instead to transfer citizens to civil courts, inclusive of previous ministers who had been tried in Higher Parliamentary Courts.
- Limiting the Government's ability to dissolve the parliament without giving its resignation
- Binding the governments privileges in issuing temporary laws, with exception to cases of war, natural disasters, expedient and necessary expenditures that cannot sustain postponing.

The Constitutional Reform Process took its natural course in Jordan through constitutional channels whether by discussing it or agreeing upon it from the Parliament with approval from the Senate and the House of Representatives, or by certification by His Majesty. Most of the constitutional reforms gained a large degree of support, as can be identified in the Table (1) below.

Table 1: Popular Satisfaction and Support for Constitutional Reform (2011)²

Q1	In general, to what extent are you satisfied with the proposed constitutional amendments made by the Committee?			
	Percent %			
	Satisfied to a large degree + moderate degree	72		
	Satisfied to a little degree+ Not satisfied at all	15		
	Don't know + Refused to answer	13		
Q2	I Will remind you of some of these proposed constitutional amendments, please let us know if you strongly support, support, oppose or strongly oppose these amendments or not?			
	Constitutional Reforms	Strongly Support +Support %	Oppose +Strongly oppose %	Don't know/ Refused to answer %
1	The establishment of a constitutional court to rule on the constitutionality of laws issued by the Government	89	3	8
2	The formation of an independent body overseeing the parliamentary elections	92	3	5
3	Reduce the age of the candidate for membership of the House of Representatives from 30 to 25 years	56	40	4
4	Trial of ministers regarding of their work in their ministries in the regular courts instead of special courts	91	5	4
5	Deciding on appeals from the parliamentary election results in court instead of the House of Representatives	89	6	5
6	No one many hold senior positions (Ministers, Senates and MP's) unless they are Jordanian and not a national of another country.	87	10	3
7	Specify cases of issuing temporary laws as only in cases of public disaster, war and emergency and the need for urgent expenditures without delay.	83	8	9
8	Independence of the Judicial Council in matters relating to the regular courts	83	7	10
9	Restrict the powers of the State Security Court in, Terrorism cases, Spying and Treason only.	80	12	8

² **Constitutional Amendments Survey**, Center For Strategic Studies CSS- University of Jordan, September 2011, available from www.jcss.org

Despite the support for a quasi-constitutional reform, there were some opposing factions calling for more reforms even though they supported the changes that were implicated, nonetheless there isn't wide public support for the demands called by the oppositions in terms of executing additional constitutional reforms within this period.

Resultant of these constitutional reforms, a variety of laws pertaining to governing political life, such as the Independent Commission Law for Monitoring Elections, the Electoral Laws, Political Party Laws, and Constitutional Court Laws within the constitutional and governing sphere have been established.

CSOs had a large contribution preceding the emergence of political movements in Jordan, by means of a variety of programs and initiatives that revolved around establishing conferences and workshops and building coalitions towards serving the organizations' missions and objectives.

CSOs have contributed actively to the National Political Reform Process during 2011-2012, and despite that their extent of influence remains debatable, it is undeniable that CSOs have exerted efforts to bring forth changes and prepared the environment conducive to the organizations to work in expanding their operative sphere pertaining to them through enhancing awareness and political participation.

In addition to the existence of active CSOs in the past duration, that the year 2011 witnessed a rise in the number of new activists in the arena, such as demand movements, youth movements, and emerging trend movements, as well as Cyber Groups, wherein these movements were able to produce a political scene and attain public outreach which pushed the political reform process forward and the country's response with their demands. This indeed could have impacted the activity level of CSOs already in existence, and the nature of their work, as well as the debate surrounding their role in the political reform process.

1.2 General Objectives of the Study

This study explores the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in contributing to the achievement of sustainable political reform in Jordan. The study is divided into 3 main sections and targets 3 core objectives. The first section assesses the current situation of CSOs by developing an understanding of their characteristics and the operative climate of the civil society environment, along with exploring CSOs methods that were used in the reform process. It also focuses on narrowing the approaches that provided results, and analyzes their applications and implications. The second section evaluates the role of CSOs within the political reform process in the year 2011 – marked as a year of political activism and reform movements in Jordan. In this section, the CSOs are assessed in terms of the types of programs and activities initiated towards achieving ends within the reform process, their relationships with other CSOs towards achieving reform objectives, their level of involvement in dialogues with government bodies, the types of obstacles faced by CSOs, and their level of impact on the reform process (if any)³.

³ Reform is broadly identified as involving the transformation of democratic institutions (at the national and local level), the improvement of the legislative arsenal (including adherence to international conventions and Human Rights principles) and also the engagement of a more informed citizenry.

The third section of the study analyzes the working relation between CSOs and Donors, noting potentials for improvement, cooperation, and recommendations from Donors for CSOs to improve their operative capacity and overall impact.

The Three General Objectives of the study are as follows:

1. To assess the current situation for CSOs through understanding their working environment and the tools used to achieve its mission; in addition to clarify their institutional capacity in effecting the path towards political reform.
2. Assessing the CSOs' programs, initiatives, and their relations with other CSOs, in addition to their contribution to the political dialogue in 2011
3. Shedding light on the nature of the relationship between CSOs, and donors and the government
4. Providing practical recommendation for the future role of CSOs within the political reform process

The themes of the study center on CSOs' role pertaining to the following:

1. The Constitutional reform process.
2. The development of a Democratic System:
 - Electoral Processes (Election Laws, Independent Electoral Commission, and Political Parties Law)
 - Electoral Education and Awareness
 - Monitoring Municipal Elections and Municipalities Law, local councils and governance systems, as well as the Judiciary (Parliamentary elections are not expected to be held during the study period).
 - Citizenship education and mechanisms for enhanced citizens' participation (with focus on youth, women and marginalized areas in general)
3. Accountability, transparency, Rule of Law and anti-corruption measures which is of great concern for the general public currently
4. The aforementioned sectors will be evaluated taking into account the issues of Women's rights and gender equality.

1.3 The Concept of Civil Society

The concept of a civil society has received attention and importance like no other concept in the past 3 decades within the Arab region following the collapse of Communist Regimes, given the important role played by civil society in the transition to democracy within those countries. However despite the importance given to this concept within the Arab region, its definition remains debatable.

Nonetheless, there is a common consensus within the literature that the civil society includes all organizations existing in public space between the family and the state. Therefore, the civil society does not include hereditary or inherited organizations; accordingly it is independent from the family and at the same time it is not a governmental organization, and it requires to remain independent from the state. One of the most important characteristics of civil society is that it is based on free will, volunteerism, and independence and on the principle of accepting differences, diversity, and tolerance; towards resolving conflict peacefully. Additionally, this study adheres to the definition stating that the “Civil society encompasses all those organizations that exist in the space between the household and the state, which are voluntary in nature and which have significant autonomy from the state (Deniva, 2006; Manor, 2004; Bazaara and Kintu, 1999); Civil society goes beyond the big (and more formal, legally constituted and structured) non-governmental organizations to also include small (usually non-formal) community-based organizations, as long as they are “voluntary and autonomous from the state (Manor, 2004).”

It is important to note here that defining the concept of a civil society has stirred many difficulties around its formation, its importance, and practices in making a difference. Wherein some of the debatable definitions revolved around the concept of civil society in being “a group of voluntary independent organizations that fill the public sphere between the family and the government to achieve the interests of its members, and doing so in adherence to values and standards of respect, reconciliation, forgiveness, and positive administration of diversity and fear; the definition includes all of the organizations, unions, political parties, clubs, societal-ties, and collaborative, and everything that is non-governmental, non-familial, and non-hereditary”.⁴

In the beginning of the nineties, the debate revolved around the components and characteristics of the civil society, wherein the democratic liberalization process in Jordan was accompanied by academic efforts in looking and researching the concept of civil society within the frame of Jordanian societal development.

The nature and objectives of this research study required establishing a working definition of the civil society, and practical definitions of concepts related to the study. The general sphere of the study covers the public spectrum for civil movements; thereby the narrow definition of the concept of civil society excludes organizations such as professional unions given their function as interest groups to

⁴ Shteiwi, M., & Hourani, H. (1996). *Civil Society and the Public Sphere in Amman*. Amman.

achieve the objectives of their members. Nonetheless, this does not indicate that the professional unions did not play a role in the political reform process, but rather these unions did have an important role in different levels of the process due to the absence or banning of political parties from participating. Likewise, the definition used herein the study is not inclusive of political parties, given their objectives of participating in the government; particularly since this type of activity is one that civil society organizations do not perform or assume under their functional parameters. Undoubtedly, political parties form one of the main pillars of democracy; however they were not included in this study for the aforementioned reasons.

The most important characteristic of civil society is that it is associated with public life, and not private or familial (clan or tribal) life; thereby giving civil society an important role in public works, volunteerism, and non-partisanship. Another important characteristic of civil society is that the organizations working within its sphere do not compete with each other in reaching authorities, and rather work to limit the government's authority if the government tried to intervene in the affairs of the civil society.

1.4 Methodology

The study was conducted using both qualitative and quantitative methods: the CSOs were surveyed, and select key experts were interviewed, along with the formation of focus group discussions, and finally interviewing of some Donors for their assessments as well. The research process took two months from April to June 2012

Below is the methodology section for the quantitative and qualitative parts of the study.

1.4.1 Quantitative Methodology:

The Quantitative Methodology aided in the collection of information pertaining to the CSOs' background profile, institutional and financial capacity, vision and mission, activities, initiatives, and relationship with the government and donor agencies. The survey method was used to gather these types of information about CSOs.

Survey Sample

Initially there were 33 CSOs selected on the basis of the definition of CSOs used in this research study and as outlined above, thereby excluding political parties and unions. The sample included registered CSOs, Emerging Groups, and Movements. These 33 CSOs were selected on basis of specific criteria, most important of which were their involvement in the political reform process in 2011 – 2012 through programs, projects and various initiatives contributing towards reform in Jordan. Out of these 33 CSOs, 19 were willing to take part in

this research study, for a list of the participating organization, see Appendix B1 and B2. Accordingly, only 19 Questionnaires were filled out. For a list of organizations that refused to participate, see Appendix B3.

Survey Instrument

A questionnaire was administered to all participating CSOs in the Study with a total of 19 CSOs selected on the basis of the aforementioned criteria. The questionnaire was divided into four sections, with each section serving to address a specific category of responses.

Section 1: General Background of CSOs

Questions in this section were designed to provide a general picture on the status of CSOs in terms of their structural, functional and financial capacity. In terms of their structural capacity, questions addressed their mission and governance such as their founding, their vision; what their objectives are and if they play any significant role in society. Functionally, the questions explore how many (if any) branches of the organization exists, the number of programs the CSOs are working on, whether they have any partnerships with other CSOs or local and international organizations, as well as the areas of programs and target groups being addressed. Financially, the questions explored CSOs' resources, such as their budget size, sources, and percentage of funding, whether they were government aid, membership fees, loans, international sources, or local sources.

Section 2: Assessing the Role of CSOs in the Reform Process within Jordan

Questions were administered to explore the level of effectiveness of CSOs and their impact in the political reform process specific to constitutional reform; the Political Parties Law, Electoral Law, Independent Commission Law, Political and Electoral Awareness Campaigns, Municipalities Law, legislative tools, citizenship, empowering women and youth and the marginalized in political participation, transparency, anti-corruption, accountability and rule of law, and women's rights and gender equality. Other questions focused on finding out whether the activities of the CSOs have had any measurable outcomes per deliverables of reform. Additionally, the questionnaire explores the extent (if any at all) of CSOs' participation in the National Dialogue Committee, Economic Dialogue Committee, and Royal Committee for Constitutional Reform/ Amendments. Additionally, the questionnaire asked about the level of CSOs' involvement in the political reform process and whether they assumed a major role, appraising the CSOs' level of engagement with the government, and exploring the obstacles facing CSOs. Moreover, the questionnaire inquired about their sources (are there any internal or external obstacles or barriers that disrupted the CSOs' performance), identified any emerging CSO coalitions in the transitional period (did the CSOs form any coalitions to achieve the reform related results), and explored the methods applied and implemented by CSOs in the reform process (what were the methods used by CSOs in achieving their reform results).

Section 3: Appraising the Potential for their Future Contribution

In this section, the questions were designed to analyze the role CSOs picture for themselves and their visions for the future regarding planned programs and initiatives. The questions also asked whether they feel the need to change or adjust their priorities, their level of activism in the political arena (by means of their own initiatives as well as the parameters set allowing their participation – in terms of obstacles and how to overcome them). Finally, the CSOs were asked what they expected from the government, Donors, and other CSOs in order to increase the effectiveness and impact of their involvement in the political reform process.

Section 4: Assessing CSOs' Relations with Each Other and with Supporting Donors

This section analyzes the nature of the relationship between CSOs and Donors (both local and international), the type of funding received, the level of dependence on funding for the CSOs' activities and its sustainability, the type of programs funding is received for, advantages and disadvantages of working with International Donors, any obstacles facing mutual cooperation with Donors, the CSOs' perspective in terms of the standards Donors provide funding and operate within, the extent political reform agendas have motivated Donors to provide CSOs with funding (from CSOs perspectives), and any suggestions to improve the relationship with Donors.

1.4.2 Qualitative Methodology:

This study conducted the qualitative aspects of the research by means of focus group discussions which included representatives of the 19 CSOs that were interviewed. In addition, this study conducted interviews with experts and activists in civil society, youth movements, and Donors.

A) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

We conducted 4 FGDs in total: Two FGDs within Amman and the remaining two outside of Amman in Karak and Ajloun areas. Each of the FGDs included members from CSOs, Movements, and Experts. The discussions were directed around the following focal points:

- B. Evaluating the role of CSOs in the political reform process
- C. The relationship between CSOs and other partners (local and international)
- D. Appraising the future role of CSOs in the Political Reform Process

The results of the FGDs were transcribed and a matrix of responses was carried out categorizing themes and frequencies per issues raised in the discussions. This created a pattern enabling the analysis of the FGDs' results.

B) Personal Interviews

The Interviews were conducted with two experts in civil society, three leaders in civil society, and three Donor Organizations. The questions which were addressed to **the experts** revolved around their evaluation of the CSOs condition in Jordan, their level of impact and effectiveness in the political arena and towards achieving political reforms in 2011, evaluating the relationship of CSOs with Donors and government support in choosing their programs and areas of activity, assessing the extent and level of cooperation and partnership between CSOs, and finally the reasons behind the partnerships.

The questions addressed to the **leaders in civil society** focused on the role of CSOs in the process of reform, the activeness of CSOs in the past year, assessing EGs and movements that unfolded, the level of CSOs' involvement in Political Reform, participation of CSOs in National Dialogue Committee and other outreach mediums by the government. Additional questions were raised about the impact of programs and initiatives towards achieving any reforms, the relationship with Donors (local and international), the attitude of Donors towards CSOs working on political reform, the attitude of government towards CSOs and relationship of CSOs with the Government, the requirements from CSOs in order to achieve results towards political reform and be more impactful and effective, and the requirements from the Government in order to improve Civil Society and CSOs' initiatives.

Interviews with Donors consisted of questions of their involvement and program support, Donors' relationship with the government, Donors' level of involvement in funding projects related to political reform in Jordan, Donors' criteria in choosing CSOs to fund, Donors' matching of priorities, the sustainability of Donors' activities, the state of CSOs in Jordan and their capacity, and finally providing recommendations for enhancing the role and contribution of CSOs in the next phase of reforms in Jordan.

For a list of Experts and Leaders in Civil Society, see Appendix C. The Donor Agencies which participated in this study wished not to be identified; therefore they are not listed herein.

1.4.3 Obstacles in Researching CSOs in Jordan (Limitations)

This study faced a few obstacles and challenges when conducting research. The first problem was that the topic at hand was fairly new. Thus, there was limited literature on the topic of CSOs and their role in the political reform Process in Jordan.

The sample size of this study was limited given the number of CSOs active in the reform process in Jordan is small. Even though the total number of CSOs in Jordan is large, the CSOs active in the reform process in 2011-2012 were limited. The number of CSOs targeted to be included in the study was 33 CSOs, however only 19 out of the 33 consented to participate. From within the 19, there were three emerging groups; three cyber-groups; two coalitions; and the remaining were registered as CSOs.

The other challenge was that given the novelty of emerging groups and movements, it was difficult at times to reach all of them, since they did not have an established base. In addition, at times the CSOs had no method of contacting them, as their structures remained intangible such that large portions of the questionnaires would not have applied to them.

Moreover, those organizations that participated had a delayed response time when it came to filling out the questionnaires and returning them within the deadline. CSS has exerted all efforts towards collecting the questionnaires in time, yet it took 5 weeks in order to collect all of them.


Additionally, with regards to financial section of the questionnaire some of the CSOs refused to provide information whilst some of the organizations provide incomplete information on this section as well. And pertaining Emerging Groups, some of the questions were inapplicable given their unique attributes such as not having a physical office, with official employees, and not being registered officially.

Chapter Two: The Current Situation of CSOs Participating in the Study

2.1 General Vision and Objectives of CSOs

Results indicate that the political reform process in Jordan receives attention by most of the surveyed CSOs. The general vision and mission of these CSOs could most commonly be described in a few categories. These were comprehensive democratic reforms, enhancing freedoms and human rights, citizenship and political participation, justice and equality, transparency and integrity, comprehensive development, and women’s empowerment. Figure (1) demonstrates their distribution per weighted percentage of responses.⁵

Figure 1: CSO’s Vision and Mission




Furthermore, the objectives of the surveyed CSOs active in the political reform process revolved around the following themes: empowering women and youth politically, institutional reform, legislative reform, enhancing awareness and political participation, human rights, transparency and anti-corruption and

⁵ This was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this question was 19 CSOs.

capacity building.⁶ These objectives are portrayed in Figure (2) in terms of their weighted percentage of responses. Enhancing awareness and political participation was the most common Objective (28.8%), followed by empowering women and youth politically (20.3%). The least common objective was in the field of Human Rights (1.7%).

Figure 2: Objectives of CSOs in Political Reform




2.2 Major Target Groups and Program Focus Areas of CSOs

The CSOs in Jordan have been most active in 2011-2012. The CSOs that participated in this study were asked to report **the number of programs** they have worked on in this period (18 respondents). The highest reported number of programs was 20 by one organizations, and the lowest was three. The average number of programs in 2011-2012 was ten. Figure (3) below depicts the frequency of responses in accordance to number of programs for 2011-2012 periods.


⁶ This was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this question was 19 CSOs.

Figure 3: Number of Programs & Projects CSOs Worked on in 2011-12



A further step analyzed the types and areas of those programs listed above. The highest numbers included 14 programs in the area of politics and 13 programs in the area of social programs. Figure (4) displays those programs in accordance to their area of involvement.

Figure 4: Areas of Involvement of CSOs' Projects



2.3 Capacity of CSOs: Structural and Financial

In considering the structural capacity of CSOs, their **administrative and staff bodies** were surveyed, resulting in the following findings: With regards to *Administrative Staff*, on average there are three part-time and six full-time employees in the CSOs, and a total-employee average of six administrative staff. Research Staff comprised an average of 2.3 for part-time and full-time an average of 2.6, while the average for total number of part-time staff was 15. The highest number of experts reported was for part-time experts (12 experts) by one organization and the highest number of Service Staff was seven for total service staff as reported by one organization. The averages for experts and service staff are listed in Table (2) below.

Table 2: Capacity of CSOs' Administrative and Staff Bodies*

<u>Structural Capacity</u>								
<u>Category of Position</u>	<u>Administrative Total #</u>	<u>Average Administrative</u>	<u>Research Total #</u>	<u>Research Average</u>	<u>Experts Total #</u>	<u>Experts Average</u>	<u>Services Total #</u>	<u>Services Average</u>
<i>Part-Time</i>	17 (6 respondents)	3	9 (8 respondents)	2.3	27 (6 respondents)	6.8	6 (5 respondents)	1.5
<i>Full-Time</i>	24 (7 respondents)	6	8 (5 respondents)	2.6	3 (5 respondents)	1	17 (7 respondents)	8.5
<i>Total Reported Staff</i>	42 (11 respondents)	6	15 (7 respondents)	3.8	69 (6 respondents)	13.8	21 (7 respondents)	4.2


*The calculation method of the average was done by multiplying the total of responses for each category by their frequency of occurrence, and subsequently summing the total outcome and later dividing that figure with the number of variables available to obtain the average. (*Appendix E* serves as an example for the calculation of Administrative Average for Part-time Workers)

**The calculation method for 'total reported staff' was done by summing up the outcomes of (number of workers*frequency) for the total of workers without specifying part-time or full-time, as reported by organizations. Hence, the total number of reported staff will not necessarily add up to the sum of part-time and full-time staff.

***The number of respondents listed within the brackets represents the number of organizations that have provided information for that corresponding category, and given the total number of organizations, it is out of 19 (total).

The structural capacity of CSOs also encompasses their presence in the country in terms of the number of **branches**, and according to their presence in the **Governorates** of Jordan. When asked whether their organizations had branches within Jordan, 47.4 % answered 'Yes'. When asked about the listing of branches according to governorates, the listings included Irbid, Karak, Ma'an, Zarqa, Amman, Madaba, Aqaba, Ajloun, and three organizations listed 'All Governorates' as their response. Figure (5) below is illustrative of these findings.


Figure 5: Branches of CSOs According to Governorates



The types of projects and programs as covered by CSOs' 2011-2012 Financial Budget, were reported to focus on the following areas: Economic, Women and Youth Empowerment, Developmental, Political Reform, Enhancing Awareness and Political Participation, Freedoms (freedom of assembly, association, media, etc.), Transparency and Anti-corruption, Co-existence and Dialogue, and Capacity Building. The highest types of programs fell within the category of Women and Youth Empowerment (26.1%); and the least for Transparency and Anti-corruption (2.2%) as reported by one CSO.⁷ Figure (6) below displays further details.

⁷ This was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this question was 8/19 CSOs.


Figure 6: Types of Projects by CSOs as Covered within Financial Budget (2011-2012)



From these types of projects listed above, the geographic areas that were covered were examined on the basis of the disbursement of the numbers of projects in each governorate (from all of the respondents): the highest numbers of projects implemented were in Irbid, followed by Madaba, and the least was in Al-Aqaba.⁸ Figure (7) lists the numbers of projects implemented in each governorate.


⁸ This was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this question was 9/19 CSOs.

Figure 7: Number of Programs in Each Governorate



Amalgamating the number of responses for programs on a regional scale, the results showcased highest number of responses as concentrated in the North (38.7 %), followed by the Middle (37.1 %), and lastly the South (24.2 %).⁹ Figure (8) demonstrates this distribution.

Figure 8: Concentration of Programs per Regions in Jordan



⁹ This was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this question was 9/19 CSOs.

When taking into consideration the **financial capacity** of CSOs, concerning the Budget of CSOs can be noted from the figure below that majority of the organizations reported having a budget of 50,000 JDs and less for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. Table (3) below outlines the frequencies of the financial details as provided by the CSOs.

Table 3: Financial Details of CSOs

CSOs' Budget for the Past 3 Years	2010	2011	2012
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
1000 JDs and Less	1	1	n.a.
Between 1001 and 5000 JDs	1	1	n.a.
Between 5001 and 50'000 JDs	3	4	2
Between 50'001 and 100'000 JDs	2	2	2
Between 100'001 and 500'000 JDs	2	2	2
Total Number of Respondents (out of 19)	9	10	6

*The financial figures listed above were submitted by the participating organizations themselves and cannot be verified. It is noteworthy also that some of the organizations did not wish to provide their financial information; accordingly, corresponding to each year the total number of respondents is provided to showcase the total number of organizations that have provided their financial information for that specific year.

**Organizations that are listed as less than 1000 JDs correspond to an emerging group as well as a newly established CSO in Ajloun.

When asked what percentage of their budget was comprised of **government assistance** in their 2011 Budget, only 4 CSOs chose to respond. Two respondents reported (0) amount and the remaining two respondents stated 14% and 56% of their budget was comprised of government assistance. Both organizations are registered CSOs, with the latter located outside of Amman, and receiving the remainder of its budget resources from Internal resources (3%); External resources (12%); and Self-financing (8%).

In comparing the Internal (donations and gifts) with External financial resources for CSOs, it is notable that majority of participating organizations in this study rely heavily on external resources. It is important to note that obtaining data for financial resources' breakdown was difficult due to the sensitivity of the issue to participants, as many did not want to provide information. Accordingly, it has not been possible to conduct a cross-tab analysis. The number of respondents who provided answers to the Internal Resources Category were 7/19; External Resources Category 11/19; Governmental Resources Category were 4/19; and Self-financing Category 9/19 respondents.

As can be noted CSOs were more inclined to provide responses for External Resources, in comparison to other financial resources categories. There were however only 4 cases in which an organization provided responses for all 4 categories. Those 4 cases were all registered CSOs with only one of them located outside of Amman, which indicated that it relies mostly on government assistance comprising (56%) of their budget in 2011; whilst the remaining 3 CSOs indicated not receiving governmental

assistance. Amongst these 4 cases, the highest reported for in terms of reliance on External resources in their 2011 Budget was a CSO that is involved in Human Rights and Environmental issues at (97%); followed by (85%), (80%) and (12%) for the remaining 3 CSOs. For the same 4 cases, the highest reported for Internal resources in their 2011 Budget was for a CSO that works on democratic issues at (10%); followed by (3%) for the CSO involved in HR and Environmental issues, whilst the remaining two CSOs reported (0%) as Internal resources comprising their 2011 Budget. Finally, amongst the 4 cases, the highest reported for in terms of self-financing as percentage of 2011 Budget was at (15%) by a CSO focused on the status of civil society in Jordan, and located within Amman; followed by (8%) for the CSO located outside of Amman; and (3%) as reported by the CSO working on HR and Environmental issues, located outside of Amman; the remaining CSO listed self-financing as (0%) of its resources for 2011 budget.


In general, when assessing the responses from participants, the types of organizations that tend to rely on Internal Resources were found to be Emerging Groups and newly registered CSOs that tend to finance themselves; whilst CSOs that rely on External Resources were registered and relatively more established organizations. Upon exclusion of Emerging Groups, coalitions, and CSOs outside of Amman, we find that most of the CSOs rely on foreign and external financing.

Nine CSOs out of total of 19 chose to provide responses pertaining to the percentage of self-financing as within their 2011 Budget. Their average comprised 19% from their 2011 Budget as **self-financed**, with one organization reporting 100% of its Budget as such, which was an Emerging Group.

When all participants (all 19 of them) were asked about the percentage of **loans** comprising their 2011 Budget only one respondent (a CSO) provided information, noting that 8 % of their 2011 Budget consisted of financial loans. Similarly, only one respondent (an EG) listed **other sources of income** as 20% of their 2011 Budget.

Regarding the **type/source of financial support** CSOs are receiving, the highest reported sources were for international funds (42%) [6/14 respondents] and membership fees (42%) [6/14 respondents]. Figure (9) below provides further details.


Figure 9: Type of Funding Sources for CSOs



2.4 Relationship of CSOs with Government

The majority of CSOs surveyed (14/19) reported that they do not have any partnerships with an official governmental body, and the remaining 5 noted that they do have a partnership with the government.


Figure 10: Official Governmental Partnerships (Yes/No)



The 5 CSOs which reported as having partnerships with the government noted their partner institutions as the following: The Ministry of Social Development, The Ministry of Political Development, The Ministry of Municipalities, The Associations Registry, The Ministry of Environment, and The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.

In terms of government support for CSOs programs, (50%) of CSOs [5/10 respondents] declared (1-25%) of government funding for their programs. Figure (11) below explains the results.

Figure 11: Percentage Brackets of Government Support for CSOs Programs



The extent of CSOs **dependence on governmental financial support** was reported as ‘not dependent at all’ by (50%) of CSOs [5/10 respondents]. (20%) of CSOs [2/10 respondents] reported ‘to a small degree’, and another (20%) of CSOs [2/10 respondents] reported ‘moderately dependent’; and the remaining (10%) as represented by one CSO/10 respondents reported ‘dependence to a large degree’.

The nature of the relationship between CSOs and the Government was reported as ‘financial’ by (75%) of CSOs [3/4 respondents]; and as technical by (25%) [1/4 respondents].

A common view held by CSOs within the past decade regarding the government’s practices towards the existence of CSOs is that the government is taking many of the civil society organizations under its wing. It was reported in the Focus Group Discussions, that this practice by the government has weakened the likelihood of CSOs to exist in a medium wherein they can have a real impact and pressure decision-makers, given that some CSOs exist under special governance.

The CSOs have voiced their agreement on the fact that there is an absence of coordination between their organizations and the government. In-depth interviews with CSOs Leaders in Jordan have pointed out their unanimous agreement that the government’s response to their demands was weak, according to **Amena Al-Zoubi**¹⁰ "the amendments [which the government took in response to CSOs’ demands from them] were minor and superficial, and without ambition...slight changes don’t affect the substance of the issues that we want."

¹⁰ Interview, **Amena Al-Zoubi** "the President of the Jordanian Women’s Union", (23 May, 2012).

Nizam Assaf¹¹ agrees with Al-Zoubi, stating “the lack of appreciation, cooperation and partnership with institutions was clear, particularly in the government’s minimal response to our initiatives. They have a very suspicious view of our intention; they view us as corrupted bodies or agents of the West. Unfortunately, we neither have a healthy environment to incubate the successful models achieved by CSOs, nor do we have a real democratic competitiveness, within the current status quo.”

Khaled Kalaldeh¹² concurred that “the government didn’t take into consideration the recommendations of the dialogue committee [the National Dialogue Committee] regarding the constitutional amendments that we proposed, we had entirely different view of the one-man, one-vote system, we were able to influence the output of the dialogue committee, but unfortunately the response showed that the government was not serious about reforms.”

With regard to the relationship of civil society organizations to the government in Jordan, both Civil Society Experts (**Hussein Abu-Rumman**¹³ and **Sa’ad Karajah**¹⁴) agreed that the government continues to look with suspicion on civil society institutions, and it did not come to terms with the role of a genuine civil society existing in Jordan. Moreover, Karajah acknowledges the existence of security-approval pertaining to funding issues and even though the existence of such laws can be justified to a certain extent, he stresses the need for the government to make legislation that facilitates the operations of the CSOs because they are serving society; he labels these as “constructive organizations” as opposed to his term “destructive organizations.” He believes this routine of security operations and stringent funding approval system is destructive as it marginalizes the performing capacity of those “constructive organizations.”

On the other hand, **Hussein Abu-Rumman** believes that 2011 witnessed a positive development in the relationship between CSOs and governments, as he put it the “government was put under pressure by domestic and international forces to amend the law on public meetings, which made it easy for people to claim their rights,” but he added, “the government has not proven itself yet that it could establish or form a clear framework to support the civil society organizations; real support and not just merely a formal/symbolic support.”

2.5 Relationship of CSOs with Each Other

In evaluating the relationship of CSOs amongst themselves, of the total 19 CSOs surveyed, 18 mentioned that they do have partnerships with other CSOs. Moreover, the nature of the CSOs’ partnering organizations was surveyed and resulted in the following categories Legal, Political Institution, Research Centers, Development Institutions, Political Movements, and Unions. The highest share of partnerships (24.3%) corresponds with Developmental Institutions (such as Noor Al-Hussein Foundation; Association

¹¹ Interview, **Nizam Assaf** “the Director for Amman Center for Human Rights Studies”, (9 May, 2012).


¹² Interview, **Khaled Kalaldeh** “the Secretary General of the Leftist Social Movement”, (1 June, 2012).

¹³ Interview, **Hussein Abu Rumman** “Civil Society Expert in Jordan”, (3 June, 2012).

¹⁴ Interview, **Sa’ad Karajah** “Lawyer and Expert in Civil Society in Jordan”, (13 May, 2012).

of Orphans; National Committee for Veterans; the Academy of Change for Democracy and Developmental Studies; and East and West Center for Human Resources).¹⁵ Figure (12) below demonstrates the partnership fields.

Figure 12: CSOs Partnership Fields with Other CSOs




From within these partnerships, the types of the programs CSOs implemented with their partners as aforementioned, focused on the following program categories: Economic; Women and Youth; Legislative Reforms; Social and Developmental; and Capacity Building. The highest reported type of programs was directed at Youth and Women (34.8%). The second highest was Social and Developmental programs (30.4%), followed by Capacity Building (17.4%); and the least reported was for Economic type of programs (4.3%) (see Figure (13) below).¹⁶

¹⁵ The Question pertaining to the nature of the CSOs' partnering organizations was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of respondents. Total number of respondents for this Question was 17/19 CSOs.

¹⁶ This was a multi-part Question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this Question was 11/19 CSOs.

Figure 13: Type of Programs with Other CSOs



Nonetheless, although initiatives for cooperation amongst CSOs exist, **Civil Society Activists** argue that there is a lack of coordination and weak networking amongst CSOs themselves, and this in turn has weakened any attempts to mobilize for social demands and puts pressure on the government to be more responsive to public needs. One activist stated, “We couldn’t keep up with the changes in civic movements, we couldn’t lead them, we couldn’t even organize them, we lack the mechanism that is used to gather people and represent them, and we keep running into the questions of how to lead a CSO? And how does it function?”

Kalaldeh noted that generally speaking the CSOs’ role in Jordan has been positive and they have garnered awareness and helped to reform issues facing previously marginalized segments of the society. However, there is a multiplicity of CSOs, which has served a cause for the dissipation of their power and has weakened their ability to pressure for one issue; given that they remain fragmented such that the power that may result from these CSOs does not have the same momentum as it would have if they were united.


2.6 Relationship between CSOs and Donors

In assessing the relationship between CSOs and Donors and International Organizations, CSOs were surveyed on whether they had any partnerships with International Organizations in the past two years, (63.2%) of CSOs [12/19 respondents] reported having a partnership.

The **partnering organizations** that were reported by all surveyed CSOs resulted in a list included in Appendix D.

Regarding the **support by Donors and International Organizations** for CSOs' programs, (57.1 %) of CSOs [4/7 respondents] reported the percentage they receive as between (75-100 %). The figure below displays the results.

Figure 14: Percentage Brackets of Donor Support for CSOs' Programs



The extent of CSOs **dependence on International Funds**, was reported as 'by a large degree' by (50%) of CSOs [6/12 respondents]; 'by a moderate degree' by (33.3 %) of CSOs [4/12 respondents]; and (16.7%) [2/12 respondents] reported zero dependence on International Funds.


The **nature of the relationship with Donors and International Organizations** was reported as both financial and technical by (55.6%) of CSOs [5/9 respondents]; the remaining (44.4%) of CSOs [4/9 respondents] reported their relationship as being solely financial.

When asked about the **reasons that CSOs were pushed to partner with International Organizations** and build relationships with donors, (88.9%) of CSOs [8/9 respondents] noted the lack of local resources, and weakness of self-financing initiatives that support their local programs and projects; and (11.1%) [1/9 respondent] reported sharing a common vision as reason for creating the partnership.

Of the **types of programs that were supported by Donors and International Organizations**, the highest number of responses (17.4%) was for enhancing awareness and political participation; followed by Human Rights (13%), and Capacity Building (13%). Figure (15) below provides further explanation of the types of programs.¹⁷

¹⁷ This was a multi-part Question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this Question was 11/19 CSOs.

Figure 15: Types of Programs by Donor Funds



Whether any *disadvantages existed for partnering with Donors* and International Organizations, (40%) of total respondents noted that there were no disadvantages; (30%) of respondents reported the difference in priorities between Donors and the CSOs; (20%) of respondents noted the Donors’ excessive interference in the projects and their implementation; and the remaining (10%) of respondents considered conditions imposed by donors to be a disadvantage.¹⁸

Civil Society activists regard their relationship with foreign donors as one wherein they are able to maintain their independence by setting the priorities of their projects and keeping their practices independent from foreign agendas. There were, however, other views nascent of CSOs critiquing each other’s practices. They stated that CSOs observed that some organizations which partner with foreign donors and receive foreign funds are accepting of and try to bend to the foreign agendas of donors that do not necessarily serve national interests, or the Jordanian Reform Process’ priorities. In particular, CSO activists in Karak were most notably speculative of foreign funding, and believed that the entire funding should be local and national and funded by the private sector; large corporations; government institutions; and local civil society organizations (self-financing, membership fees, and coalition support).

This was a reoccurring theme amongst activists in youth movements and emerging groups; they believed that by refusing any funding whether foreign or local, donors (local or international) would not be able to impose their objectives on their agendas. One of the activists pointed out that their group is self-funded by its members (membership fees), whereby further donations are received from those who support the organization (from the outside) for the needed logistics. These kinds of funding enable and assure the effectiveness and certainty of their activities.

However, some CSOs remained convinced; pointing out that their relationship with foreign donors was carried out in accordance with the national platform and national priorities. They also noted that some

¹⁸ This was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this question was 9/19 respondents.

organizations have benefited from such relationships by strengthening their presence at the international arena, which influences decision-makers in Jordan.

Kalaldeh notes that foreign and local funding are usually directed to specific programs and sets limits on the organizations that cannot be crossed. For example, once the CSOs receive funding from foreign donors, they will naturally be more complacent with the donor organization’s demands, in hopes of securing future funding as well as sustaining current projects’ financing.

According to **Al-Zoubi**, funding is very important whether it is foreign or local, and serves as the backbone for the work of any organization. She adds that foreign funding recently witnessed a real decline due to the economic crisis and donors’ interests in specific geographic areas. She stresses that their organization does not accept conditional funding, and refuses any funds or collaboration with USAID for example, noting “this is a red line we don’t deal with it... also we refuse funds from Western Embassies, and our cooperation is limited to ‘friendly’ organizations from Italy and Spain”.

CSOs were presented with 7 different dimensions and asked to evaluate which of them, in their opinion, were the ones most taken into consideration by donors when evaluating which of the CSOs’ programs to fund (from the perspective of CSOs). As can be noted in the table below, the majority of CSOs agree that donors rely mostly on the mission of CSOs in choosing which programs to fund. Table (4) below provides an illustration of the acquired responses per listed dimension, in concurrence with listed definitions herein:

Table 4: Funding Standards by Donors (as perceived by CSOs)

<i>Funding Standards by Donors (as perceived by CSOs)</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total Respondents</i>
<u>Mission of the CSO</u>	87.5	12.5	8
<u>Geographical Location</u>	71.4	28.6	7
<u>Political Dimension</u>	62.5	37.5	8
<u>Social Dimension</u>	80	20	5
<u>Religious Dimension</u>	57.1	42.9	7
<u>Economic Dimension</u>	33.3	66.7	6

Definitions of the Dimensions:

-*Mission of the CSOs*: the overall objectives listed for the CSOs, their aims and goals; whether CSOs feel that Donors consider this as a determining factor in funding CSOs’ programs.

-*Geographical Location*: whether CSOs feel that Donors consider the location of CSOs and their programs’ geographical catering as a point to consider in their funding decisions for programs.

-*Political Dimension*: whether CSOs feel that donors consider their level of involvement politically and the areas of political involvement as a point to consider when deciding which programs to fund.

-*Social Dimension*: whether CSOs feel that donors consider their involvement in social issues, and their place in society as an important measure in deciding which programs to fund.

- *Religious Dimension*: whether CSOs feel that donors take into consideration the involvement of CSOs in the religious dimension, projects, and cultural dialogue initiatives in providing their funding.

- *Economic Dimension*: whether CSOs feel that donors consider the level of their involvement in economic projects, and economic issues as a measure in making funding related decisions.

The majority of experts concur that funding is an important factor that helps organizations to carry out their activities. However, **Abu-Rumman** refuses to agree with sentiments alluding to the conventional suspicious assumptions that donors use CSOs to learn more about Jordan and get information from them. “This is ridiculous! Donors and Western Embassies do not need to use such means to know what is going on in Jordan,” adding that he believes that donors want our communities to be more democratic.

In examining *whether Donors affect or stir the CSOs to focus on new issues within Jordan*, (22%) of CSOs [4/18 respondents] said ‘Yes,’ whilst the majority (77.8%) [14/18 respondents] reported ‘No,’

Furthermore, when exploring *the types of new issues Donors can stir CSOs to work on in Jordan*, CSOs reported the most common issues that surfaced were Capacity Building (42.9%) of responses; Integrity and Anti- Corruption (14.3%) of responses; Women’s and Youth issues (14.3%) of responses; Legislative Reforms (14.3%) of responses; and Economic Reforms (14.3%) of responses. The number of respondents for this question was 4 respondents.¹⁹

When considering the direction of political reforms in Jordan, CSOs were asked whether they believed this *reform environment has motivated Donors and International Organizations to provide funding for CSOs*; the majority of CSOs (63.2%) responded ‘No’ [12/19 respondents]. Furthermore, according to the perception of CSOs, (66.7%) [6/9 respondents] reported that they did not believe there was a medium of *coordination/cooperation between the government and Donors*, whilst the remaining (33.3%) [3/9 respondents] reported they believed there was coordination/cooperation between the two.

According to **Assaf**, in some instances, donors do not choose the most efficient organizations of civil society. When making their funding decisions, donors consider the closeness to or distance from political power. He further notes, “I believe the relationship between donors and CSOs is not based on choosing the most efficient organizations; donors tend to support institutions that are close to the political authority”.

On the other hand, **Karajah** believes that donors have their own orientalist perception of participating in political reforms. It is somewhat undeniable that donors do have a vision of their own to uphold and serve, thereby creating a state of chaos and distraction amongst CSOs and setting of the wrong priorities. Hence, according to Karajah, CSOs need to agree on visions and priorities at the national platform, and not the ones imposed by the foreign donors.

Regarding standards for selecting CSOs, one of the donor agencies noted that they always prefer working with CSOs because they have good working relations with them. It cited that at times CSOs approach the agency, provide their proposals and ask for the financial support without wanting the agency to get involved in the operations and implementation of the project. There needs to be a strict mechanism for monitoring and evaluating in order to ensure that the delivery of the project is operationally and sustainably successful.

¹⁹ This was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this question was 4/19 respondents.

In its selection of CSOs to fund, one donor agency expressed that although experience is necessary and it is preferable to have a proven record of activities in the selection process, rather than funding a CSO with no record of donor relations and previous projects. In the event that there is proven potential and all that is required is guidance for the newly emerging groups or movements, the agency provides the training and the guidance necessary for the leaders to run their organizations in an efficient and effective manner and to work with donors towards achieving their objectives. Another donor agency also concurred with this standard and agreed that they do provide technical and capacity building assistance in situations that require the applicant agency to prove an increased level of proficiency.

Regarding donor-reliance in terms of the CSOs in Jordan, according to one donor agency, 95% of CSOs in Jordan rely on financial support from donors in order to operate and function, mainly because they lack the capacity to initiate their own projects and to fund them.

Chapter Three: The Role of CSOs in the Reform Process

This section will present results related to the role of CSOs in the Political Reform Process in Jordan within the period of reforms the country witnessed last year.

3.1 The Contribution of CSOs in the Reform Agenda and Process

The years 2011 and 2012 are considered significant years for political reform and democratic transition in Jordan. The vast majority of the CSOs (94%) included in the study reported considering themselves as having contributed to the reform process in 2011 [16/17 respondents].

In the focus group discussions that were conducted in Amman, Karak, and Ajloun, **CSOs activists** all agreed that the role of CSOs in the political reform process during the year 2011 was weak and limited to a certain extent. Activists in Ajloun were the exception; they were appreciative of CSOs level of involvement in the reform process and believed that the deficit in any changes brought forth by reform was due to the weakness of political parties in the political scene during the past year.

Some activists stressed the importance of the active role that CSOs played in the reform process within past year. They offered alternatives and proposals for bills, in addition to their role in enhancing political awareness and citizenship. As one activists put it, “One should not deny the important role some CSOs have played in the reform process and such role must be taken into consideration in assessing the contribution of CSOs, at a time when political parties did not provide alternatives, civil society was the only one who did.” Nonetheless it was apparent that these findings apply more on the preceding period of time.

Activists in the three provinces agreed that the civic movements (youth movements, emerging groups) played the most prominent role in the democratic transformation process in the Kingdom. They had the greatest impact in influencing the changes and decisions that determined some of the people’s aspirations and visions for Jordan’s future. Meanwhile they pointed out that traditional civil society institutions did not press forward with reform initiatives and mostly followed donors’ desires and agendas.

In considering their own capability in achieving their **planned objectives**, (77.8%) of CSOs [7/9 respondents] believed that they did achieve their planned objectives by a large degree, whilst the remaining (22.2%) of CSOs [2/9 respondents] viewed their planned objectives as achieved by a moderate degree.

In terms of the degree of achieving CSO’s **objectives as resultant from political conditions**, (83.3%) of CSOs [5/6 respondents] believed they did so to a large degree. When considering **objectives as both planned and resultant of political conditions**, (57.1%) believed they did so moderately [4/7

respondents], (28.6%) believed they did to a large degree [2/7 respondents], and (14.3%) believed they did by a small degree [1/7 respondents].

When CSOs considered the degree of their Activities' **impact on decision makers**, (50%) of CSOs [7/14 respondents] believed they did have a moderate impact; and the remaining (50%) reported having a small impact.

The degree of CSO's Activities' **Impact on their Target Groups** was considered to have a moderate impact by (60%) of CSOs [9/15 respondents]; a large degree of impact by (33.3%) of CSOs [5/15 respondents]; and a small degree of impact by (6.7%) of CSOs [1/15 respondents].

Taking into consideration the CSO's Activities' **Impact on Public Opinion**, the majority (62.5%) of CSOs [10/16 respondents] viewed themselves as having an impact to a moderate extent; followed by (25%) of CSOs [4/16 respondents] believed they had a large degree of impact on public opinion; and (12.5%) of CSOs [2/16 respondents] reported having a small degree of impact.

When CSOs were asked to evaluate themselves on the **extent of their Political Engagement** in the reform process on a scale from 1-10 with 1 being weakest, the weighted mean reported was 6.68/10; which is (1.18%) above the average of 5.5/10 rating. This means that the CSOs which were surveyed consider themselves to be moderately active in Political Engagement.

According to some civil society leaders, CSOs' performance in the last couple of years has been positive. **Al-Zoubi** further stated that, "CSOs' role was always distinct, and it did not only begin in 2011. The role of CSOs in calling for comprehensive political, social and economic reforms had begun prior to 2011 through seminars to build public opinion towards reforms; the CSOs role is distinct, and not just in Jordan but also in the Arab World at large, wherein its contributions have built awareness on issues such as social justice, democracy and citizenship."

Assaf has a different point of view in assessing the effectiveness of CSOs in the reform agenda and process; he believes that the role of CSOs was not as effective and the overall performance is still weak. He argues that the key players in the reform process were the political parties and trade unions, not the civil society. He believes that CSOs should play a neutral and impartial role in carrying out of their initiatives rather than opposing or supporting the government. But according to **Al-Zoubi**, CSOs have played a more important and influential role than the political parties. **Karajah** argues that political parties played the most prominent role in the reform process; followed by CSOs; then youth movements as last. He elaborates that the reason youth movements have had the least impact is their restricted capacity. They limited their performance by introducing slogans and concepts rather than presenting any alternatives and providing proposals of measurable outcomes.

Experts agree that the role played by CSOs in the democratic transformation process in 2011-2012 could have been stronger if the CSOs focused more on developing their own vision and determining a clearer method and a better participation strategy in the reform process. Hence, the majority agrees that role of CSOs' remains minor in the reform process.

The majority of the CSOs included in the study (63.2%) consider that political changes unfolding towards the reform process in Jordan have helped them to gain **increased freedoms and wider parameters in their presence**. When asked specifically about **the means by which they were able to gain increased role and presence**, (45%) of responses noted an increase in overall freedoms (freedom of assembly, association, expression, public and media freedoms); (30%) of responses an enhancement in cooperation and dialogue with CSOs; (20%) of responses governmental and legislative liberalization; whilst the remaining (5%) were for Donor support for projects as a reason for their increased role.²⁰

Abu-Rumman believes that 2011 witnessed a significant shift that had never been seen before in the Kingdom (such as the constitutional amendments.) This altered our focus from the role of traditional institutions to demand-driven movements and their impact.

However, **Karajah** notes that despite the significant shift in the Kingdom's reform agenda, the mobilization of civil society in both institutional organizations and demand-driven movements was less than necessary in terms of quantity and quality of their presence. It did not reach a point whereby it set a clear vision for the goals that the CSOs want or seek.

3.1.1 Issues CSOs worked on for the Reform Agenda in Jordan

In their efforts towards achieving Political Reforms in Jordan, CSOs have been involved in raising a variety of issues to be addressed and calling for change within their spectrum. Below is a list of issues the CSOs who have participated in this study took an active part in bringing onto the reform platform and pushing them for the reform agenda in Jordan during the 2011-2012 year.

-Constitutional Reform: (78.6%) of CSOs [11/14 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.

-Elections Law: (71.4%) of CSOs [10/14 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.

-Political Parties Law: (69.2%) of CSOs [9/13 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.

-Independent Commission Law: (53.8%) of CSOs [7/13 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.

-Awareness Campaigns related to the Election Process: (69.2%) of CSOs [9/14 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.

-Municipal Laws: (61.5%) of CSOs [8/13 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.

²⁰ This was a multi-part Question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this Question was 11/19 CSOs.

-Legislative Process: (58.3%) of CSOs [7/12 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.

-Citizenship: (75%) of CSOs [9/12 of respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.

-Enhancing Political Participation (for Women and Youth and the Marginalized): (100%) of CSOs [14/14 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.


-Transparency, Accountability, Rule of Law, and Anti-Corruption: (86.7%) of CSOs [13/15 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012.

-Women and Gender Equality: (91.7%) of CSOs [11/12 respondents] reported having worked on this issue in 2011-2012

3.1.2 Initiatives and Programs by CSOs in the Reform Process in 2011

CSOs were surveyed for the types of programs they had created regarding the issues mentioned above. The results showed highest response was for Legislative Reform types of programs (32.3%); followed by Capacity Building types of programs (29.2%), the smallest portions were for Institutional Reform and Human Rights at (1.5%) alike.²¹ Figure (16) below illustrates this reporting.

Figure 16: Type of Programs Related to Issues Raised by CSOs in Reform Process



Regarding the overall activities of CSOs in the reform process, when asked whether their activities were planned for, (47.7%) of CSOs [9/19 respondents] said that they were planned for. Moreover, when asked whether their activities resulted from current political situations, the majority (68.4%) of CSOs [13/19 respondents] said 'No.' The majority of CSOs (63.2%) also responded 'No' to whether their

²¹ This was a multi-part Question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this Question was 16/19 CSOs.

activities were both simultaneously planned ahead for as well as resultant from current political situations [12/19 respondents].

National Dialogue Committee: the majority of CSOs (78.9%) reported not participating in the National Dialogue Committee [15/19 respondents]. The CSOs that participated in this committee (21.1%) [4/19 respondents], contributed by presenting a list of recommendations that were reviewed and received by the committee. Two of the participating CSOs believe that the committee was responsive to their submissions.

Economic Dialogue Committee: almost all of the CSOs (94.7%) reported not participating in the Economic Dialogue Committee [18/19 respondents]. The CSO that participated in this committee listed its initiative as submitting a memorandum of recommendations, and reported believing the committee was responsive of its submission by a large degree.

The Royal Committee for Constitutional Reform: the vast majority (89.5%) reported not having participated in this committee [17/19 respondents]. The two CSOs that reported participating in this committee listed that their initiatives were submitting a memorandum of recommendations. One of these CSOs believed the committee was moderately responsive to their submissions, while the other believed the committee was responsive to a small degree.

3.1.3 Coalition Building and Emerging Groups towards Reform Ends

The leaders of emerging groups view coalitions as a positive step in impacting and improving coordination between CSOs, amongst other emerging groups, and demand-driven movements.


Experts Abu-Rumman and Karajah agreed that building a coalition is constructive and has been proven to have positive results worldwide. Abu-Rumman and Karajah have differing view-points on the weaknesses of coalitions in Jordan. Abu-Rumman believes that it's constructive to have some alliances or coalitions between CSOs, but they should be based on good faith in order to be sustainable and have a positive, measurable impact, and a loud voice to be heard.

The CSOs were also surveyed on whether they had formed any type of coalitions or partnership unions, 14/19 CSOs said 'Yes.' These partnerships/coalitions were pertinent to the following: 'Movement ["Hirak"] Coalitions' (29.6%); 'Unions Coalitions' (7.4%); 'CSOs Coalitions' (55.6%); and (2%) cited 'Other'.²² The types of programs affiliated with these coalitions were Legislative Reforms; Empowering Women and Youth; Networking and Coordination; Reform Initiatives; Developmental and Environmental. The

²² This was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this question was 14/19 respondents.

most common types were 'Legislative Reforms' (27.3%) and 'Demand-driven Movements' (27.3%).²³ Figure (17) below provides further details.

Figure 17: Type of Programs with Coalitions



When asked whether the CSOs have had any coalitions with other CSOs and emerging groups for purposes of political reforms in 2011-2012 year period, (78.9%) of CSOs [15/19 respondents] reported having coalitions.

Al-Zoubi emphasized that the year 2011 enhanced collaborations between CSOs and other civic movements, “We used to meet once a month now we meet on daily basis as we are committed to many coalitions.”

On the other hand, **Kalaldeh** assessed coalition building by addressing his movement’s experience with other emerging groups. He stated, “There were many pitfalls due to lack of experience among youth leaders; we as a movement helped in establishing many coalition such as “jayeen”, Movement 24, but every time we faced anxiety due to leaders’ lack of expertise in tactics and strategy.”

Karajah pointed out the pitfall with coalitions that they tend to politicize direction. As the more dominant side in the coalition takes lead, the pressure becomes diverted to operate in a single direction leading the coalition and not necessarily expressive of its members individual interests.

²³ This was a multi-part question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this question was 10/19respondents.

According to **Assaf**, the general perception is that coalitions are difficult to form because of issues related to finances; but **Assaf** argues that this is not an obstacle that should hinder coalitions. He cites his organization as an example because they formed coalitions with Human Rights groups without any external funding, operating independently.

Chapter Four: Challenges, Issues and Solutions

This section treats challenges and issues facing CSOs in Jordan and presents some solutions to these issues from their own perspectives.

4.1 General Outlook

CSOs face many challenges, and in the course of this research it became apparent that there are many issues and problems that hinder the ability of CSOs to perform better. This chapter addresses these challenges facing CSOs, and describes CSOs' views on how to overcome those challenges.


The majority of CSOs surveyed reported that they face a set of obstacles and challenges within the political reform process; (73.7%) of them [14/19 respondents] reported that along the way, their activities faced certain obstacles and challenges.

From the perspective of participating CSOs, the most important of obstacles faced by them included:

- Request for prior approval from the government for any projects requires foreign funding
- Lack of understanding of the role of civil society (by society and official authorities)
- The lack of cooperation between legislative and executive authorities in passing of laws related to the works of CSOs
- Stringent Government regulations and bureaucratic obstacles
- Weakness of the community in accepting CSOS and civic movement
- The lack of awareness of local communities of the importance of civic society
- Lack of communication between CSOs and with decision-makers
- Tightening of and intervention by the security grip and intervention (as mentioned by EGs)
- The lack of trust between CSOs and International Institutions
- Associations' routines and procedures
- Regulatory barriers and capacity weakness by some associations
- Weakness and replication of programs once external funding ends
- Lack of communications with the capital in the case of organizations outside of Amman
- The government remains suspicious of CSOs' intentions and goals
- The lack of financial capabilities
- Rapid political changes in Jordan and the Arab region
- Political disagreements between some CSOs and opposition parties
- Youth movement programs are scattered
- The official reform position is not considered serious and is viewed negatively
- Lack of financial coordination and global cooperation to enhance political actions

When grouped together by theme, the highest type of obstacles reported for were Financial Obstacles (22.2%) and Bureaucratic Obstacles (22.2%); followed by Security Obstacles (18.5%); Internal Administrative Obstacles (14.8%); and Legislative Obstacles (11.1%)²⁴, these findings exist in addition to the cultural barriers/obstacles voiced in the way CSOs are viewed. The figure below displays their distribution.

Figure 18: Types of Obstacles as Reported by CSOs



In addition to the above, it became apparent from the FGDs and the In-depth Interviews with various sides, that there exist other obstacles as well, most important of which included:


- Weak networking and coordination between institutions
- The absence of real democracy within the institutions themselves
- Lack of coordination and joint action between CSOs and civic movements

When CSOs were surveyed about what they believed ought to take place in order to overcome the challenges facing them, the highest responses were for changing the government’s position/attitude towards CSOs (35%); followed by enhancing public awareness (20%); and financial aid and assistance

²⁴ This was a multi-part Question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this Question was 12/19 CSOs.

(20%); (15%) for restructuring internally; and (10%) for enacting legislations in the interest of CSOs.²⁵ The figure below displays these findings.

Figure 19: Means of Overcoming Challenges Faced by CSOs from their Perspective



Accordingly in the sections below, the recommendations offer a way for CSOs to move forward and improve their standing within the civil society arena in Jordan and become more effective and impactful

4.2 Structural and Capacity Obstacles

CSO representatives from within **Ajloun and Karak**, FGDs view the lack of networking as one of the major obstacles facing CSOs in Jordan. Furthermore, according to these groups, CSOs located within Amman do not communicate enough with the groups outside of Amman.

According to **Civil Society Leaders**, another obstacle lies in the fact that CSOs have multiplied in number and this has weakened the impact on decision makers. CSOs lack coordination and a unified voice. **Assaf** further addressed the lack of professionalism inside the institutions as structural and capacity obstacles, noting that some institutions remain too newly established and exist in an environment that is not conducive to any real democratic competition.

²⁵ This was a multi-part Question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this Question was 13/19 CSOs.

Abu-Rumman noted that organizations remain affiliated with personal interests of the individuals managing them. They operate individually rather than cooperating and joining initiatives with other CSOs, which hinders the capacity of CSOs to operate on a large scale and have a measurable impact.

For the purpose of defining the basis of their structure, **Karajah** compared the CSOs in Europe and in Jordan in terms of their nascent nature; noting that CSOs in Europe were born out of the concept of citizenship and political participation, whereas Jordanian CSOs are born out of the concept of charity and serving the less fortunate.

In terms of the structural and capacity obstacles, the relationship between CSOs is a challenge facing civil society and its capacity to operate at an optimal level. According to one donor agency, CSOs in Jordan are somewhat connected when it comes to ad-hoc issues, yet there needs to be increased cohesion when it comes to more pressing issues that call for change. Furthermore, a cultural challenge was mentioned as an obstacle to CSOs structure and capacity. CSOs in Jordan are subject to clan divisions which further isolate them from one another and spur competition between CSOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs). The agency noted that **CSOs are willing to collaborate** between each other, but it has to be genuine and not just to please the donors. There have been instances when CSOs have collaborated and at the end of the project after receiving all of the funds, and the finances are settled, they split up and go back to the same old routine and competitive demeanor.

Both experts Abu-Rumman and Karajah agreed that CSOs should consolidate their efforts and priorities needed for the reform agenda. They should understand their political role of helping build political life in Jordan, and have a large and direct impact on national political life. Karajah further notes that CSOs should ensure transparency in legal, administrative, and financial matters.

The coordination amongst CSOs themselves is considered a framework for joint-action to strengthen the pivotal role played by CSOs in initiating programs and creating public awareness towards the construction of political life, and the establishment of programs to achieve the desired democratic transitions.

CSOs must be competent and develop governance structures to facilitate cooperation with political parties, emerging groups, and demand-driven movements. Their cooperation with other groups, institutions, and establishments will gain them a higher position as functional players that drive democratic transitions in the political reform process.

4.3 Financial Obstacles

The Focus Group Discussions pointed out that the participation of the private sector is weak and lags behind in funding CSOs in Jordan. The discussions noted that there is a common belief that this was the result of a tendency of the private sector to fund more tangible projects such as building schools. Funding initiatives to support a specific law becomes less appealing for lack of immediate measurable outcomes, and for political reasons.

Discussions that took place in **Ajloun and Karak** shared a common note by participants which stated that financial support was mostly directed to CSOs in Amman, noting the CSOS outside of Amman suffered more in receiving funding for their projects.

Experts agree that the main obstacle facing CSOs in Jordan is receiving financial support from the government and Donors.

Abu-Rumman believes that CSO programs are based on donor's priorities, not the priorities of Jordan. He was also concerned that donor's interference with procedural details regarding the implementation of those programs poses another difficulty for CSOs to determine the sources of their financial support.

When it comes to **Youth Movements**, one of the major financial challenges facing them is the fact that they do not want to be financed by foreign donors because they do not want to be accused of carrying-out western agendas. They also do not want to receive any funding from the government because they want to carry out their initiatives independent of any obligations or conditions attached to funding.

Another financial obstacle mentioned by a donor agency was the exchange rate in international funding, specifically the Euro; when there is a set budget and the Euro exchange rate fluctuates, money is lost at times from the budget and this affects some activities that were already planned ahead and calculated for.

When asked about whether CSOS are in favor of receiving international funding and forging working partnerships with international organizations, 68.4% of CSOs [13/19 respondents] approved (the CSOs which receive funding from international organizations and donors); listing the following reasons for their approval:

- International organizations have a large and strong capacity to provide assistance to CSOs
- Need to secure external resources to be invested for local development
- International organizations support the causes of the CSOs and their efforts towards change
- Limited local resources and insufficient resources to perform tasks
- International organizations are more credible, accountable, and are not corrupted
- Provide non-biased assistance

However, when asked about the obstacles faced by CSOs in cooperating with Donors, most of the CSOs (33.3%) [3/9 respondents] reported the weakness pertaining to the cadre of the local offices of the Donors; (22%) [2/9 respondents] reported financial obstacles; another (22%) [2/9 respondents] reported legislative obstacles in Jordan; (11.1%) [1/9 respondents] reported obstacles related to the conditions imposed by donor organizations; and (11.1%) [1/9 respondents] reported that donor organizations do not grasp the local/national priorities for Jordan.

Resultant from the Focus Group Discussions, a common belief by CSOs was that donors should re-examine their programs and re-align their priorities to match the national reform agenda; moreover, Donors should support the national priorities in a coordinated manner amongst themselves. This points

to the fact that just as the government and the donors expect CSOs to become more united and to coordinate their existence amongst themselves to increase efficiency and capacity, likewise, CSOs expect the government and donors to coordinate between themselves in order to serve CSOs better and cooperate with them towards achieving common objectives to serve the interests of the country.

In dealing with Donors, Kalaldehy asserts that it is time for CSOs to have an action plan in applying for funding. In their relationship with donor agencies; they need to have clear proposals when they apply for funding, and to form what himself terms 'alliances of the civil democratic state;' an alliance that encompasses all actors within the Civil Society.

On the issue of youth movements, their rejection of funding, and any relationships they had with donor agencies, they recommended restructuring their operation system so that it does not exist in a sporadic manner. They need to show their presence in a disciplined and structured system, particularly given the consideration that they are major players who are driving for change. If they refuse to receive funding to avoid associating themselves with Western donors and Western agendas, they should at least be open to receiving technical assistance and capacity building instead. Youth movements should also coalesce with emerging groups and CSOs and work together in order to structure themselves better and benefit from organizations that have a solid system of operations intact rather than sporadic in nature.

Donor Agencies have to provide help to CSOs in the form of capacity building and technical assistance. CSOs need to develop themselves and become self-sustaining to an extent whereby they are not fully or majorly dependent on donor funding, particularly because there are new emerging groups and novel movements in the Civil Society arena.

According to donor agencies, their relationship with CSOs is dependent upon 2 themes: increased governmental and legislative cooperation and better coordination amongst the CSOs themselves.

4.4 Legislative and Governmental Obstacles

The Legislative and Governmental Obstacles received common consensus from all participating CSOs, and in particular with relation to the 'Associations Law'.

The 'Association Law' was also brought up by a donor agency as to be considered a legislative obstacle for CSOs, whereby no CSO can get funding without the permission of the government. The donor agency thinks this is a burden for CSOs and NGOs, and the delegation always puts this issue on the political platform for discussions. This donor agency believes that the current law serves as an obstacle to the work by CSOs.


CSO representatives in Karak believe that the government is implementing a double standard in dealing with CSOs; the government is tightening the noose on CSOs' work through its bylaws, at the same time it requests CSOs to implement some aspects of reform-related issues. Governmental bodies are perceived as prolonging the time period for approving specific projects. Experts also agree that there is a

cumbersome and lengthy process/ routine by the government and there is a lack of understanding and cooperation between the government and CSOs.

Nonetheless, according to a donor agency, when comparing Jordan to Lebanon or Egypt, or Iraq even, the CSOs and donor agencies have a lot of freedom in Jordan in the legislative and governmental arena.

When asked about their demands from the government in order to increase the role of CSOs in the reform process, the demand highest reported (30%) was for increasing the dialogue between CSOs and the government; followed by legislative amendments (26.7%) untangling the security apparatus (26.7%); and (13.3%) for increased financial assistance.²⁶ Figure (20) on next page demonstrates these findings.

Figure 20: Demands from the Government by CSOs



In the focus groups that were conducted, all participants agreed that the government is required to remove any administrative (bureaucratic) and legislative obstacles to the activation of CSOs. Furthermore, it was noted that all CSOs were eager for the government to provide technical and financial support. They also believed that the government should open channels of dialogue and build trust with CSOs, for instance, by asserting the role of CSOs in election monitoring.

²⁶ This was a multi-part Question wherein the number of answers recorded may exceed the number of responses. Total number of respondents for this Question was 17/19 CSOs.

The in-depth interview with CSOs leaders resulted in recommending an enhanced constructive role for the government in the future, as it is required to enhance the role of CSOs more effectively and peculiar of the reform process. They agreed that coordination between the government and CSOs is necessary to eliminate any legislative obstacles. They also agreed that private sector should work with CSOs to develop tools to provide financial and technical support to CSOs in Jordan and help them to boost their capabilities to act more efficiently.

With regards to funding from the government, (73.3%) of CSOs [14/19 respondents] stated their support for governmental financial assistance and partnerships, whilst the remaining (25.3%) reported refusal. Those who were in favor of government support sighted the following reasons for their support:

- Assurance of sustainability of the programs
- Support for institutions in implementing their programs and projects
- Enhancing partnerships and cooperation on a national level
- Secure the ideal and efficient use of government resources
- Fulfilling the social responsibility of the government
- Working towards achieving national interests rather than international agendas

Al-Zoubi, expressed a need for the government to establish a National Fund to support CSOs, and government budget should include an initiative in its budget to support CSOs, rather than merely delegating the involvement through the Ministry of Social Development. She added that there should be an independent mechanism similar to the 'provincial development fund,' wherein its finances are included and clearly allotted for in the government's budget. Next to having a clear mechanism for distributing funds to the provinces, likewise it should be done to manage CSOs financial support and redistribution of funds from the allotted government budget to support their operations. Moreover, Al-Zoubi noted the significant role played by CSOs in poverty eradication, human development and in providing solutions to areas that the government is unwilling or unable to service.

Assaf agrees with Al-Zoubi about establishing a National Fund, and he goes further by pointing out to a certain mechanism to run such fund, "they [the government's fund] should form a committee consisting of experts, donors who should be neutral in accepting and selecting CSOs based on efficiency and qualification standards. Such criteria for selection will drive and motivate similar CSOs to form coalitions and to unite their goals."

Kalaldeh agrees with Al-Zoubi and Assaf in this initiative and concurs that there should be a certain fund to support CSOs and emerging groups and that such a fund should be included in the governmental budget.

Overall, experts agree that the government should reconsider its assessment of CSOs, recognize that CSOs are essential to the development and success of free societies, and that it is time to initiate a dialogue with CSOs which is an essential step towards building partnerships.

Abu-Rumman raised another point, he called for review of the legislative environment to allow CSOs to freely carry out their activities and publications, and express their aspirations for the future. And work

towards underlining the needs of their audience, in his opinion, this will allow CSOs to effectively influence the government, and take a leading role in the society.

Karajah believes that CSOs have a significant role in enhancing security in the country, in terms of combating poverty, political awareness, and fighting corruption. This contributes in consolidating security in the country; hence the government should support CSOs and protect their presence.

According to donor agencies, the relationship between the CSOs and the government can be ameliorated by creating a dialogue with authorities and parliamentarians by involving and consulting CSOs when making legislation and allowing them to take-part in the decision making process. Given the multiplicity of CSOs in Jordan and their lack in direction, there is a need for the provision of technical assistance and capacity building in order for the government to get involved more with CSOs in the country.

Chapter Five: Looking Forward, the Role of CSOs in the Reform Process

This section presents most important results and findings of this research study in addition to recommendation outcomes.

5.1 Conclusion

Civil Society Organizations have had numerous contributions preceding the upsurge of political movements in Jordan, by means of various programs and initiatives which revolved around conducting conferences, workshops, and building coalitions towards serving the objectives of the organizations.

It is important to indicate that the role of CSOs in the reform process is cumulative, and that the CSOs played an important role within the past few years through their works and concentration on enhancing concepts of democracy, freedom, transparency, and accountability. The Jordanian Spring formed a challenge to some CSO which remained to use traditional tools of change, whereas the powers in effect within the Jordanian Spring had resorted to alternate non-traditional methods.

During the democratic transition period in Jordan, and particularity in 2011, CSOs in Jordan focused their work on the issues pertaining to current affairs as was observed through their level and types of involvements. Despite the challenges facing them, CSOs centered their themes on political reforms that included: constitutional amendments, strengthening the role of women and youth, rule of law, and anti-corruption efforts.

The CSOs in Jordan have assumed an active role in the national political reform process in 2011-2012. Although the extent of their impact remains debated, undeniably they have pushed for changes and altered the arena for CSOs by expanding their operating parameters, along with enhancing awareness and political participation.

Mostly 2011 witnessed the emergence of new and active actors such as the demand-driven movements, and cyber groups that have had a significant impact on public opinion, and have shown strong ability to communicate with a large segment of the society. These emerging groups are not officially registered, and sometimes do not have permanent location. Nonetheless, they were active in advancing the process of political reforms, and some of their representatives had participated in the National Dialogue Committee. In comparison to this finding, registered CSOs remain to lack the public outreach as achieved by the aforementioned groups, and this possibly could serve as an explanation for the limited role observed by CSOs in extending their impact on society, and not having sufficient legitimacy in representing society, thereby impacting the nature of the topics they involve themselves in and address as well as the modest role of their contribution to the political reform process.

Notably, the capacity of CSOs remains weak as they require strengthening of their administrative and staff bodies, internal restructuring, and better allocation of resources. There needs to be better coordination and networking amongst CSOs since their multiplicity and fragmentation hinders their impact and weakens their voice. The study has shown that the majority of CSOs, particularly in the center (Amman), rely almost entirely on funding from international institutions, and some government funding, which could affect the nature of CSOs' work, as well as their ability to form an independent agenda with national reform priorities.

Similarly, the study has shown that CSOs focused their work on one area (the Capital), noting also a lack of coordination between CSOs in Amman and outside Amman; consequently, CSOs outside Amman were not able to get involved in the political affairs as much, hence opening space for the emerging groups to take the lead in the areas outside the capital and the peripheries. This allowed the EGs to have a stronger influence on the reform process.

The study has revealed that there are common challenges facing CSOs that hinder their ability to perform better, these challenges revolved around structural obstacles, financial obstacles, as well as legislative and governmental obstacles. It was apparent that CSOs in Jordan lack coordination and a unified voice, and some of them remain affiliated with personal interests. In terms of the legislative and governmental obstacles, the themes revolved around the government's establishment of NGOs that has weakened the role of other CSOs, combined with the presence of bureaucratic obstacles to increase the active role of CSOs and enhance their presence. From the previously mentioned challenges and obstacles facing CSOs (Structural and Capacity Obstacles; Financial Obstacles; and Legislative and Governmental Obstacles), the highest reported for types of obstacles were financial and bureaucratic.

Financially, it was found that CSOs do not have large operating budgets given their limited sources of funding, as well as being subject to donors' discretion. International funding represents the largest share of funding for CSOs; accordingly, the local government should get more involved in funding CSOs; and possibly consider allocating a National Fund for CSOs with a designated annual budget. The involvement of local government financially will assure the longevity and sustainability of CSOs and their initiatives in Jordan.

Regarding CSOs' involvement in the political reform process, the government, political parties, and unions, should work towards cooperating with the CSOs and to involve them in the decision-making process, and consult with them more regularly.

Although the government was regarded as giving CSOs the space to exist and room to operate, and as having taken into consideration reform related amendments as proposed to a certain degree, there remains much room for improving the relationship between CSOs and the government. Moreover, it is important for the government to reconsider its position about CSOs and not view them suspiciously; take their inputs and recommendations more seriously.

CSOs' relationship with donors witnessed a report of mixed findings, as some believe the donors do keep in line with Jordan's national priorities while others felt donors are not mindful of national

interests and they should realign their projects to match Jordan's interests and the CSOs' initiatives in the reform process.

The study also indicated that CSOs regard their relationship with donors as one wherein they are able to maintain their independence; whilst the majority of the emerging groups refuse building relations with donors and receiving any kind of foreign or local funding, as they believe they can maintain their independence from foreign agendas and outside interferences in their objectives.

As some types of organizations, and in particular youth movements, refuse external sources of funding for reasons related to fund-tied conditions, the financial scene remains weak for these organizations that solely rely on donations, gifts and membership-fees. The issue of foreign funding undoubtedly requires critical assessment in order to make this type of funding more effective in supporting CSOs.

It became clear that youth movements and political parties as well as unions played a prominent role in the democratic transformation process in Jordan, and they had the greatest impact in influencing the changes and decisions which determined the platform for reform through their leadership and active role in the social movements and reform process within Jordan.

In their self-assessment regarding the role of CSOs' impact on decision makers, CSOs' views were fluctuating between half the sample indicating they felt they did have a moderate impact whilst the remaining thought they had a limited impact. None of the CSOs reported having an impact to a large degree.

The majority of CSOs reported they believed they had a moderate impact on their target groups. Impact on public opinion was considered moderate by the majority of CSOs, and the extent of their political engagement regarded as moderately by majority of CSOs as well.

This finding is in line with the assessment by experts noting that the role played by CSOs in the 2011 political reform process could have been stronger, and that they key players in the reform process were the political parties and trade unions instead of CSOs.


Nonetheless the CSOs have been successful in raising issues to be considered in the reform agenda in Jordan, such as constitutional reform, elections law, political parties law, independent commission law, awareness campaigns, municipal law, legislative process, citizenship, enhancing political participation (especially for women and youth), transparency, accountability, rule of law, and anti-corruption, women and gender equality.

CSOs should assume an increasingly active role to participate in mediums and actions taken by the Government to increase dialogue. As was mentioned, the government can do much more to ameliorate its relationship with CSOs, yet the CSOs also must exert an effort to take advantage of opportunities and participate in government initiatives: the majority of CSOs had responded not participating in the National Dialogue Committee; Economic Dialogue Committee; and the Royal Committee for Constitutional Reform.

Even though there had been a few coalitions formed between CSOs, in particular within the field of Women’s Rights, nonetheless CSOs should consider more active coalition building and joining emerging groups in an effort to increase the impact of CSOs and unite their voice for their common objectives and initiatives towards reform.

When asked to assess what is expected from them in the future in order to play a more effective role and have increasing impact in the reform process within Jordan, CSOs reported highest responses for conducting institutional reform and increasing transparency within their organizations (30.8%); followed by building coalitions and networking (26.9%); shifting focus to national platforms (concentrating more on meeting local interests rather than donor-driven agendas) and concentrate efforts onto reform issues (23.1%); constructing dialogue and planning with the government (11.5%), and search for local donors as well as increasing the presence of CSOs at (3.8%) of responses each. Figure (21) below is illustrative of the responses.

Figure 21: Future Role sought by CSOs to Increase Impact on Reform



For purposes of ameliorating and bettering the role played by CSOs in the political reform process in Jordan, CSOs reported highest for the need of the government to change its position and attitude towards CSOs, better financial assistance to CSOs, the need for enhancing public awareness, and for CSOs to restructure internally, as well as enacting legislations that serve in the interest of CSOs. CSOs are also required to ensure transparency in legal, administrative and financial matters, in an effort to

improve its relations with official bodies. CSOs should engage in public awareness campaigns to increase the public's understanding of the positive contributions by CSOs in the society and towards reform ends.

Overall, there is much room for improvement in the arena of CSOs and their parameters of activity in the political reform process in Jordan, and in particular in their relation with the Government, with other CSOs and with Donor Agencies.

5.2 Recommendations

The results of this research which used a multiple of methodologies revealed many interesting points, and highlighted many important issues and ideas that are worthy of consideration for the recommendations towards enhancing the role of civil society in the next phase of reforms in Jordan. It is important to note that the following recommendations to enhance the role and contribution of civil society in the political reform process are focused on the next phase of the reform process. It is important to note that implementing these recommendations requires joining the efforts by many of the parties involved inclusive of CSOs, political parties, and political movements, as well as the government, in addition to the donor agencies. Furthermore it is important to find a mechanism to implement these recommendations, and which it is possible to identify specific time-frame for, and clarify the main actors through holding of a national conference/ convention with participants from all parties involved for purposes of bringing these recommendations to life and commencing their implementation.

For the purpose of clarity and focus, the recommendations will be presented in relation to Civil Society Organizations; Government; and Donors, as follows:

5.2.1 Civil Society Organization

1. Forge strong partnership with the government in order to ensure the success of the political reform process, which should include: developing a shared vision and understanding of objectives and mechanisms for the next stage of reform.
2. Lead the efforts in fostering political and civil culture by embodying democratic principles such as the rule of law, citizenship, rights and obligations, and the values of pluralism.
3. Create forums for debate and open discussion for the different stakeholders in the reform process.
4. Capitalize on the CSOs strength and relationship to solidify reports and policy option on specific issues.
5. Establish networks and alliances with other stakeholders such as CSOs, political parties, and international organizations to work for common solutions.

6. Develop networks and alliances with organizations working at the local and regional level in the country.
7. Work as a safeguard and a watchdog for accountability, transparency, and fighting corruption.
8. Create coalitions with other concerned groups to lobby the government and parliament on specific issues.
9. Develop partnership with the private sector that goes beyond financial contributions.

5.2.2 Government

1. Enhance the CSOs access to information and build capacity of government institutions to facilitate access to information for CSOs and remove bureaucratic obstacles.
2. Remove all legal and political obstacles that limit the freedom of speech and action.
3. Empower CSOs by establishing a special fund to support CSOs in the areas of national priority.
4. Take measures to remove mistrust between government institutions and CSOs.

5.2.3 Donors

5. Strengthen CSOs' capacity by increasing funding for infrastructure and program developments.
6. Diversify and extend support for CSOs at the local level in urban and rural areas outside Amman.
7. Empower CSOs through capacity building, working with grassroots, building coalitions, and lobbying.

Appendix

Appendix A: Literature Review Material

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Appendix B: List of CSOs

List of CSOs Participating in the Study								
Name	Type	Area of Intervention					Amman	Outside Amman
		Constitutional Reforms	Democratic System	Rule of Law	Women's Right	Youth		
Identity Center	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Phenix for Economic & Informatics Studies	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Amman Center For Human Rights Studies	CSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The Earth and Human Society for Supporting Development	CSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partners-Jordan Center for Civi Collaboration	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sharakeh for Democracy	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Arab Women Organization of Jordan	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Al Sindyan Istitute for Democratic and Political Development	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Jordan Transparency Center	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Leajlekom "لاجلكم" Charity Association	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Jordanian Commission for Democratic Culture	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Nationalist Progressive Trend	EG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Social Leftist Movement	EG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National Front for Reforms	EG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ana Umi Urdoneya Campaign	CG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Jordanian National Campaign for Change "Jayeen"	CG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The National Campaign for Students' Rights "Dabahtona"	CG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Jor National Alliance for Reforming the Electoral Process	CO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Women's Alliance for Reforms	CO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CSO: Civil Society Organization								
EG: Emerging Group								
CG: Cyber Group								
CO: Coalition								

Appendix C: Profile of the List of CSOs

Profile of CSOs Participating in the Study				
Name	Type	Year of Establishment	Branches outside Amman?	Independent Yes/NO?
Identity Center	CSO	2009	NO	YES
Phenix for Economic & Informatics Studies	CSO	2003	NO	YES
Amman Center For Human Rights Studies	CSO	1999	NO	YES
The Earth and Human Society for Supporting Development	CSO	2000	YES	NO
Partners-Jordan Center for Civi Collaboration	CSO	2005	NO	YES
Sharakeh for Democracy	CSO	2008	YES	YES
Arab Women Organization of Jordan	CSO	1970	NO	YES
Al Sindyan Istitute for Democratic and Political Development	CSO	2010	YES	YES
Jordan Transparency Center	CSO	2011	NO	YES
Leajlekom "لاجلکم" Charity Association	CSO	2010	NO	YES
Jordanian Commission for Democratic Culture	CSO	2002	NO	YES
Nationalist Progressive Trend	EG	2010	YES	YES
Social Leftist Movement	EG	2006	NO	NO
National Front for Reforms	EG	2011	YES	YES
Ana Umi Urdoneya Campaign	CG	2008	NO	YES
Jordanian National Campaign for Change "Jayeen"	CG	2011	YES	YES
The National Campaign for Students' Rights "Dabahtona"	CG	2007	YES	YES
Jor National Alliance for Reforming the Electoral Process	CO	2009	YES	YES
Women's Alliance for Reforms	CO	2011	YES	YES
CSO: Civil Society Organization				
EG: Emerging Group				
CG: Cyber Group				
CO: Coalition				

Appendix D: List of CSOs which Refused to Participate

List of CSOs (did not respond / refused to participate) in the Survey			
Name	Type	Didn't Respond	Refused to Participate
Al Badeel for Studies and Research	CSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Al Quds Center for Political Studies	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Al Urdun AL Jadeed Research Center	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Adaleh Center	CSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Jordanian Forum for Human Rights	CSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hayat Center	CSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Center for Defending Freedoms of Journalists	CSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National Society for Enhancement of Freedom & Democracy JUND	CSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Jordanian Women's Union	CSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Jordanian Voting Rights Organization	CSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Youth Movement 7erak	CG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Free Assembly JO	CG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
52 Movement	EG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Youth and Public Movements Coordination	EG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

CSO: Civil Society Organization

EG: Emerging Group

CG: Cyber Group

CO: Coalition

Appendix E: List of Key Experts and Civil Society Leaders

Key Experts	
Name	Expertise
Hussein Abu Roman	Civil Society Expert
Sa'ed Karajah	Lawyer and Civil Society Expert
Civil Society Leaders	
Dr. Nizam Assaf	Director of Amman Center for Human Rights Studies
Amena AL-Zoubi	President of the Jordanian Women's Union
Dr. Khaled Kalaldehy	Secretary General of the Social Leftist Movement

Appendix F: Names of International Organizations Partnering with Surveyed CSOs in 2011-2012

Academy for Educational Development, The
Action Aid
Alfred Mozer Stichting
Arab Network for Environment and Development
Center for Civil and Political Rights, The
CONEMUND (Spanish NGO)
Euro Mediterranean Network for Environmental, Educational and Sustainable Development
European Union
Finnish Church Grants
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Heinrich Böll Foundation
IFE-EFI The European Feminist Initiative
The Middle East Partnership Initiative
International Federation for Human Rights, The
International Federation of Trade Unions
International Labor Organization
International Union for Conservation of Nature
International Women's Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific
National Democratic Institute
National Endowment for Democracy
Network for Educational and Academic Rights
Open Society Institute
Partners for Political Change
Press Media International Foundation
Public Services International
Scholars at Risk Foundation
Solidaridad Internacional
Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
Swiss Embassy
United Nations Development Program
Women for Women

Appendix G: Calculation Method for Capacity of CSOs' Administrative and Staff Bodies Ex: Average of Administrative Part-time Staff

Number of Administrative Part-time Workers		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Number of Workers*Frequency	Average of Administrative Part-time Workers
Valid	0	1	5.3	16.7	16.7	0	3.4
	1	2	10.5	33.3	50.0	2	
	2	1	5.3	16.7	66.7	2	
	4	1	5.3	16.7	83.3	4	
	9	1	5.3	16.7	100.0	9	
	Total	6	31.6	100.0		17	
Missing	غير معين	13	68.4				
Total		19	100.0				