{"id":14714,"date":"2025-12-15T18:19:56","date_gmt":"2025-12-15T15:19:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jcss.org\/?p=14714"},"modified":"2025-12-15T18:19:59","modified_gmt":"2025-12-15T15:19:59","slug":"turkey-and-the-international-stabilisation-force-isf-in-gaza-regional-implications-and-policy-options","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jcss.org\/en\/14714\/turkey-and-the-international-stabilisation-force-isf-in-gaza-regional-implications-and-policy-options\/","title":{"rendered":"Turkey and the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza: Regional Implications and Policy Options"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Supervision: Professor Dr. Hasan Almomani
Prepared by (Research Fellow): Emad Al-Hammadin<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First: Background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

International efforts to establish an international stabilisation force (ISF) in the Gaza Strip have revealed clear divergences among concerned states, largely due to persistent ambiguity surrounding the mandate, scope, authorities, and rules of engagement of such a force. While some non-Arab Islamic countries\u2014most notably Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan\u2014have expressed preliminary willingness to participate, these states remain hesitant to move toward actual deployment. In contrast, Arab states have refrained from openly endorsing participation, given the political and security sensitivities of the Palestinian arena and its complex dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within this context, Turkey has emerged as the most proactive actor seeking a leading role in the proposed stabilization force. According to statements by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ankara views the Gaza issue as highly complex and politically sensitive, requiring the protection of Palestinian interests, the uninterrupted flow of humanitarian assistance, and the reconstruction of Gaza. Turkey argues that for any stabilization arrangement to succeed, it must rely on a professional force that is acceptable by Hamas and other Palestinianresistance factions, a condition Ankara considers essential for the sustainability of any future security framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Second: The Core of the Turkish\u2013Israeli Dispute<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey and Israel fundamentally diverge over the issue of disarming Palestinian factions. Israel views disarmament as a prerequisite for launching the second phase of the U.S. peace plan. Turkey, however, advances an alternative approach, arguing that disarmament should not occur during the second phase, but rather at a later stage\u2014after humanitarian aid has been delivered, reconstruction has begun, and lines of contact have been stabilized\u2014only then should factions be asked to hand over their weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan reportedly proposed postponing disarmament for two years, a proposal Israel rejected outright. From the Israeli perspective, delaying disarmament effectively ensures that weapons will not be surrendered, but rather upgraded, while factions may gradually shift their allegiance toward Turkey following Iran\u2019s relative retreat. Israel believes this would allow Hamas to continue stalling while rebuilding its military capabilities under the cover of humanitarian access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Israel also considers Turkey non-neutral in this matter. Israeli officials argue that Turkey\u2019s current leadership, which they associate with political Islam and movements close to the Muslim Brotherhood, holds an anti-Israeli agenda and lacks transparency regarding its intentions in Gaza. Against this backdrop, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu\u2019s upcoming visit to Washington is expected to focus on a categorical Israeli rejection of any Turkish role, not only in leading the stabilization force but in participating in it as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Israel understands that accepting Turkey would undermine its ability to impose its own security and political vision for Gaza and would derail Netanyahu\u2019s plans centered on dismantling Hamas, disarming factions, and restructuring the Strip in a manner aligned with his domestic political calculations ahead of upcoming elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, Turkey possesses strong leverage. Turkish participation could significantly increase the likelihood of success of the U.S. president\u2019s plan. Most importantly, the presence of Turkey would provide political cover for Islamic countries to contribute forces, making participation easier to justify domestically. More critically, Turkey\u2019s relationship with Hamas could help ensure that the stabilization force is not targeted by armed factions should conditions deteriorate. This consideration represents a powerful incentive for Washington\u2014one that may be difficult for President Trump to disregard in favor of Netanyahu\u2019s objections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Third: Israeli Security Concerns Regarding Turkish Participation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Israeli apprehension regarding Turkey\u2019s involvement extends well beyond concerns over delayed disarmament. From Israel\u2019s perspective, Turkish participation poses several direct threats to its national security:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. Military and Intelligence Capabilities: Israel views Turkey as a state with advanced military and intelligence capabilities, enabling it to monitor lines of contact and impose rules of engagement that could significantly restrict Israeli operational freedom, potentially exposing Israeli forces to risk and increasing the likelihood of a direct confrontation with Turkey.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Intelligence Exposure: Israel fears that Turkey would seek access to sensitive intelligence held by Hamas regarding Israel, including data and materials acquired during the 7 October attack. Such access could substantially increase Israel\u2019s strategic exposure to Turkey.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. Political Influence and Mediation: Turkey enjoys strong ties with Hamas, broad popularity among Gaza\u2019s population, and working relations with other factions as well as the Palestinian Authority. Israel fears that this could facilitate Palestinian national reconciliation, returning Israel to \u201csquare one,\u201d particularly as it remains firmly opposed to the emergence of any future Palestinian political entity.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. Undermining Israeli Objectives: Israel does not appear genuinely invested in the success of a stabilization force. Turkish leadership of such a force would undermine Netanyahu\u2019s long-term objectives in Gaza, including gradual population displacement, territorial fragmentation, the elimination of Hamas, and disarmament\u2014objectives upon which his next electoral campaign is likely to be built.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    Finally, economic considerations are also present. Turkish companies are expected to play a significant role in Gaza\u2019s reconstruction, which partly explains Netanyahu\u2019s recent efforts to push for Israeli-U.S. involvement in rubble removal, aimed at limiting Turkish economic and political influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n\n\n\n

    Fourth: Turkish Strategic Calculations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Despite its ideological rhetoric, Turkey operates firmly within a framework of national strategic interests. Ankara believes its regional role should be significantly expanded and that it should have a decisive voice in regional affairs\u2014particularly following its successful investment in forces of change in Syria and the consolidation of power by its close ally, President al-Sharaa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    A future Turkish presence in Gaza, combined with Turkey\u2019s military and political footprint in Syria and Erdo\u011fan\u2019s strong personal relationship with President Trump\u2014whom many analysts believe favors Erdo\u011fan over Netanyahu\u2014represents a strategic opportunity for Turkey to expand its regional influence. Ankara also seeks to ensure that any future confrontation with Israel would carry a high cost for Tel Aviv.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Within this context, Turkey increasingly views itself as a leading Middle Eastern power and a successor to Iran\u2019s declining regional influence\u2014this time under American sponsorship rather than confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n\n\n\n

    Fifth: The U.S. Position and Washington\u2019s Calculations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The United States aligns with Turkey on several key points. Washington recognizes that Turkey possesses capabilities that neither Israel nor Arab allies can fully replicate\u2014particularly its military presence in Syria, counterterrorism expertise, intelligence assets, and credibility as a mediator with Islamist actors, including Gaza factions. These factors make Turkey an attractive functional partner from the U.S. perspective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n\n\n\n

    Sixth: Potential Scenarios and the Anticipated Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    1. Conditional Acceptance of Turkey<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Under this scenario, Washington approves a Turkish role while imposing clear constraints on the force\u2019s mandate. This would likely result in sustained Israeli-Turkish tension without immediate escalation. Such an outcome could weaken Netanyahu\u2019s electoral prospects and further strain U.S.\u2013Israeli relations, which have already shown signs of friction\u2014particularly following the establishment of a joint coordination center near Gaza, viewed by some analysts as reflecting U.S. mistrust of Israel\u2019s commitment to the peace plan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    On the positive side, this scenario would increase the likelihood of success for both the stabilization force and the U.S. plan, encouraging broader Arab and Islamic participation\u2014operationally or logistically. It would enhance Turkey\u2019s regional influence at Israel\u2019s expense and boost Erdo\u011fan\u2019s popularity among Arab and Palestinian publics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    However, it may also raise concerns among key Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, given Turkey\u2019s political Islam orientation. Nonetheless, a time-bound, tightly controlled Turkish presence may be viewed by Arab states as the lesser of two evils compared to a renewed war following the collapse of stabilization efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    From Jordan\u2019s perspective, Turkish participation\u2014given Ankara\u2019s influence over Hamas and other factions\u2014is preferable.  Otherwise,  complete failure of the stabilization force would be expected. Accordingly, Jordan may benefit from greater engagement with Turkey while keeping channels open to leverage political and security gains from Ankara\u2019s presence in Gaza.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    2. Exclusion of Turkey<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    This scenario entails Israel successfully persuading Washington to exclude Turkey, shifting toward an Egyptian-Arab role or assigning leadership to other Islamic states that had expressed preliminary interest. Although this remains the more likely scenario, it carries serious risks. Hamas and other factions have already rejected disarmament and may view the force as illegitimate, potentially targeting it. Recent polling in Gaza indicates strong public opposition to disarming resistance groups under such arrangements, suggesting a hostile operating environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Moreover, many Islamic states may refuse participation without Turkey\u2019s involvement. Failure of the stabilization force\u2014and of President Trump\u2019s plan\u2014due to Israeli intransigence would ultimately benefit Hamas and Turkey while portraying Israel as the party responsible for undermining U.S. efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n\n\n\n

    Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    From Israel\u2019s perspective, the entry of Turkish forces into Gaza represents a highly dangerous scenario that could culminate in a direct Israeli-Turkish conflict in the near future\u2014particularly given Turkey\u2019s membership in NATO, which would further complicate escalation dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Israel prefers an Egyptian-led option supported by moderate Arab states, which could enhance the prospects of Palestinian Authority involvement in Gaza\u2014an outcome deeply troubling for Netanyahu\u2019s government but arguably the most viable long-term solution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The final decision is expected by the end of the month and will rest with President Trump, who appears less concerned with nuanced policy details than with personal relationships. His choice will not only determine whether Netanyahu or Erdo\u011fan holds greater influence in Washington, but will also shape the future of Israel\u2019s national security. The consequences of Netanyahu\u2019s near-total reliance on Trump may soon become clear\u2014either as a strategic success or as a profound strategic miscalculation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n\n\n\n

    Dr. Emad Al-Hammadin<\/strong>
    Center for Strategic Studies<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Supervision: Professor Dr. Hasan AlmomaniPrepared by (Research Fellow): Emad Al-Hammadin First: Background International efforts to establish an international stabilisation force (ISF) in the Gaza Strip have revealed clear divergences among concerned states, largely due to persistent ambiguity surrounding the mandate, scope, authorities, and rules of engagement of such a force. While some non-Arab Islamic countries\u2014most…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":14706,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false},"categories":[42],"tags":[1919],"class_list":["post-14714","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-position-paper","tag-1919","category-42","description-off"],"yoast_head":"\nTurkey and the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza: Regional Implications and Policy Options - \u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0625\u0633\u062a\u0631\u0627\u062a\u064a\u062c\u064a\u0629<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/jcss.org\/en\/14714\/turkey-and-the-international-stabilisation-force-isf-in-gaza-regional-implications-and-policy-options\/\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Ahmad\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"8 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/jcss.org\/en\/14714\/turkey-and-the-international-stabilisation-force-isf-in-gaza-regional-implications-and-policy-options\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/jcss.org\/en\/14714\/turkey-and-the-international-stabilisation-force-isf-in-gaza-regional-implications-and-policy-options\/\",\"name\":\"Turkey and the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza: Regional Implications and Policy Options - 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