A Review of the Response to Syrian Refugees in Jordan

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يتحمل المؤلف كامل المسؤولية القانونية عن محتوى مصنفه ولا يعتر
به هذا المصنف عن رأي دائرة المكتبة الوطنية أو أي جهة حكومية أخرى.
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Preface

More than three years have passed since the Syrian Crisis erupted and the plight of the Syrian refugees began. Jordan is one of several countries in the region that opened its doors to the massive numbers of those seeking refuge from the war. The estimated official number is approximately 1.4 million, with only about 15% living in refugee camps and the rest living amongst Jordanians in all parts of the country, with heavy concentration in the north and central regions. Meeting the needs of Syrian refugees was and remains a great challenge to the Jordanian government as well as to the international organizations involved - not due solely to the shortage of funding, but also to the highly demanding levels of organization needed to handle this crisis. This is not the first time that Jordan has to deal with such a huge influx of refugees but certainly the influx of the Syrian refugees is the most challenging.

This report is not intended to be evaluation of efforts in response to Syrian refugees in Jordan but aims, rather, at assessing and documenting such efforts that has been taken by so many actors. This includes not only identifying the types of organizations involved and the types of aid and services offered, but also identifying issues and gaps in the response to Syrian refugees. “Coping with Crisis” is part of an ongoing project that CSS is carrying out in order to assess the impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan. The project aims at examining the political, economic, social and demographic impacts on the country.

I want to sincerely thank Jonathan Walsh and Christina Klassen for their hard work, dedication, and commitment to the finalization of this project. Also, thanks are due to both James Fromson and Husni Abumelhim for reading and providing edits on different parts of the document, and to Rania Mashal for designing the document.

Finally, I hope this report will help in understanding and appreciating the immense efforts and the massive organization that emerged in dealing with the Syrian refugees both by Jordanian and non-Jordanian actors and the challenges it represents for Jordan and the international community.

Musa M. Shteiwi
Executive Summary

Insufficient funding is the greatest challenge facing the response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. The two primary relief mechanisms—the sixth Regional Response Plan (RRP6) and the National Resilience Plan (NRP) are both chronically underfunded. While unexpectedly low levels of refugee flight in 2014 have thus far forestalled the shortfall’s worst ramifications, international and Jordanian authorities remain unable to implement the full spectrum of necessary relief programs.

This is not for lack of planning; the Jordanian Government and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) have both set ambitious goals. Jordan’s Host Community Support Platform (HCSP) directs the implementation of the NRP and coordinates local resilience-building activities, while the UNHCR’s RRP6 oversees the provision of international aid to displaced Syrians.

The next step for Jordan and the UNHCR should be to further integrate these two plans under a common supervisory authority that maintains their distinctive missions and activities. Such a structure could more easily identify gaps in aid, eliminate redundant projects, and better coordinate the NRP and the RRP6. Integration would also indirectly benefit struggling Jordanian communities.

The Jordanian government and the international community should also bolster relief activities in sectors indirectly linked to the Syrian refugee crisis (e.g. the Jordanian energy system), as well as proactive development of poor governorates that do not yet host many Syrians. Unfortunately, current relief programs are largely limited to meeting refugees’ and host communities’ short-term needs and resolving immediate infrastructure problems. A comprehensive humanitarian response, however, must also plan for the potentially crippling long-term effects of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Successful reform of the refugee response is possible. For example, the UNHCR has already introduced new standard operating procedures for NGOs conducting surveys among Syrian refugees to prevent redundant assessments and has taken steps toward better coordinating its task forces. The Jordanian government, meanwhile, created the Host Community Support Platform in response to the concern that international efforts benefitting Syrian refugees were shortchanging similarly desperate Jordanian communities. If sufficiently funded, the UNHCR and Jordanian authorities can address the current shortcomings by continuing in this proactive vein.
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List of Acronyms

CHV– Community Health Volunteers
CP– Child Protection
CSO– Civil society organization
CSP– Community support project
CSS– Center for Strategic Studies
ERfKE– Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy
ESWG– Education Sector Working Group
EU– European Union
FPD– Family Protection Department
GCC– Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Gulf Cooperation Council)
HCSP– Host Community Support Platform
IAPS– Inter-Agency Protection Strategy
IATF– Inter-Agency Task Force
IGO– Inter-governmental organization
IISP– Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal
IMCG– Information Management Coordination Group
INGO– International non-governmental organization
IOM– International Organization for Migration
IS– Islamic State
ISWG– Inter-Sector Working Group
MDG– Millennium Development Goal
MHPSS– Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
MOED– Ministry of Education
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<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>MOPIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
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<td>NAR</td>
<td>Needs Assessment Review</td>
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<td>NCD</td>
<td>Non-communicable disease</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-food items</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NRP</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, sanitation &amp; hygiene</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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Introduction:

Key Players and Components in the Jordanian Response

Review of the Humanitarian Situation

More than three years after the start of the Syrian civil war, the outpouring of Syrians into neighboring countries continues nearly unabated. The Syrian refugee crisis has become one of the largest refugee crises in the world, with approximately 3 million Syrians internationally displaced and more than 6.5 million internally displaced.¹

Virtually all of Syria’s neighbors have been affected by the refugee crisis, but Jordan has been hit especially hard. As of 5 July 2014, Jordan was home to 606,282 UNHCR-recognized Syrian refugees,² with approximately 700,000 additional Syrian guest workers indefinitely stranded. What is more, Jordan’s small size makes it particularly susceptible to population pressures; Turkey is ten times as populous and significantly larger but hosts roughly the same number of refugees.³ All told, the Syrian crisis has added more than 1.3 million to Jordan’s pre-war population of 6.249 million.⁴

This is not a new phenomenon in Jordan’s history, but the social and economic effects of the crisis have nonetheless been devastating. Jordan is particularly water scarce, and the refugee crisis threatens all Jordanians’ access to decent water and sanitation services. Services such as education, electricity, and healthcare have deteriorated because of the crisis, especially in Jordan’s northern governorates and the capital Amman. Finding work has also become increasingly challenging, as competition between Syrian refugees and working-class Jordanians has raised unemployment and depressed wages.

Furthermore, the refugee influx strains Jordanian state institutions. Public services have been forced to accommodate the roughly 500,000 Syrian refugees who live outside of the camps. Jordanian communities often blame local municipalities for deteriorations in service quality, even though these are generally the inevitable result of the population shock. The national government, meanwhile, saw its Moody’s sovereign credit rating downgraded in June 2013 because of the budgetary pressures of coping with the refugee crisis.1 The upswing in domestic spending, combined with uncertainty in Jordan’s near abroad, has put the Jordanian state in its most uncertain situation in decades.

While most Jordanians have been hospitable towards the Syrian refugees, there remains palpable resentment. Jordanians often feel that organizations providing aid to displaced Syrians overlook their own difficulties, and some resent Syrians themselves, blaming them for their lowered quality of life.

The main concern among Jordanian leaders is that the shock of the Syrian refugee crisis may endanger Jordan’s development goals. Jordan has worked hard to become one of the most developed countries in the Middle East, and its progress may be reversed if it does not receive the economic relief necessary to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis. This relief must not only assist displaced Syrians but must also include care for poor Jordanians and capacity-building support to Jordanian authorities so that they can better provide for their country’s citizens.

Jordan has found a brief reprieve in the unexpectedly low numbers of new Syrian refugees thus far in 2014. The RRP6 predicted that there would be 687,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan by June 2014.2 Currently, that number is currently significantly lower. Yet these figures only cover Syrians who, having fled the war, meet the technical definition of “refugee” and excludes the large number of Syrian expatriates who have become stranded in Jordan.

This luck, however, was more than offset by the increasing severity of the non-camp refugee problem. At the beginning of 2014, the UNHCR predicted that 75% of refugees would be accommodated outside of camps.3 In mid-June, 2014, that number is over 83%. This is concerning because non-camp refugees are both more difficult to reach with humanitarian aid and more directly affect the Jordanian economy.

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The problem of stranded expatriates has barely been addressed. Some refugee population planning figures on the UNHCR’s Jordan homepage suggest that there is some awareness that expatriate Syrians are in many ways de facto refugees (the planning figures for Syrian refugees in Jordan are roughly twice the number of registered Syrians), but this awareness seems to be far from widely accepted among relief authorities. Almost all recent official UNHR publications place the Syrian refugee population at just over 600,000.

**Methodology**

The tools used for fulfilling this assessment study are:

1. Desk Review
2. Interviews with relevant governmental and humanitarian authorities

This study employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative research tools to identify gaps, redundancies, and opportunities for greater efficiency in the response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. A full assessment of the Jordanian government’s response plan follows a “desk review” of the activities of UNHCR-identified agencies.

The desk review permitted the research team to identify the major trends, partners, and components of aid operations. After completing this step, the team gauged local government officials’ reactions to the initial findings through targeted interviews. Subsequently, the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) will conduct surveys targeting both the refugee population and host communities. CSS will follow up on this report by continuing to assess refugee/host community circumstances and relations.

This comprehensive report covers all data collected in the desk review and interview phases and is one part of a series of CSS reports aimed at providing timely and helpful information to the parties - governmental and NGO - responsible for alleviating the refugee crisis.

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Refugee Movement Timeline

2011

In March 2011, in the midst of escalating protests and violence, Syrians begin to leave their homes, fleeing to neighboring countries for refuge. The intense fighting in Talkalakh in May causes many to flee to Lebanon, via an unofficial border crossing.

The military siege of Jisr al-Shughour in the northwest of Syria sends many refugees to Turkey, with thousands entering to escape shelling and fighting. July 2011 sees an increase in the number of Syrian refugees leaving for Jordan, most of whom come from Deraa, the town on Syria’s border known as the birthplace of the uprising.

By the end of 2011, approximately 2,600 Syrian asylum seekers have arrived in Jordan. Many Syrian refugees have also entered Lebanon and Turkey. By the end of the year, the Turkish government has spent $15 million on the creation of six camps, which house thousands of both refugees and military defectors. All the while, Turkey, for diplomatic reasons, claims that the displaced Syrians are “guests” and not “refugees,” although this does little to prevent Turkish-Syrian relations from deteriorating.

While the Syrian conflict is worsening, there is not yet widespread concern at the prospect of a Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. The “Jordan” sector of the UNHCR’s 2011 Global Report primarily focuses on the remaining Iraqi refugees in Jordan. Tellingly, the report calls the displaced Syrians “asylum seekers” instead of “refugees,” indicating that it was not yet decided whether or not they qualified for UNHCR support.

2012

In early 2012, the eastern part of Lebanon sees the Bekaa Valley become the country’s main refugee destination, with many of the new arrivals fleeing fighting in the cities of Homs, Quseir, Zabadani, and Hama.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq, also known as Iraqi Kurdistan, begins welcoming more Syrian refugees, with the opening of the Domiz Camp near the KRG-governed city of Dahuk in April 2012. Dahuk is soon stretched to capacity when, by 2013, it becomes Iraq’s largest Syrian refugee camp.

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1-All information taken from either http://syrianrefugees.eu/?page_id=163, or the UNHCR, unless otherwise indicated
2-2011 UNHCR Global Report Jordan, Overview
In the days leading up to the UN’s attempted April 12th ceasefire, fighting intensifies, and in one day over 2,500 refugees cross into Turkey; both rebels and civilian refugees claim that Syrian government forces planted landmines near the Turkish border, in an attempt to prevent both refugees from fleeing and supplies and reinforcements for insurgents from entering the country.

In June 2012, the UN for the first time officially declared the Syrian conflict a “civil war.” This announcement came shortly after UN monitors were fired on near the besieged city of Haffa.¹

July 2012’s further intensification of fighting sends up to 200,000 more Syrians fleeing, with thousands crossing into Turkey. Meanwhile, Greece increases its own border security in order to prevent the possibility of a large refugee influx by land and sea.

A bombing in Damascus later in July kills many high-ranking Ba’ath regime security officials, among them President Bashar al-Assad’s brother-in-law. Fearing a brutal response, 18,000 to 40,000 refugees enter Lebanon through the Masnaa border crossing over the next few days.

On July 29th, 2012, the UNHCR opens the Za’atari Refugee Camp in Jordan’s northern governorate of Mafraq, 10 km to the east of Mafraq City. The camp is built to hold up to 113,000 persons over the long term.

Refugee flow continues to increase, and in September, more than 11,000 refugees flee Syria in a single day. This constitutes the “highest [wave of refugees] we have had in quite some time”, according to Panos Moumtzis, the UNHCR’s regional coordinator.

In late September, there are protests over harsh living conditions in Jordan’s Za’atari camp, although the majority of Syrian refugees remain in Jordanian cities, spread throughout the country. The north, however, is disproportionately affected by the refugee crisis.

In December, the Second Syrian Regional Response Plan is released. At this time, over 525,000 refugees are being reached by humanitarian partners, in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt, with the UN refugee agency requesting support from the international community to the amount of US$1 billion, in order to support refugees fleeing to each of these countries.

According to the UNHCR, in December 2012, the average number of total refugees fleeing Syria each day is 3,288.¹

Within Jordan, the number of Syrians being assisted by the UNHCR has risen to almost 119,000 by the year’s end. Za’atari camp shelters more than 45,000 individuals by the end of 2012. The total Syrian refugee population is twice as high at 238,800 by the end of 2012. Of this population, and estimated 51% are female, and 54% are under the age of 18 years.²

2013
January sees a landmark political decision for Lebanon, as the Lebanese government agrees to register refugees despite divisions within the Cabinet. Very harsh weather conditions cause much suffering for both camp- and urban/rural-dwelling refugees.

In January, the UNHCR records an average of 5,081 people leaving Syria each day. By February, this daily average has risen to 8,275.

On March 6, 2013, the UNHCR’s official count of registered Syrian refugees and those being assisted as such reaches one million.

April sees Za’atari camp continuing to grow as Syrian refugees flee into Jordan in ever-higher numbers.

Between July 2013 and January 2014, violence spreads within Lebanon, with a series of bombings in Beirut targeting persons and institutions who are associated with Hezbollah, Iranian, and the Lebanese Shi’ite community. In late December 2013, a car bomb kills former Lebanese finance minister Mohamad Chatah, a well-known critic of the Syrian regime. No group or state claims responsibility for the attack. By the end of 2013, nearly 100 Lebanese have been killed by bombings in both Tripoli and Beirut. Fears rise that Lebanon’s ever-uneasy sectarian relations may deteriorate into further violence.

In the summer of 2013, the average number of refugees fleeing on a daily basis is approximately 6,000. According to António Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees: “Such a rate has not been seen since the mid-1990s”, making the Syrian crisis the cause of the largest refugee outflow since the Rwandan genocide.

¹-http://media-cache-ec0.pinimg.com/originals/62/21/9f/62219f73cb6c89cc555c413dabe359dc.jpg
²-2012 UNHCR Global Report Jordan, Overview
August sees thousands of refugees flooding Iraq and the KRG, with nearly 20,000 entering over just a few days. At this point, there are over 500,000 Syrians registered in or awaiting registration in Jordan, most of who have come from Deraa. Approximately 120,000 are being hosted in Za’atari camp—well over the camp’s planned maximum capacity—and others are registered in all of the governorates across Jordan, with Amman containing about 13 percent of these registered refugees.

By September, the number of refugees reaches two million, half of whom are children. In the middle of September, the largest international resettlement plan for Syrian refugees has been created, with Germany agreeing to resettle 5,000 refugees, who will be permitted to stay in Germany for two years. September 11, 2013 sees the first plane arriving, carrying 107 refugees to Germany.

Soon thereafter, an announcement is made by the Swedish Migration Board, stating that all Syrians who have come to Sweden in search of asylum and been granted temporary Swedish residency can now receive permanent residency permits. This applies to both individuals and their family members and dependents. With this announcement, Sweden becomes the first country in the EU to offer full asylum to refugees.

In October, sixteen countries confirm pledges to help resettle Syrian refugees, as the UNHCR encourages the international community to accept up to 30,000 refugees by the end of 2014.

Not all countries are keen to accept refugees, however; in November, the German NGO Pro Asyl claims that at the Greek-Turkish border and in the Aegean Sea, Greek armed forces are working to push back Syrians seeking refuge. In the same month, a rise in Syrian asylum seekers prompts Bulgaria to begin building a 30km border fence on its border with Turkey. The UN reacts, with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres admonishing European countries to leave their borders open and accessible; he makes this statement while visiting Bulgaria.

After the discovery of new polio cases in Syria, the largest-ever polio immunization campaign in the region is begun in December, with more than 23 million children being targeted in Syria and the surrounding countries. December also sees the UN launch its largest appeal yet, which calls for US$6.5 billion in aid. The UN estimates that roughly three-quarters of the 22.4 million population in Syria will require humanitarian assistance in 2014.

By the end of 2013, nearly ten percent of Jordan’s population is made up of Syrian refugees, with an increase from 119,400 UNHCR-registered refugees to 585,300 within the year. Fifty-two percent of those assisted were women, and 53% were below the age of 18 years.1

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1- 2013 UNHCR Global Report Jordan, Overview
2014
At the end of January 2014, the United Kingdom announces that it will take in Syrian refugees.

In some towns in host countries, such as the Lebanese border town of Arsal as of February, Syrian refugees now number more than the town’s original residents. Syrians also are the majority in the Jordanian governorate of Mafraq. Many refugees, including those in Lebanon, are at acute risk of death due to malnutrition.

In March, UNICEF releases a report on the 5.5 million Syrian children who live in Syria and neighboring countries. At this point, approximately 1.2 million children have found themselves as refugees in host countries, and roughly 37,000 children have been born since the conflict began.

By early April, more than one million Syrian refugees are in Lebanon alone. In late June, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç announces that there are over one million Syrian refugees living in Turkey. At this time, there are 20 refugee camps in the country, with most spread along the 500 mile border with Syria. A report from Development Initiatives, a research group, announces Turkey as the third-largest donor of humanitarian aid in 2013, behind the US and the UK, having spent more than $1.5 billion on relief projects for the refugees.

Within Jordan, according to the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, there are currently over 1.4 million Syrians being treated as refugees. This number includes both those who had come to Jordan before the crisis and were subsequently unable to return, as well as those who had come in after the war broke out.¹

Overview of Aid Plans

There are two main programs responding to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan: The Sixth Regional Response Plan, overseen by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees; and the National Resilience Plan, under the auspices of the Jordanian Government. These plans are meant to overlap as little possible, and the UNHCR asserts that it coordinates closely with the Jordanian Government to avoid redundancies in relief projects and planning.

¹-Interview with Ms. Fida Gharaibeh at the MOPIC
The Jordanian component of the Sixth Regional Response Plan (RRP6) is the project of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees. The RRP6 is a region-wide relief plan that includes a Jordan-focused response plan alongside plans for Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq. The RRP6 is primarily intended to provide relief to Syrian refugees themselves, although some mentions of host communities appear in UNHCR publications and press releases. The RRP6 also explicitly states that it aims to help Jordanians who live in areas with high refugee concentrations.¹

The National Resilience Plan (NRP) is the Jordanian Government’s own response to the Syrian refugee crisis, intended to minimize the spillover effects of the Syrian refugee crisis on Jordanian host communities. The NRP is under the aegis of the Host Community Support Platform (HCSP). The HCSP is a Jordanian Government initiative under the direction of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC). The NRP is a three-year plan² intended to preserve Jordan’s economy and human development. It emphasizes assistance for Jordanian host communities, and its programs are meant to harmonize the Syrian refugee response with Jordan’s domestic development goals. Any help that it delivers to Syrian refugees is incidental to its goal of supporting Jordanians.

In general, RRP6 is meant to provide short-term emergency aid, and focuses on Syrian refugees in Jordan. The RRP6 targets Jordanians, but as a secondary goal. Also, a review of mid-year funding data shows that UNHCR programs that target both Syrians and Jordanians tend to be more of an abstract, macro-level nature (for example, information-sharing, public outreach campaigns, awareness-building). Most of the UNHCR’s specific item and service provision campaigns are targeted overwhelmingly at Syrians.

The NRP, on the other hand, is meant to strengthen medium- and long-term coping systems, and focuses explicitly on Jordanians themselves, only assisting Syrian refugees when doing so is a part of Jordanian community support work.

In addition to the RRP6 and the NRP, there are other, smaller relief programs operating in parallel to the main response. Ahl al-Sunnah, an Islamic network, is one such initiative. It is primarily funded by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) donors, and is tied to a conservative Islamist ideology. Its work is lower-profile than the NRP and the RRP6, and it seems to interact little with the two mainstream relief tracks.

Palestinian refugees who have been displaced from refugee camps in Syria are a major concern, but they—like the Palestinian refugees already present in Jordan—are the responsibility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). UNRWA is an extremely large refugee support initiative, but it is only charged with assisting displaced Palestinians. It cooperates with the UNHCR to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis, but it is not an integral part of the RRP6 or NRP, and does not appear to be involved with strategic response planning.

**RRP6 Overview**

The UNHCR’s RRP6 is a multifaceted program. The different categories of aid that the RRP6 aims to deliver can be identified from the list of official UNHCR Working Groups, and the categories of UNHCR activities listed on the UNHCR’s Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. A list of “Priority Areas of Humanitarian Intervention” was published in the RRP6’s official launch document; the list lines up almost perfectly with the current Working Groups, except for the absence of Livelihoods support among the “priority areas.”

The Sector Working Groups (SWG) are administrative and strategic subdivisions of the UNHCR authorities in Jordan. They are the official UNHCR entities responsible for ensuring the well-being of the Syrian refugees, and for coordinating the various humanitarian activities in Jordan. Coordination of the refugee relief response is the one common responsibility of the SWGs: Virtually all of them emphasize that they set goals and ensure the quality of relief projects by bringing together and consulting with Jordanian governmental agencies, Jordanian civil society groups, Jordanian NGOs, international NGOs (INGOs), and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) in their official public statements.

While the Working Groups and the Priority Areas of Humanitarian Intervention generally overlap, there are some noteworthy differences between the two lists. For example, the RRP6 designates “Livelihoods” one of eight Priority Areas, but there is no Livelihoods Working Group. Likewise, Inter-Sector Coordination and Cash Assistance both have working groups, but were not listed as Priority Areas.1

**HCSP/National Resilience Plan Overview**

The National Resilience Plan (NRP) is a three-year program established in September 2013,2 intended to prevent the deterioration of Jordan’s development achievements in face of the Syrian refugee crisis. The NRP is designed to build on and expand existing national development projects whenever possible.3 It is a parallel initiative to the RRP6, and is intended to overlap with it as little as possible. Numerous agencies are partnered with both it and the UNHCR. The HCSP is composed

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1-UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Strategic Overview, 11.
3-Ibid, 6.
of five governmental Task Forces along with three Reference Groups. Strangely, in the Document Library on the HCSP’s website, there is a “Food Security Sector” which does not correspond to any Task Force or Reference Group (food security is a component of Livelihoods in the HCSP structure).¹

Although the refugee crisis has harmed communities across Jordan, the HCSP currently concentrates on northern Jordan, primarily the Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa governorates. Eventually, the Jordanian Government intends to expand the relief program geographically as the crisis in the north is resolved.

**Review of RRP6 Sector Working Groups**

**Inter-Sector Working Group**

The Inter-Sector Working Group (ISWG) is responsible for ensuring coordination between the other Sector Working Groups. According to its page on the UNHCR Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, the ISWG meets once per month, “with membership of the Sector chairs and representatives of the Jordan International NGO Forum.”² The ISWG also serves as the bridge between the various SWGs and the head refugee coordination body in the UNHCR’s Jordan division, the **Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF)**. It lists its main goals as to:

- **Coordinate, identify, process and elevate relevant topics/issues to the IATF, referring to IATF for policy decisions and guidance at the heads of agency level.**

- **Facilitate the flow of information between Sectors, and other fora.**

- **Optimize complementarity between Sector activities, by building on a series of common processes.**

- **Promote consistency in co-ordination standards and capacity between Sectors.**

- **Ensure cross-cutting issues, including gender equality programming, are properly reflected in Sector activities.³**

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3-Ibid
Cash Working Group
The Cash Working Group’s mission is to provide cash assistance to Syrian refugees both in and out of the camps and to vulnerable Jordanian nationals. It describes cash assistance as “a flexible way to complement assistance provided by other sectors and cover not addressed needs” of recipients.

Cash assistance is a popular form of aid, as recipients welcome the dignifying effect of being able to choose their own priorities. The group uses “needs assessments, vulnerability analysis, distribution methods, post distribution and evaluation measures” in deciding how to allocate cash assistance funding in Jordan. It divides cash assistance into the following categories: urgent, ongoing/regular, and seasonal. It claims that its partners have sought to “to strengthen the link between emergency assistance and more durable solutions,” and that it is committed to coordinating with the HCSP.

Education Working Group
The Education Working Group calls its goal “to ensure uninterrupted access to public education for displaced Syrian children across the country including those in refugee camps;” notable by its absence is a goal pertaining to Jordanian host community children. However, the ESWG makes it clear that helping Syrian children means boosting the capacities of the Jordanian educational system. It aims to provide extra learning spaces, give disadvantaged Syrian children remedial classes, to train Jordanian teachers, and to ensure that boys and girls have equal access to schooling. It lists its main objectives as:

1. To provide a coordination forum in which all the appropriate organisations and institutions collaborate with the aim to support the Jordanian education system in current and future emergencies.

2. To plan and implement a response strategy: applying norms and standards, developing capacity, responding to needs, monitoring and evaluation, and conducting advocacy.

3. To ensure continued access to quality education in a safe and protective environment for all vulnerable children.

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2-Ibid.
4-Ibid.
**Food Security Working Group**

According to its official statement on the UNHCR Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal (IISP), the Food Security Working Group focuses on both providing food assistance and enhancing coordination in its sector. It focuses on “information sharing, mapping, identifying gaps and avoiding duplication.”

It also aims to connect NGOs, UN agencies, and “other partners” to one another through meetings.

**Health Working Group**

The Health Working Group coordinates the healthcare response to Syrian refugees’ needs. It aims to provide IGOs, domestic and foreign NGOs, government partners, and donors with common planning and leadership. Its main goal is to enable partners to share information and to pool resources and expertise. According to its official statement on the IISP, “The main strategic approach is to support and strengthen national capacity in responding to the humanitarian crisis by maintaining a platform for all partners and stakeholders to coordinate their response.”

The Health Working Group is one of the most broadly-focused, far-reaching SWGs involved in the UNHCR response. It differentiates between primary, secondary, tertiary, and community-based levels of health interventions, and between the unique health needs of women, girls, boys, and men. As such, it is divided into five subgroups:

**Reproductive Health**

The Reproductive Health Sub Working Group aims to provide accessible, quality reproductive health services for women and men to the Syrian refugee population, to host communities, and to “others.” It emphasizes long-term solutions and community resilience in its official public statement.

**Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (co-managed with Protection WG)**

The Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Sub Working Group is a joint project of the Health and Protection Working Groups. The Health WG is responsible for clinical psychiatric care, while Protection is responsible for psychosocial support. The IASC Intervention Pyramid guides the Sub Group’s work: It aims to lay a groundwork of basic services and security with community and family support as the next level of care, enabling the provision of focused non-specialized support.

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2- Ibid.
and specialized services as needed. The Sub Group aims to provide specialized services as efficiently as possible by making the first three levels of support strong. In particular, it concentrates on strengthening community support mechanisms and providing home-based care. It also works with Jordanian Government partners (MSD, FPD and MOH) to incorporate psychosocial support into the national healthcare service.

**Nutrition**

The Nutrition Sub-Working Group monitors the nutritional wellbeing of “those affected by the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan.” To support monitoring, it conducts nutrition surveys and works to strengthen Jordanian nutrition screening programs. It also aims to coordinate the work of relief partners in nutrition fields. Lastly, it provides direct responses to malnutrition, anemia, and micronutrient deficiencies through prevention and therapy.

**Non-Communicable Diseases**

The Non-Communicable Diseases Task Force is a new sub-group. It aims to support the MOH in the fight against non-communicable disease (NCD), and to give relief partners a space to share expertise and strategies for tackling NCDs. The sub-group was formed after the Jordanian MOH reported that it was struggling to handle the NCD challenge caused by the Syrian refugee crisis. The Syrian refugees are from a country that was economically transitioning before the outbreak of the war, and thus they have a high NCD burden. According to UNHCR partners, NCDs pose one of the greatest unfilled gaps in the refugee response. Even global health standards for tackling NCDs were felt to be underdeveloped. As of July 2014, the NCD Task Force is still in its earliest stages of work, and it has no officially published mission statement.

**Community Health**

The Community Health Task Group was formed in late 2013, in response to the need to address community health: This need was felt for both Syrian refugees and Jordanians. A major goal is to raise community awareness of their rights to access healthcare, what care is available where, and of good health practices. Among its founding goals is to provide community health volunteers (CHVs)

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4- UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 52.
with the resources and expertise of international humanitarian organizations. As of July 2014, it was still in the preliminary stages of planning and has no finalized mission statement (although farther along than the NCD Task Force).

**Non-Food Items Working Group**

The NFI Working Group is responsible for “the basic household needs of women, girls, boys and men […] in both camp and urban/rural areas.” Key NFIs include “blankets, mattresses, hygiene kits, and kitchen sets.” In the camps, refugees are given essential NFIs on arrival and consumable items are regularly distributed to camp residents. Outside of camps, items are distributed as needed when cash assistance is not used to meet NFI needs. Conditional cash assistance and NFI voucher programs are two major relief strategies. The NFI Working Group is also responsible for monitoring its programs, and for ensuring that all Syrians, regardless of gender and age, have equal access to NFIs.

**Protection Working Group**

The Protection Working Group oversees the implementation of the UNHCR’s Inter-Agency Protection Strategy (IAPS). The IAPS is centered on:

- Ensuring access to basic rights, including the right to seek asylum and timely access to registration and documentation as a prerequisite for proper protection delivery;

- Expanding community outreach and development of community-based protection mechanisms, with a focus on community empowerment and self-reliance, and ensuring that women, girls, boys and men are engaged in the planning, implementation and evaluation of services

- Mitigating and reducing the risks and consequences of SGBV (sexual and gender-based violence), while improving the quality of multi-sector response services, as well as expanding access and reach of services

- Ensuring that emergency child protection interventions are strengthened and harmonized;

- Exploring third country resettlement/durable solution options as a protection response to cases with special needs.

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Its goal for 2014 is to “swiftly and substantially” boost its support to the Jordanian Government and to host communities, in order to relieve the socioeconomic pressures of the refugee crisis. Protection also will work with other Working Groups in order to “mainstream protection into the refugee response.”¹

Protection has three sub-groups. One, Mental Health and Psychosocial Support, is shared with the Health Working Group. The other two are solely under Protection’s jurisdiction:

**Child Protection**
The Child Protection Sub Working Group has five response priorities:

I) Unaccompanied and separated children (UAC/SC)
II) Child labor
III) Child soldiers
IV) Violence against children
V) Children in trouble with the law

The sub-group aims to build the capacity of partners to protect children’s welfare, to mainstream child protection into the broader humanitarian response, to prevent abuses, to provide at-risk children with safe spaces for disclosure, and to refer at-risk children to the appropriate venues for assistance. The goal for 2014 is to improve case management systems through training, stronger referral pathways nationwide, and the implementation of standard operating procedures for child protection.²

**Sexual and Gender-Based Violence**
In 2014, the Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Sub-Working Group seeks to combat early and forced marriage, domestic violence, survival sex, and sexual violence. It seeks to prevent abuses by involving women, children, and men peer-to-peer networks on the community level, and to build awareness of the rights and responsibilities of women, girls, boys, and men. Disclosure is also encouraged through the deployment of mobile response teams and the expansion of safe spaces. Another goal for 2014 is to pay more attention to boys and male victims of SGBV.³

**Shelter Working Group**
The Shelter Working Group aims to provide Syrian refugees with adequate shelter both in the camps and in host communities, and to provide related services and facilities. In camps, shelter assistance consists of emergency tents and

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¹-Ibid.
semi-permanent pre-fab housing units. Outside of the camps, the Shelter Working Group provides five general services:

Upgrades inadequate refugee housing units to meet a basic level of dignity;

Makes sure that housing is “available, affordable and accessible” by helping property owners get vacant or in-construction units on the rental market;

Provides conditional financial aid to meet rental costs and ensure tenure security
Prepares housing units for inclement weather through the distribution of “house adaptation kits” or conditional financial aid in grants;

Informs all Syrian refugees of their rights and responsibilities as tenants.¹

**WASH Working Group**
The WASH Working Group is officially responsible for water, sanitation, and hygiene services to all persons affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. Its goal is to ensure that Jordanian WASH services meet a series of minimum acceptable standards as determined by Jordanian national standards, Sphere standards, UNHCR standards, and the input of humanitarian partners. Its four central goals are:

*To ensure safe, equitable and sustainable access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking, personal and domestic hygiene practices;*

*To provide safe and appropriate sanitation facilities;*

*To minimize the risk of WASH related diseases through access to improved hygienic practices, hygiene promotion and delivery of hygienic products and services on a sustainable and equitable basis;*

*To establish and maintain effective mechanisms for WASH coordination at national and sub-national levels.*²

**HCSP Task Forces**
The HCSP task forces are formalized, government-sanctioned entities created to “operationalize” the HCSP’s goals.³ The five task forces are Education; Health; Livelihoods and Employment; Municipal Services; and Water & Sanitation.

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Education

The aim of the Education sector is:

To provide access to quality inclusive education for all children – particularly the most vulnerable – through formal, non-formal and informal opportunities

Specific objectives are as follows:

- Strengthening the capacity of the educational system to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services
- Ensuring access to quality educational services for all, particularly those living in areas that have been most affected and made more vulnerable by the refugee crisis

The Education Task Force’s approach includes formal education, as well as special initiatives for children who have been so badly left behind that they are ineligible for formal education (of which the Jordanian government estimates there are 60,000). The NRP’s Education goals overlap with those of the 2013-2020 National Poverty Strategy, and those of the ERfKE education reform program, which aims to create a school system that produces graduates who can contribute to robust national development. In particular, ERfKE and the NRP both aim to strengthen education in grades K-10.

The Jordanian public education system has been strained badly. As families struggle to make ends meet, they have begun pulling their children out of private schools and sending them to public ones. Key reforms have been delayed as the system scramble to make room for Syrian children, teachers are often undertrained and overworked, and national test scores have declined. Jordan is likely to remain one of the more stable countries in the Middle East, and as such the HCSP warns that in addition to fighting the current crisis, the Ministry of Education (MOED) must be made ready to withstand similar shocks in the future. This warning is especially salient in light of the so-called “Islamic State’s” (IS) summer 2014 offensive in Iraq, and the large displacement that crisis caused. While IS did not drive any Iraqis into Jordan, if it seeks to expand its “caliphate” in Syria it could reignite the massive wave of flight that occurred in the fall of 2013.

The HCSP admits that it is “unclear” how the Syrian refugee crisis has affected the most vulnerable groups in Jordan, such as refugee-hosting municipalities and low-income households. The availability of quality kindergarten and pre-K programs

1-Ibid, 19.
2-Ibid.
3-Ibid, 20
4-Ibid, 21
and the status of special education are especially uncertain. More monitoring in these fields is necessary if Jordan is to craft an adequate early education policy in light of the crisis.

**Health**

The aim of the Health sector is:

To improve the health of citizens residing in the areas most affected by the Syrian crisis

Specific objectives are as follows:

- Urgent financial support to MOH budget provided to cover the cost incurred as a result of Syrian crisis
- Gap in medical specialties facing shortages filled in
- Absorptive capacities of MOH hospitals and health centres, especially in areas with high concentration of Syrians scaled up
- Critical equipment, ambulances and vehicles provided to MOH hospitals and health centres, where needed
- Ongoing MOH projects and activities strengthened and sustained

The Health Task Force combines its relief and system maintenance goals with an aim to provide Jordanian health systems with oversight and monitoring during the crisis.

Since the beginning of the crisis in 2011, the Jordanian healthcare system has faced severe challenges and shortages. Its financial resources have been strained, it is short on physical plant and equipment, and healthcare professionals are becoming overworked. Syrian refugees are at a heightened risk of communicable and non-communicable diseases, and host communities’ health has been threatened too. Many refugees have war-related health problems, particularly regarding mental health.

**Livelihoods and Employment**

The aim of the Livelihoods sector is:

To strengthen the capacity of poor and vulnerable households in host communities to cope with and recover in a sustainable way from the impact of the Syrian crisis, and mitigate future effects on their employment and livelihoods

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1-Ibid, 20
2-Ibid, 27
Specific objectives are as follows:

• Create more and better job opportunities for the poor and vulnerable (women and youth)
• Revive the local economies of the most affected areas through support to existing and new micro and small enterprises for poor and vulnerable households (women and youth)
• Restore and preserve pastoral livelihoods, rangeland and natural resources
• Improve food security for poor and vulnerable households

Besides the expected concerns of job creation and support to small businesses, the Task Force also prioritizes support for farmers and improving food security.¹

The Jordanian economy—already vulnerable due to previous shocks including those caused by the 2003-2011 Iraq War—is showing serious signs of stagnation, and inflation of consumer prices is also a growing concern. This is particularly threatening to poor Jordanian families, women, and young Jordanians. High youth unemployment has, in the HCSP’s view, become a “structural” problem (i.e., one that cannot be solved without serious, far-reaching economic reforms), and existing jobs are often unproductive, of low quality, or do not fully use Jordanians’ acquired skills. The high percentage of foreign workers has helped drive down wages, and the population influx has forced prices up. The Jordanian working poor now must compete with Syrians for basic jobs. Women are especially harmed by this trend, as they appear to be losing jobs to Syrians. Labor protection laws are laxly enforced, which contributes to the deteriorating situation of working Jordanians. Agricultural resources, meanwhile, have been pushed near their limits.

**Municipal Services**

The aim of the Municipal Services sector is:

> To make the Jordanian local governance system responsive to host citizens’ and communities’ needs, identified in governorates most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis

Specific objectives are as follows:

• Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis
• Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socioeconomic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees
• Local governance systems become more resilient to crisis over the long-term as a result of better performance in core functions, and more enabling legal and fiscal framework

¹-Ibid, 39
The refugee crisis has impeded the basic processes of governance in affected municipalities. Local governments have been forced to take on unsustainable amounts of debt; this problem is compounded by the fact that there is already little public financial oversight in Jordan. Furthermore, established approaches to municipal governance have proven ineffective in meeting the needs of towns and cities that have absorbed the largest numbers of refugees.

One serious gap is that the refugee crisis’ effects on municipalities outside of the Mafraq and Irbid governorates are understudied. The crisis can potentially affect even communities that do not have large refugee populations due to the demands it places on national-level resources. What is certain is that in the governorates that are most affected, major development initiatives have been disrupted and planned governmental reforms have been pushed back while authorities scramble to cope with the refugee influx.¹

**Water and Sanitation**

The aim of the WASH sector is:

*To enhance the capacity of the Government of Jordan and the Host communities to meet the increase in demand in the Water & Sanitation services.*

Specific objectives are as follows:

- Improving the quantity, quality and efficiency of Water Delivery
- Expanding and improving Sanitation services
- Addressing Cross Cutting WASH issues

The Water and Sanitation Task Force is facing a critical situation, since Jordan is the fourth most water-scarce country in the world.² The HCSP starkly warns that “Without new levels of investment in the sector, the further decline in service levels can be fairly guaranteed.”³

Water sourcing and water and sanitation infrastructure remain serious gaps.⁴ Water distribution and revenue collection are alarmingly inefficient, with serious losses registered routinely. Another concern is whether or not Jordanian water authorities have the capacity to carry out programs, even if they are fully-funded.⁵ “Cross-cutting water and sanitation issues” are also under-addressed: For example, encouraging efficient use in public spaces like overcrowded schools is considered a “political orphan.”⁶

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¹-Ibid, 43
²-Ibid, 55
³-Ibid, 55
⁴-Ibid, 55
⁵-Ibid, 56
⁶-Ibid, 57
HCSP Reference Groups
The Reference Groups are “ad hoc” bodies designed to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis in less formalized ways. As a sign of their informal nature, they (unlike the Task Forces) have no dedicated pages on the HCSP’s website. There also are no official projects associated with the Reference Groups. However, their specialties are no less important to Jordan’s long-term stability than those of the Task Forces, and their goals are often no less ambitious.

Social Protection
The Social Protection Reference Group is led by the Ministry of Social Development, and supported by UNICEF and UN Women. The HCSP’s goal for the Social Protection sector is:

To give vulnerable groups affected by the crisis access to improved social protection and improved legal and operational frameworks and services in governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis.

Specific objectives are as follows:

- Strengthen and expand national and sub-national protection systems to meet the needs of vulnerable groups
- Improve social protection and poverty alleviation mechanisms for vulnerable people at national and sub-national levels
- Mitigate violence and reduced social tensions through increased coordination between GoJ & community based mechanisms

Housing
The Housing Reference Group is led by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, in collaboration with the Housing and Urban Development Corporation. It is supported by UN-Habitat and UNOPS. The aim of the Housing sector is:

To give Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian households improved access to affordable and adequate housing within a housing sector that helps meet the housing needs of all Jordanians

Specific objectives are as follows:

- Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian households have increased access to affordable and adequate housing
- Housing-related institutions, regulations and policies enable housing markets to meet the needs of Syrian refugees and all Jordanians, including vulnerable groups

1-ibid,62
Housing has significant implications for the other sectors. The HCSP states that “guiding the location of new housing to align with infrastructure” is necessary to improve the quality of services like water, sanitation, roads, clinics, and more.¹

Housing is an important gap to fill, as vulnerable households are being squeezed to avoid homelessness. The HCSP states that the most recent humanitarian response program put camp housing before non-camp support, and warns that without major support from the government and the private sector, the current relief plan is likely to fall short.²

Energy

The Energy Reference Group is led by the Ministry of Energy, and supported by UNDP and UNOPS. The aim of the Energy sector is:

To address the increased demands for energy arising as a result of the arrival of the Syrian refugee population through innovative and sustainable solutions

Specific objectives are as follows:
• Rapid sustainable energy solutions to offset incremental energy demand (short-term)
• Solar energy solutions for growing energy supply needs (medium-term)

The fact that energy is still relatively non-institutionalized in the Jordanian resilience program is a major gap. In an interview with the CSS, Senator Jawad Anani stated that disorganization in the energy sector is one of Jordan’s greatest economic weaknesses. Energy imports are a major cause of Jordanian debt and contribute greatly to risk, as political developments in Jordan’s major energy suppliers such as Egypt could destabilize the Jordanian economy with relatively little warning. As an extremely water-scarce, arid country, Jordan is also vulnerable to the effects of climate change, which makes sustainability extremely important to Jordan. However, it must be said that as a small country, Jordanian domestic energy policies will have little impact on global greenhouse gases emissions unless it combines domestic reforms with aggressive international lobbying. Climate change adaptation is a broad issue with serious implications for virtually all HCSP divisions.

¹-Ibid, 34
²-Ibid, 34
Administrative Structure: Planning, Implementation, and Participation

Introduction: Coordinated Division of Labor

The overall doctrine of the Jordanian refugee response can be called a coordinated division of labor. There are two major parallel systems in place for directing the response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan: The UNHCR’s RRP6, and the Host Community Support Platform (HCSP). Both are officially under the Government of Jordan’s authority, and the UNHCR coordinates closely on certain projects with Jordanian state actors. The HCSP, however, is a full part of the Jordanian Government, while direction of the RRP6’s day-to-day implementation falls to the UNHCR leadership.

The UNHCR’s Regional Response Plan is designed to primarily respond to the needs of Syrian refugees, while the HCSP’s NRP is meant to ease the burden on Jordanian host communities due to the crisis. While the UNHCR and the Government of Jordan are working to minimize overlap between the RRP6 and the NRP, the UNHCR reported in April 2014 that UN initiatives were still responsible for providing 700,000 Jordanian nationals with short-term aid.\(^1\) This is not necessarily indicative of redundancy; it is very possible that the aid the UNHCR delivered could not have been given at all if the Jordanian government alone were responsible for assisting host communities. But because the UNHCR and the HCSP still have a communication gap, there is every reason to expect that given the sheer scale of the refugee and resilience responses, there are redundant projects that have not yet been identified.

The UNHCR and the HCSP have aimed to coordinate and plan with one another for maximum efficiency and minimal overlaps. Internally, the UNHCR and the HCSP are divided into discrete task forces. The UNHCR has sought to minimize internal redundancies by strengthening coordination systems between its own partners.

One potential benefit of specialization and division is that it can lessen the strain on each contributing authority if there is sufficient communication in the planning stages. One example of this succeeding is that the UNHCR was able to cut all planned projects that fell under the HCSP’s purview, thus freeing its resources and enabling it to focus more intensely on Syrian refugees.\(^2\) Furthermore, maintaining separate, focused response plans enables the UNHCR and the HCSP to reap the known benefits of the division of labor: specialization enables units to operate more efficiently in their fields, and to gain deeper and more thorough expertise.

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2-ibid
Management Structure

**Administrative Structure: UNHCR**

The RRP6 is officially under the [Jordanian Government’s](#) authority. The [Syrian Refugee Affairs](#) Department (SRAD) within the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is the Jordanian state institution explicitly devoted to responding to the refugee crisis,¹ and the UNHCR involves SRAD to a great extent in logistical work, especially the administration of the Za’atari camp. However, the UNHCR generally acts with great autonomy from governmental supervision.

The **Inter-Agency Task Force** is responsible for actually overseeing the response. The UNHCR calls it a “steering committee” that oversees the Sector Working Groups, and directly works on strategizing, advocacy, and funding operations. The IATF is responsible for making sure that the UNHCR communicates with the HCSP, and with the Humanitarian Country Team and the UN Country Team.²

The nine **Sector Working Groups (SWGs)** are the core “architecture”³ of the RRP6 (for a review of each sector, see the previous chapter). They direct humanitarian work in the specific sectors of the RRP6. The Sectors are intended to complement each other without duplicating each other. One key responsibility of Sector Chairs is to review appeals from partners for amendments to the RRP6. The **Inter-Sector Working Group (ISWG)** is a unique SWG composed of the other sector chairs and representatives from the **International NGO Forum (INGO Forum)**⁴, an independent body through which foreign NGOs communicate, cooperate, and share data with one another. The IATF controls the different Sectors through the ISWG. The ISWG is directly responsible for ensuring that the different Sectors communicate with one another by providing them with a common forum. The ISWG is also responsible for ensuring that each SWG’s work meets quality standards, for making sure that all sectors are consistently coordinating with UNHCR partners and with one another, and for preventing duplication of activities between the RRP6 and the NRP. The ISWG seems to have more control over preventing duplication by monitoring RRP6 partners than it does over NRP-based activities.

There are many additional miscellaneous task forces and groups that complement the core Sector Working Groups. The most fully-institutionalized, well-connected of these supplementary teams is the **Refugee Sector Gender Focal Point Network**, ¹United Nations, UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 16, [http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php).

²»Inter-Agency Coordination Briefing Kit,» Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, July 10, 2014, 7, UNHCR.

³-Ibid.

⁴-Ibid.
which consists of special representatives ("focal points") from each Sector who make sure that sector work takes into account unique gender-based needs. The Network is led by the Senior Gender Capacity Advisor, who reports to the IATF. The Youth Task Force has worked in the Za’atari camp since late 2012, but is only now being rolled out on a national level. It currently reports to both the Education and Protection SWGs. The Age & Disability Task Force aims to ensure that refugee relief is generally accessible to disabled persons and seniors; it currently only has a working presence in Za’atari. The Communications Group reports to the ISWG. It helps the Sectors communicate with their beneficiaries (especially donors), directs “common and joint messaging,” and oversees media and advocacy events.

The Information Management Coordination Group (IMCG) is the most important bridge between the UNHCR and the HCSP. The HCSP and the UNHCR co-chair the group (it appears to be directly under the ISWG) and it is intended to serve as the key coordinating platform between the NRP and the RRP. The successful working of this group is critical to ensuring that the HCSP and the UNHCR complement one another’s work synergistically. Its five responsibilities are:

1. Systematic information sharing
2. Coordinated monitoring and information collection systems
3. Providing a forum to discuss the quality of data, methodologies, and other technical issues
4. Inter-sector data analysis
5. Harmonization of standards to assist data comparison between sectors.

The UNHCR reports: “Significant investments are being made in information management tools to facilitate coordination, including improvements to the refugee response portal (data.unhcr.org), and an online activities planning, tracking and reporting tool specifically for the RRP (syrianrefugeeresponse.org).

The UNHCR has decentralized its operations as the Syrian refugees have diffused through Jordan. It opened four field offices as of May 4-17 2014 in Amman, Azraq, Mafraq, and Irbid, in addition to the central UNHCR office in Amman.

1-lbid,12
2-lbid
3-lbid
4-lbid
5-lbid,6
6-lbid,13
Administrative Structure: HCSP
The Host Community Support Platform is led by the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (MOPIC). MOPIC leads and coordinates the overall drafting of the refugee response plan. The HCSP’s membership includes representatives from Jordanian Government line ministries, donors, international NGOs, and UN agencies. The HCSP was responsible for the Needs Assessment Review (NAR) of 2013. The NAR’s findings were the information that guided the drafting of the actual National Resilience Plan, and NAR-determined goals currently guide the work of the HCSP’s component organizations.¹ The HCSP Secretariat is responsible for overall monitoring of relief efforts and progress.²

Five formalized Task Forces are under the HCSP’s command. These task forces exchanged and compiled the data that made the NAR possible, consulted on the strategies underlying the National Resilience Plan, and are now responsible for planning the particular interventions in their respective sectors. One particularly important role of the Task Forces has been identifying priority areas of intervention so that funding can be channeled where it is needed quickly and efficiently.³

In addition to the Task Forces, there are three informal Reference Groups, which have consultation roles in their domains but are not institutionalized bodies. The Reference Groups do less implementing work than the Task Forces, although they provide the HCSP with a direct link to key partners.

The Jordanian Government maintains overall responsibility for each sector, but the details or work are left to the Task Forces. The Task Forces also enable donors to collaborate in the relief process on all levels, from the macro level to project-specific support.⁴ The Task Force structure means that donors can influence and observe resilience programs on a finer, more project-specific level.

The HCSP eventually aims to implement an overarching, coherent humanitarian framework for the Syrian refugee response in Jordan that can oversee all aid, whether targeted to Syrians, host communities, or both.⁵ However, it currently only cooperates with the United Nations on a case-by-case basis.

⁵-HCSP. National Resilience Plan 2014-2016, 63.
Review of Coordination Structures

**Jordanian-international coordination**

A groundwork for Jordanian-international cooperation on refugee affairs has been in place since 2007, when the international community worked with Jordanian authorities on the Iraqi refugee crisis. The main Jordanian institution responsible for working with the UNHCR is the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. The UNHCR and the Jordanian government agree that close communication is necessary for successfully managing the crisis. MOPIC is responsible for international coordination in general, and for cooperation related to the HCSP in particular.

Meanwhile, the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD) serves as a special Jordanian governmental task force for ensuring Jordanian cooperation with the UNHCR in all affairs directly related to Syrian refugee relief. SRAD was established in 2014 under the Ministry of the Interior, and seems to have the most direct influence over the refugee camps. SRAD has great authority in the Za’atari refugee camp: All new aid activities in the camp must have SRAD’s approval alongside that of camp management in order to proceed.¹

Jordanian authorities and international aid partners generally agree that although Jordanian-international cooperation has improved, there are still serious remaining gaps. While the UNHCR and key Jordanian governmental agencies have begun regularly meeting with one another and the IMCG has been formally chartered to facilitate this communication, there is not yet a full strategic framework for cooperation. On its main webpage, the UNHCR’s Jordan division states that it is still expanding cooperation with the Jordanian Government, indicating that UN authorities recognize that currently Jordan and international partners are not cooperating effectively enough.² As evidence of this gap, UNHCR Standard Operating Procedures laid out in April 2014 currently do not cover getting project approval from Jordanian line ministries, MOPIC, or SRAD.

Sen. Jawad Anani highlighted the UN-Jordan communications problem, saying that “right now there is very little knowledge management … there are lots of meetings between the UNHCR and the Jordanian Government, but the meetings aren’t very efficient. I’d favor fewer players.” Fida Gharibeh of MOPIC called the UNHCR “reluctant to consider working on resilience and humanitarian aid together,” and expressed a wish for more productive Jordanian-UN meetings.

¹-UNHCR, «Inter-Agency Coordination Briefing Kit,» 15.
²-»UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response.» http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486566.html
The Jordanian Government supports the UNHCR most directly in the administrative necessities of the refugee relief response. For example, Jordanian authorities from SRAD and the UNHCR cooperate very closely in registering Syrian refugees, with considerable success. Also, the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is responsible for issuing refugees with service cards. Currently, the MOI issues these cards on the same day as their UNHCR verification interviews, thereby minimizing the gap between when refugees register and when they can start receiving aid.¹

One key reason for stronger coordination between the HCSP and the UNHCR is the avoidance of redundancies between the two tracks of aid, and the promotion of synergies. The HCSP states that it took the UNHCR’s work into account from the earliest stages of planning the National Resilience Plan, and that it has avoided any overlap with the UNHCR’s Regional Response Plan.² The UNHCR also emphasizes the importance of communicating with the HCSP, and emphasizes in its Jordan Mid-Year Update that this communication is necessary as the refugee response moves from relief to resilience-building, as this shift will entail the transfer of authority over key projects from the UNHCR to the NRP.³

**Internal UN response coordination**

The UNHCR’s work in Jordan has become fairly well-coordinated. One point in the UNHCR’s favor is that it has a fairly clear, well-defined internal administrative structure. The Inter-Sector Working Group has a clear mandate to oversee the other relief sectors and sub-sectors. The report also shows a concern about research being conducted for research’s sake, rather than for any concrete benefit to the refugee population. However, it lays out very clear instructions for undertaking a project.

The UNHCR has also moved to standardize the work its partners do through the introduction of standard operating procedures (SOP) in April 2014. The SOP are intended to ensure quality control, and give SWGs clear guidelines on approving projects. The SOP were formulated in response to concerns that relief NGOs and IGOs were working without focus or coordination, leading to redundant studies, cluttered information, and “assessment fatigue”⁴ among Syrian refugees who were becoming tired of repetitive polling on the same group of issues.

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³ UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 66.
⁴ «Standard Operating Procedures for needs assessments,» Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, April 6, 2014, 1, UNHCR.
The UNHCR has generally shown that it responds to identified problems within its own programs quickly. For example, shortly after a report found that many Syrian refugee children were not attending remedial education programs, the UNHCR investigated the causes of this truancy, and found that one of the leading reasons was parental safety fears. UN authorities have subsequently initiated a tracking program to identify absent children and provide them with future support.¹

Questions remain about how well the UNHCR itself coordinates with other leading IGOs such as the UNDP, the WHO, UNICEF, and the World Bank. While these IGOs are often included under the RRP6 rubric as “Executing-Level Agencies,” it is not clear if there is any structure in place responsible for harmonizing the UNHCR’s goals with the goals of other organizations. Currently, the UNHCR appears to treat other IGOs as components of the RRP6. There is no apparent structure in place to sync the UNHCR’s refugee response mission with the work of other IGOs in fields that are not directly linked to refugee crises. IGOs generally do not openly criticize one another, but several former UN workers and Jordanian officials expressed the belief that the various UN agencies still do not work on the same page.

**Internal Jordanian coordination**

At the broadest level, the Jordanian response to the Syrian refugee crisis is fairly coordinated. There are two main Jordanian agencies responsible for the refugee crisis. One, SRAD, is explicitly devoted to tackling the Syrian refugee crisis. SRAD’s work consists of ensuring the necessary level of Jordanian cooperation with the UNHCR on the RRP6, particularly with relation to the camps. SRAD does not, however, oversee any relief mission of its own. MOPIC, as the parent organization of the HCSP, assumes the ultimate authority the National Resilience Plan. Unlike SRAD, MOPIC not only facilitates cooperation with the international community, but oversees an aid program of its own.

The HCSP and SRAD appear to be parallel to one another in working structure, with no major overlaps in mission or jurisdiction. This is not surprising, since the National Resilience Plan and the RRP6 themselves are parallel relief plans. Because SRAD’s purpose is to consult and support the UNHCR, its work is fundamentally different from the resilience-focused work of the HCSP.

Donor and Funding Information

Overview of Funding Needs

The main difference between the Jordanian and UN approaches to funding is that the Jordanian refugee relief authorities estimate funding needs farther in advance than the UNHCR. The HCSP has estimated its financial requirements through to the end of the year 2016, while the UNHCR has only estimated its funding requirements for the year 2014; the next stage of the UNHCR’s Regional Response Plan begins in 2015, and the UNHCR has not yet publicized its estimated needs nor made any financial requests. The UNHCR, however, is more meticulous in publicizing and updating its financial status, and unlike the HCSP publishes an official financial tracker and revised its financial needs midway through 2014.

The HCSP estimates that from 2014 to the end of 2016, the National Resilience Plan will need a grand total of $4.13 billion to maintain its operations. The UNHCR estimates that it will need a total of $1.018 billion just for the year 2014 to achieve all of its goals. The UNHCR and HCSP appear to coordinate relatively closely in financial planning, and each takes the other’s financial requests into account when formulating its own.

UNHCR financial requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total 2014 requirements</th>
<th>Revision from Jan. 2014 estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>93,881,249</td>
<td>-13.10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>73,772,697</td>
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<td>Food</td>
<td>286,984,609</td>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
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<td>Shelter</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>1,014,530,914</td>
<td>-15.50%</td>
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</table>

2-UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 9


HCSP financial requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Three-year total</th>
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<td>Municipal Services</td>
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<td>Protection &amp; Social Protection</td>
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<td>114,483,136</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
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<td>NRP Programmatic Response sub-total</td>
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Funding Shortfalls

The immediately striking thing about refugee response funding is how short it has fallen, compared to the levels of funding that the UNHCR and the HCSP have requested. Neither the UNHCR nor the HCSP has received even half of their requested funding as of August 2014. According to the UNHCR’s mid-year review of the RRP6, Jordanian operations had only received 40% of requested funds; had the UNHCR not revised its funding needs downwards, this shortfall would have been even worse, at 34%.1 Although the Jordanian Government does not publish funding updates as regularly as the UNHCR does, Fida Gharabeh of MOPIC reported in mid-July that funding for the HCSP for 2014 only equaled $40 million to $50 million.

The UNHCR has publicly emphasized that under-funding is having immediate negative consequences for refugee relief. It particularly stresses that vital health work is going undone, such as polio vaccinations (it estimates that 2.4 million vaccinations will not be given), that cash support is being threatened, and that WASH work in Zaatari is being curtailed due to lack of funds.2

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1-Ibid.
2-Ibid.
Key Donors

The Syrian refugee response in Jordan is overwhelmingly funded by states. Private donors contribute significantly to the regional response, but very little private money goes directly to Jordanian projects.1 Fida Gharibeh of MOPIC identified the United States, Germany, and the European Union as Jordan’s most valued partners while also crediting Canada, Switzerland, and Italy.

Charitable institutions and wealthy individuals from GCC states also contribute to relief initiatives in Jordan, but these donations tend to be directed to religious institutions that operate parallel to the HCSP and the UNHCR.

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Aid extended: In-depth Review

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to look past official UN and Jordanian state institutional descriptions and mission statements to describe what, exactly, is being done in response to the Syrian refugee crisis.

One important field of questions is, what kinds of services are the aid systems delivering to Syrians and host communities? How are these services integrated into the relief architecture? Who is primarily responsible for relief in these various areas? Another question concerns where aid is going. A key distinction to recognize is that between refugees and host communities, who have different needs and will pose different kinds of challenges if those needs are not met. Other distinctions are location and gender.

Populations of Concern
The persons affected by the Syrian refugee crisis can be divided into four general groups: Refugees in camps, refugees outside of camps, unregistered Syrians in Jordan, and host communities. The wellbeing of the four is interconnected, and if any group is ignored, it has the potential to destabilize Jordan.

Refugees in camps
The refugees in camps are the responsibility of the UNHCR and its partners. They are living in dire conditions, but they are also relatively easy to access for aid interventions. Camp residents are less interconnected to the other populations of concern: The camps are governed semi-autonomously of the Jordanian government (although SRAD has extensive oversight powers for relief projects in the camps), and the largest camp, Za’atari, has developed its own localized economy. However, the refugee camps still place serious resource and environmental strains on Jordan. The RRP6 estimates that the annual cost of supporting one refugee in the camps will be $1,900.¹

Refugees outside of camps
Most UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees live in urban and rural areas outside of the refugee camps. These refugees are more integrated with the rest of Jordan and have access to more economic participation. However, being outside of the camps creates unique vulnerabilities. Syrian refugees are vulnerable to economic exploitation, and struggle to find legitimate employment at a living wage. They have access to housing in permanent structures (as opposed to tents or mobile units),

but are vulnerable to eviction, often live in unsafe or unfinished units, and sometimes must live in UNHCR-provided tents. While the UNHCR strives to make sure that these refugees remain accounted for and registered, it is often difficult to contact refugees with necessary information and services. While the UNHCR takes responsibility for urban and rural refugees, these refugees are interconnected with the Jordanian host community, and therefore are also the HCSPs’ concern.

According to the UNCHR, the support cost per refugee in “urban” settings will be $980 per year. In NGO and UNHCR reports, non-camp refugees are often collectively referred to as “urban refugees.” This description is inadequate, however, as Syrians outside of the camps have settled in both urban and rural areas.

Undocumented Syrians
Roughly 700,000 Syrians came to Jordan before the Syrian civil war began as expatriates and guest workers. However, they have become de facto refugees in many ways, because they cannot return to their homes. These persons are perhaps the least-studied vulnerable population in Jordan, and as such they pose perhaps the greatest potential problem. They are not registered with the UNHCR and therefore have less access to UN refugee relief. At the same time, they do not enjoy the economic liberties and privileges of Jordanian citizenship. Numerous Jordanian officials stated in interviews that these undocumented citizens are a major challenge, but there is little coordinated work being done to assist them.

Jordanian host communities
Jordan’s citizens are all affected to varying degrees by the Syrian refugee crisis. The working poor and rural northern communities are most affected due to competition over resources and employment. However, the crisis’ strains on national-level resources are undoubtedly being felt throughout Jordan.

The HCSP’s founding purpose is to help Jordanian communities cope with the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis. The UNHCR also gives vulnerable Jordanians—particularly in Ma’raq and Irbid—secondary consideration. The UNHCR’s May 4-17 update reports that as of that time, 13 community support projects (CSP) had been approved, to a total of JD 550,000. CSPs are intended to provide support to both refugees and Jordanian populations, thereby reducing communal tensions. The RRP6 intends for this program to alleviate strain on host communities alongside the HCSP’s work.

1-Ibid.
List of Aid Types
The following list details the overall kinds of aid that the UNHCR and the HCSP recognize as necessary. This list is based on a synthesis of the aid categories listed on the UNHCR’s Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal and the HCSP Task Forces and Reference Groups. This section shows which authorities take responsibility for each type of relief, how institutionalized each form of aid is, and where in the hierarchy of priorities it falls.

Cash Assistance
Responsibility: The UNHCR’s Cash Working Group is responsible for giving life-saving and deterioration-preventing cash assistance to both Syrian refugees outside of camps and host community members. The NRP aims to support government cash programs as part of its goal of assisting the Jordanian state’s safety net and may eventually fund cash programs of its own, but for now emphasizes cash less than the RRP6 does. Distribution of cash falls entirely to UNHCR partners.

Institutionalization level: Cash assistance is fully institutionalized as a UNCHR Sector Working Group under the RRP6. Conversely, the NRP only mentions cash assistance as an incidental component of other relief goals, rather than as a form of relief in itself. Very few of the reports conducted through the HCSP focus on cash.

Description of cash assistance interventions

Summary
Regular cash assistance: One main UNHCR strategy for cash assistance is monthly distribution to the neediest identified households.

Need-specific cash assistance: The UNHCR emphasizes that “urgent cash assistance” can be targeted to meet a specific need. Both the UNHCR and the HCSP indicate that cash assistance is in high demand to meet housing expenses.

Seasonal and specialized cash assistance: The UNHCR provides specialized cash assistance for needs like winterization support.

Cash as a supplement to other aid: The UNHCR reports that cash’s flexibility makes it an effective “augment” to other sectors. The HCSP,

1-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 77.
3-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 81.
4-Ibid.
6-Ibid
7-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 78.
8-HCSP. National Resilience Plan 2014-2016, 35.
meanwhile, only mentions cash assistance as a supporting component of other relief strategies.

**Distribution requirements:** The Jordanian Government requires that 30% of cash assistance projects directly benefit Jordanian nationals.¹

**Risk of redundancy:** Refugees and Jordanians may spend cash assistance on services that relief partners already provide. For example, refugees have spent cash on healthcare services that humanitarian agencies offer for free.² Better communication between relief agencies and Syrians and Jordanians can prevent such waste in the future.

**UNHCR Objectives**
Ensure that the needs of extremely vulnerable Syrian refugees as well as Jordanians affected by the refugee crisis are covered across Jordan.

Ensure that coordination is continuously enhanced in order to deliver quality cash assistance in the most efficient and targeted manner possible to women, girls, boys and men.

**Child Protection**

**Responsibility:** The UNHCR is responsible for child protection among refugees and Jordanians³ through the Child Protection Sub-Working Group, and aims to build a working relationship with existing Jordanian child protection services.⁴ The HCSP aims to complement the RRP6’s child protection goals but does not directly work on child protection.⁵ Rather, child protection is looked at within the context of the broader Protection sector.

**Institutionalization level:** Child Protection is a registered and staffed UNHCR sub-group under the RRP6. The HCSP’s Protection Reference Group, however, does not substantially disaggregate child protection from other forms of protection.

**Description of child protection interventions**

**Summary**
Key concerns of both the UNHCR and the HCSP include: Unaccompanied children; children affected by war; children in legal trouble; violence against children; and child labor. Inter-sector work has also occurred: For example, the CP Sub-Sector has strengthened its working ties with the SGBV Sub-Sector, and aims to do the same with Education.⁶

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¹-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 73
²-Ibid, 79.
⁴-“Child Protection Sub Working Group.” UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response.
⁶-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 16-17.
UNHCR Objectives

Protection response: Emergency CP interventions for boys and girls are strengthened and harmonized with the broader relief project.

HCSP Objectives

Specific Objective 1: Strengthen and expand national and sub-national protection systems to meet the needs of vulnerable groups.

Intervention 1.1: Institutional capacity development for governmental and CSO working in the field of protection of vulnerable groups such as women and girls at risk; survivors of violence; children deprived of parental care; children in conflict with the law; child labour and the disabled.

Intervention 1.2: Expand and improve the security forces’ (FPDs, police, juvenile police, etc.) capacity to respond to all protection concerns in gender sensitive, child friendly manner.

Education

Responsibility: Both the UNHCR (through the Education Sector Working Group) and the HCSP (through the Education Task Force) are responsible for education.

Institutionalization level: Education is fully institutionalized into both the RRP6 and the NRP.

Description of education interventions

Summary

Summary: The three main elements focused on in the Education responses from the UNHCR and the HCSP are to protect access to education, to ensure quality of education, and to build Jordanian capacity in the education system.

UNHCR Objectives

Children and youth have sustained access to appropriate education opportunities.
Children and youth benefit from learning environments that promote quality education, protection and their well-being.

HCSP Objectives

Specific Objective 1: Strengthening the capacity of the MOED to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services.

Specific Objective 2: Ensuring access to quality educational services for all, particularly the most vulnerable and excluded children.

Energy

Responsibility: The UNHCR implements energy solutions in camps, particularly regarding renewable power sources. The HCSP claims responsibility for macro-level reforms to the Jordanian energy sector.
Institutionalization level: Energy’s institutionalization level is fairly low. It is not institutionalized in the UNHCR response, and is only a reference group under the HCSP.

Description of energy interventions

Summary
Energy in camps: UNHCR partners and donors are responsible for camp energy needs (such as lighting), since camp infrastructure generally runs parallel to Jordanian infrastructure. There are concerns about the high cost of energy in Za’atari, and the lack of electricity in shelters in Azraq.

Interest in sustainability: Both in the camps and in host communities, sustainability is heavily emphasized when discussing energy policy. For the HCSP, sustainability means meeting increased demand by investing in efficiency and domestic renewables technology.

Energy independence: The HCSP’s strategic energy vision emphasizes moving Jordan away from reliance on energy imports and towards domestic power generation. This, the HCSP notes, can be coupled with the goal to boost renewables’ grid contributions.

HCSP Objectives
Specific Objective 1: Rapid sustainable energy solutions to offset incremental energy demand (short-term).
Specific Objective 2: Solar energy solutions for growing energy supply needs (medium-term).

Food Security
Responsibility: The UNHCR’s Food Security Sector Working Group primarily targets refugees’ food security, but also assumes responsibility for feeding 87,501 vulnerable Jordanians in heavily-Syrian areas, and for providing 32,154 Jordanians with livelihoods support. The NRP program also calls for food support to poor Jordanian households, for national food security monitoring, and for the drafting and implementation of more sustainable and efficient farming policies.

4-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 34.
Institutionalization level: Food security is a Sector-level Working Group within the UNHCR’s Jordanian response. It is not institutionalized into the National Resilience Plan, however: Food security is treated as a component of the HCSP’s Livelihoods Task Force.

Description of food security interventions:

Summary
Overlap with livelihoods: The HCSP and the UNHCR agree that livelihoods support and food security work are connected. Besides providing livelihoods assistance to vulnerable Jordanians, the UNHCR is in talks with the Jordanian government about livelihoods support for food-insecure Syrians.¹

Some UNHCR-HCSP overlap: Both relief networks are heavily involved in providing food assistance to vulnerable Jordanians, and in supporting Jordanians’ livelihoods (although this work is done on a larger scale by the HCSP).

UNHCR Objectives:
Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies in order to:
Maintain food security and improve food availability, access and utilization for Syrian refugees in Jordan through appropriate and consistent food assistance.
Improve food security including food availability, access and utilization for vulnerable Jordanian populations through targeted food production and livelihood interventions.
Improve the nutritional status of Syrian refugees, particularly malnourished girls and boys under the age of five and pregnant and lactating mothers.
Ensure effective and coordinated sector response through evidence-based food security and livelihood interventions.

Gender-Based Violence
Responsibility: The UNHCR’s Protection Sector includes sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as a major concern. It aims to assist both Syrians and Jordanians in large numbers,² and is concentrated on providing relief to survivors of violence. The HCSP includes SGBV as a component of its Protection work: Its focus is on improving the response capacities of Jordanian law enforcement and medical personnel.
Institutionalization level: SGBV is fully institutionalized as a Sub-Working Group within the RRP. It is much less institutionalized in the NRP, being only one focus of the ad hoc Protection Reference Group.
Description of gender-based violence interventions:

¹ UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 32.
² UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 11.
Summary
The UNHCR Protection response for SGBV targets both Syrians and Jordanians in large numbers, and is concentrated on providing relief to survivors of violence. The HCSP Protection Sector generally discusses services as targeting vulnerable groups, which often indicate gender groups that are more likely to be victims of SGBV.

UNHCR Objectives
The risks and consequences of SGBV experienced by women, girls, boys and men are reduced and/or mitigated, and the quality of response is improved.

HCSP Objectives
- Specific Objective 1: Strengthen and expand national and sub-national protection systems to meet the needs of vulnerable groups.
- Intervention 1.2: Expand and improve the security forces (FPDs, police, juvenile police etc.) capacity to respond to all protection concerns in gender sensitive, child friendly manner.

Health
Responsibility: Both the UNHCR (through the Health Sector Working Group) and the HCSP (through the Health Task Force) are responsible for health, and much of the UNHCR’s health response relies on the Jordanian MOH.
Institutionalization level: Health is fully institutionalized into both the RRP6 and the NRP.
Description of health interventions

Summary
Health is one of the key components of both the UNHCR and the HCSP responses. Since the UNHCR focuses more on the Syrian refugee population than on the host communities, its health response also focuses primarily on Syrian refugees, as seen in the UNHCR Health Objectives below, and it is in light of this responsibility that the UNHCR also seeks to support Jordan’s national health care system. On the other hand, the HCSP’s objectives focus on not only acquiring adequate finances to deliver health services to Syrian refugees, but also on maintaining service standards for Jordanians, as well as not backtracking on progress in national health services that have been made, in order to meet national targets and MDGs by the year 2015. The UNHCR and the UNDP are working with MOPIC in order to meet refugees’ needs and mitigate the impact of refugee influx on the country and host communities.2

1-ibid
However, there are still shortcomings in the health responses. One of the greatest is lack of communication: Studies have repeatedly found that persons and households are often unaware of what services they are entitled to, and how to access those services. As healthcare is a major expense, individuals and households who pay for services that they could receive for free are taking from major unnecessary financial losses.

**UNHCR Objectives:**
- Improve equitable access, quality and coverage to comprehensive primary health care for Syrian refugee women, girls, boys and men in Jordan by end of 2014.
- Improve equitable access, quality and coverage to essential secondary and tertiary health care for Syrian refugee women, girls, boys and men in Jordan by end of 2014.
- Support the capacity of the national health care system to provide services to Syrian women, girls, boys and men and vulnerable Jordanians in the most affected governorates.
- Improve coverage of comprehensive health and rehabilitation services to Syrian refugees through integrated community level health and rehabilitation interventions by end of 2014.

**HCSP Objectives**
- General Objective 1: To improve health system performance in terms of equity, accessibility and quality.
- General Objective 2: To control and direct health expenditure.
- General Objective 3: To control communicable and non-communicable diseases.

**Livelihood**
*Responsibility:* The HCSP is responsible for Livelihoods through the Livelihoods & Employment Task Force, although the UNHCR is mindful of livelihood needs which it treats as part of its Food Security Response.

*Institutionalization level:* Livelihoods are fully institutionalized as part of the NRP. They are not institutionalized under the UNHCR, and are only touched upon to the extent that they relate to food security.

*Description of livelihoods support interventions:*

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1-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 41.
Summary
-The HCSP’s interventions with regards to livelihoods and employment seek to not only address the problems caused by the crisis, but also to look at and improve upon the underlying vulnerabilities in the current system that exacerbate the crisis’s effects. Thus, the NRP recommends that, “short, medium, and long-term interventions should be mutually supportive and implemented simultaneously”\(^1\).

HCSP Objectives
- Overall Sector Objective: The capacity of poor and vulnerable households in host communities is strengthened to cope with and recover in a sustainable way from the impact of the Syrian crisis, and mitigate future effects on their employment and livelihoods.

- Specific Objective 1: Create more and better job opportunities for the poor and the vulnerable (women and youth).

- Specific Objective 2: Revive the local economies of the most-affected areas through support to existing and new micro and small enterprises for poor and vulnerable households (women and youth).

- Specific Objective 3: Restore and preserve pastoral livelihoods, rangeland and natural resources.

- Specific Objective 4: Improve food security for poor and vulnerable households.

Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
Responsibility: Both the UNHCR and the HCSP are responsible for Mental Health and Psychosocial Support.

Institutionalization level: Mental Health and Psychosocial Support are institutionalized as part of the Education, Health, and Protection sectors for the RRP6 (p. 56) and for the same three task forces for the NRP. MHPSS (Mental Health and Psychosocial Support) is an official sub-sector of the Protection working group for the RRP6.

Description of mental health & psychosocial support interventions:

Summary
Under the both the UNHCR’s and the HCSP’s response, Education, Health, and Protection work together to address different aspects of Mental Health and Psychosocial Support, with, in both cases, the Health component addressing more directly the mental health aspect, and Education and Protection looking more at the psychosocial aspect. For example, as part of the HCSP’s Education

sector response, the NRP aims to recognize the importance of inclusive education and psychosocial support.¹

**UNHCR Objectives**

**Education Response**
- Children and youth benefit from learning environments that promote quality education, protection and their well-being, as seen in the following examples:
  - Education helps through allowing access to education, which is aimed at preventing causes of potential mental health issues, such as early marriage, etc.²
  - Education actors aim to design psycho-social support activities; extracurricular activities are meant to help with this.³
  - Children and youth benefit from learning environments that promote quality education, protection and their well-being.⁴

**Health Response**
There are no specific Health objectives that specifically target Mental Health and Psychosocial Support, but one of the Lead Agencies for the Health Response is the Mental Health and Psycho-social Support Sub-Sector, meaning that the Health response takes mental health into consideration as one of its components, as seen in the following “outputs:”

- Output 1.5: Improve access to mental health services at the primary health level.
- Output 4.5: Community level mental health provided.

**Protection Response**
No objectives directly speak to Mental Health and Psychosocial Support, but are implicated within the Protection response, as in the following example:
- Counselling, and psychosocial support are given through child and youth friendly spaces, and a women’s safe space.⁵

**HCSP Objectives**

**Education Sector**
- Specific Objective 2: Ensuring access to quality educational services for all, particularly the most vulnerable and excluded children.
- Intervention 2.5: Create violence-free schools that cater to psycho-social needs of children.

²-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 56.
³-Ibid, 59.
⁴-Ibid, 51.
⁵-Ibid19
Health Sector
- Integrated mental health programs are to be strengthened, as seen in the following Health Task Force General Objective example:
- General Objective 1: To improve health system performance in terms of equity, accessibility and quality.

Social Protection Sector
- Specific Objective 3: Mitigate violence and reduced social tensions through increased coordination between Government of Jordan & community based mechanisms.

Municipal Services
Responsibility: Relieving the Syrian refugee crisis’ burden on municipal services is the sole responsibility of the HCSP. The UNHCR’s work may indirectly lighten the refugees’ impact, and some UNHCR partners (like CARE and REACH) have published studies on how municipalities have been affected by the crisis, but only the HCSP directly relieves municipal services in Jordan.

Institutionalization level: Municipal Services are fully institutionalized as a Task Force in the NRP.

Description of municipal services interventions:

Summary
The NRP’s plan for the Local Governance and Municipal Services Sector is to improve services in order to not only respond to the Syrian crisis, but also to implement more sustainable and resilient solutions that will allow Jordan’s local governance systems and municipal services to improve in the long run. The HCSP seeks to provide solutions to the following Problem Statement:

Municipalities do not have the requisite capacity (finances, human resources and expertise, and equipment) to meet key service delivery and local development priorities stemming from the Syrian crisis and the sub-national planning and execution machinery is out-of-sync with current development and crisis mitigation challenges.¹

HCSP Objectives
- Overall Task Force objective: The Jordanian local governance system is responsive to host citizens’ and communities’ needs identified in governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis.
- Specific Objective 1: Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis.

¹HCSP. National Resilience Plan 2014-2016, 44.
- Specific Objective 2: Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.

- Specific Objective 3: Local governance systems become more resilient to crisis over the long-term as a result of better performance in core functions and more enabling legal and fiscal framework.

Non-Food Items
Responsibility: Ensuring access to non-food items (NFI) is primarily the responsibility of the UNHCR.

Institutionalization level: The distribution of non-food items is fully institutionalized as part of the RRP6’s NFI Sector.

Description of non-food items interventions:

Summary
The objective of the UNHCR’s NFI response is to meet families’ and individuals’ basic household needs. This includes providing items such as blankets, mattresses, clothing, kitchen sets, solar lamps, jerry cans, and hygiene items. The UNHCR’s NFI sector focuses primarily on the refugees living in camps, preferring to coordinate with the Cash Sector to enable refugees living in urban areas to procure the household items they deem most necessary.

UNHCR Objectives
- Ensure that the basic household needs of women, girls, boys and men are met.

Nutrition
Responsibility: Both the UNHCR and the HCSP work on nutrition. However, the topic is not assigned a to specific sector or task force under either agency.

Institutionalization level: Nutrition is not institutionalized into its own sector or task force for either the UNHCR or the HCSP. Rather, nutritional security is looked at in the Employment & Livelihoods and Health Sectors of the NRP (pp. 31, 39), and in the RRP6’s Food Security Response (pp. 42, 47) and the Health Response’s Nutrition subsector (pp. 65, 72).

Description of nutrition interventions:

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1-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 89.
2-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 90.
Summary
For the UNHCR, an entire response focused on Food Security has been created, into which Nutrition falls as an important topic. For the HCSP, Nutrition is looked at more broadly within the context of health, and the food security that aims to accompany an improved Employment & Livelihoods sector.

UNHCR Objectives

Food Security Response
- Improve the nutritional status of Syrian refugees, particularly malnourished girls and boys under the age of five and pregnant and lactating women.

- Output 3.2: Syrian girls and boys under the age of five and pregnant and lactating women with moderate acute malnutrition attended until they have recovered.

- Output 3.3: Nutritional habits of Syrian women, girls, boys and men have improved through healthy behaviour training, communication and sensitization.

Health Response
- Output 4.3: Community management of acute malnutrition programs implemented and monitored.

HCSP Objectives

Employment & Livelihoods Sector
- Specific Objective 4: Improve food security for poor and vulnerable households.

Health Sector
- Objective 5.1: Establishment of Nutrition Surveillance System.
- Intervention 5.9: Training of MOH medical and managerial staff on the integrated nutrition Infant and Youth Child Feeding approach (IYCF).

Protection
Responsibility: Protection is the stated responsibility of both the UNHCR and the HCSP.
Institutionalization level: Protection is highly institutionalized, though more so in the UNHCR response than it is in the HCSP: Protection is a full sector under the RRP6, whereas it is only a reference group under the NRP.

Description of protection interventions:
Summary
The UNHCR’s protection response is wide-reaching, targeting everything from promoting registration to providing emergency CP interventions, as outlined in the UNHCR Objectives below. According to the NRP, its protection efforts are meant to complement those humanitarian efforts contained in the RRP6, specifically those focused on social cohesion and community-based protection, especially that which combats SGBV and emphasizes child protection.¹

UNHCR Objectives
- Refugees fleeing Syria are able to access the territory, to seek asylum and their rights are respected.
- Community empowerment, engagement, outreach and self-reliance is strengthened and expanded, and women, boys and men are engaged in the planning, implementation and evaluation of services.
- The risks and consequences of SGBV experienced by women, girls, boys and men are reduced and/or mitigated, and the quality of response is improved.
- Emergency CP interventions for boys and girls are strengthened and harmonized.
- Durable and protection solutions are made available to refugees from Syria.

HCSP Objectives
- Overall Sector Objective: Vulnerable groups affected by the crisis have access to improved social protection and improved legal and operational protection frameworks and services in governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis.
- Specific Objective 1: Strengthen and expand national and sub-national protection systems to meet the needs of vulnerable groups in the governorates most affected by the crisis.
- Specific Objective 2: Improve social protection and poverty alleviation mechanisms for vulnerable people affected by the crisis.
- Specific Objective 3: Mitigate violence and reduced social tensions through increased coordination between GOJ & community based mechanisms.

Registration
Responsibility: Ensuring the prompt registration of Syrian refugees is the responsibility of the UNHCR as part of its Protection response.
Institutionalization level: Registration is a key component of the UNHCR’s Protection response, but is not institutionalized with its own directing entity.

Description of registration interventions:

Summary
Registration is unique from other aid categories in that it affects only Syrians, and thus is looked at only by the UNHCR. It is a vital part of relief, because without it Syrian refugees struggle to obtain humanitarian aid. Examples of successful registration efforts include:

- The UNHCR’s registration capacity was reinforced in 2013, as new registration centres were opened in Irbid and in Amman (Khalda).
- The UNHCR conducted a Za’atari population verification exercise between January and May 2014, deactivating 23.5% of refugees who were verified as having returned to Syria, were found to be duplicate listings, or who failed to turn up for verification within 10 days of summoning. The UNHCR now has a more precise idea of Za’atari’s population. 16,000 refugees who were not called for verification were separately issued health booklets. The UNHCR also issued service cards to refugees whom the Syrian Refugee Affairs Department had failed to give Ministry of the Interior service cards to. Training programs for local partners involve lessons in how to properly refer persons with specific needs to receive help. The completion of Za’atari population verification enabled a reduction in distribution of bread by about 5.18%.

- Backlogs in registration were eliminated in late summer and early fall of 2013.

A serious remaining problem, however, is the presence of roughly 700,000 Syrian expatriates who became trapped in Jordan when the Syrian civil war broke out. These persons are not registered with the UNHCR, but they have become de facto refugees, and have many of the same needs as Syrians who fled the country during the war.

UNHCR Objectives
No objectives directly speak to Registration, but it is implicated within the Protection response, as in the Protection Objective 1:

- Refugees fleeing Syria are able to access the territory, to seek asylum and their rights are respected.

Reproductive Health
Responsibility: Both the UNHCR (through the Health response’s Reproductive Health sub-sector) and the HCSP (through the Health Task Force) are responsible for reproductive health.
Institutionalization level: Reproductive health is moderately institutionalized. It forms its own sub-sector within the UNHCR’s Reproductive Health response,

1-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 17.
but within the NRP, it is only mentioned in the context of improving existing primary healthcare programs.

**Description of reproductive health interventions:**

**Summary**
Within both plans, reproductive health is looked at within the broader context of health as a whole, although, with the UNHCR’s health response, extra emphasis is placed on reproductive health through work with the UNFPA, which is a lead agency that helps create the Reproductive Health Sub-sector. From January to August 2013, the UNHCR also managed to see that 88% of the 1628 deliveries in Za’atari camp were attended by skilled personnel.¹

**UNHCR Objectives**
No objectives speak directly to Reproductive Health, but it is implicated within the Health response, as seen in the following output:

- Output 1.2 of Health: Comprehensive reproductive health services provided to Syrian refugees and affected Jordanian population.

**HCSP Objectives**
Within the NRP, the only mention made of reproductive health programs falls within a description of response options aimed at fulfilling the Health General Objective 1: To improve health system performance in terms of equity, accessibility and quality – Strengthening of existing primary healthcare programs, including reproductive health programs.²

**Shelter**
*Responsibility:* Both the UNHCR (through the Shelter and Settlements response) and the HCSP (through the Housing reference group) are responsible for shelter.

*Institutionalization level:* Shelter is moderately to highly institutionalized, being discussed significantly in the UNHCR’s Shelter and Settlements response, and also significantly, but to a lesser extent, in the NRP’s Housing reference group.

**Description of shelter interventions:**

¹-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 62.
Summary
The UNHCR’s response reflects a desire to provide immediate emergency shelter that has expanded into developing more permanent camp shelters as the crisis has continued, and is focused primarily on shelter within camps, although efforts have also been made to improve housing for urban/rural refugees. The objectives for the Housing sector outlined in the NRP focus more on affordable housing than emergency shelter, falling more on the side of long-term shelter provision. The sector objectives aim “to complement expected humanitarian shelter programming in a way that addresses the structural issues affecting the housing sector in Jordan.”

UNHCR Objectives
- Syrian refugee women, girls, boys and men settled in planned and developed camps with adequate shelter and access to basic facilities and services
- Adequate shelter provided for vulnerable Syrian refugee women, girls, boys and men, and targeted members of the host community in urban/rural settings outside of camps.

HCSP Objectives
Overall Sector Objective: Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian households have improved access to affordable and adequate housing within a housing sector that helps meet the housing needs of all Jordanians.

- Specific Objective 1: Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian households have increased access to affordable and adequate housing.
- Specific Objective 2: Housing-related institutions, regulations and policies enable housing markets to meet the needs of Syrian refugees and all Jordanians, including vulnerable groups.

Water & Sanitation
Responsibility: Both the UNHCR (through the WASH response) and the HCSP (through the Water and Sanitation Task Force) are responsible for water and sanitation.
Institutionalization level: Water and Sanitation is highly institutionalized, forming a detailed WASH response in the RRP6, and a significant task force in the NRP.

Description of water & sanitation interventions:

Summary
The UNHCR response aims to increase sustainability of previously implemented measures by improving and replacing previously established measures. The WASH needs of all refugees in camps are being met.

1-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 75-78.
2-HCSP. National Resilience Plan 2014-2016, 34.
3-UNHCR. 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 106.
and needs within host communities are also being addressed. With the HCSP this is with a sustainable development initiative in mind: ‘Water for Life: Jordan’s Water Strategy 2012-2022’, which aims to see huge improvements to Jordan’s current water shortage situation.¹

**UNHCR Objectives**
- Affected populations are ensured with safe, equitable and sustainable access to sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking and personal and domestic hygiene.
- Affected populations have access to safe and appropriate sanitation facilities.
- Affected populations have reduced risk of WASH-related diseases through access to improved hygienic practices, hygiene promotion and delivery of hygiene products and services on a sustainable and equitable basis.
- Establish and maintain effective mechanisms for WASH coordination at national and sub-national levels.

**HCSP Objectives**
- Overall Sector Objective: To enhance the capacity of the Government of Jordan and in particular the Host communities to meet the increase in demand in the Water and Sanitation service.
- Specific Objective 1: Improving the quantity, quality and efficiency of water delivery.
- Specific Objective 2: Expanding and improving sanitation services.
- Specific Objective 3: Addressing cross cutting water and sanitation issues.

¹HCSP. National Resilience Plan 2014-2016, 55.
Assessments of Response Effectiveness

Introduction
This chapter will analyze how the different groups affected by the Syrian refugee crisis view the humanitarian response. Based on polling conducted by respected international NGOs, interviews with Jordanian government officials, and UNHCR surveys of humanitarian partners, we aim to convey how those most concerned with the humanitarian mission assess the mission’s strengths and weaknesses.

The general consensus is that the refugee response has become better at planning and internal coordination, but is still not delivering enough aid to the needy. It has also become clear that aid authorities are not communicating closely enough with refugees and host community members. More transparency and community outreach would be beneficial, both to ensure that persons know what kind of aid they are eligible for, and to tackle the growing perception among host community members that their needs are being ignored in favor of the Syrian refugees.

Refugees’ Views
Refugees generally do not feel that they receive adequate aid. This trend appears to be more pronounced among non-camp refugees. Table 1 below reveals that 81.1% of refugees who resided outside of the camps said that the aid they receive is either “sufficient to some extent” or “totally insufficient.”

Table 1: Percentage of Syrian Refugee Receiving Aid
In Za’atari camp, an Oxfam poll found that 54% of camp residents had “faced problems or barriers in accessing services.” ¹ A joint UNHCR-IRD poll conducted over the course of 2012-2013 found that non-camp refugees are greatly troubled by precarious housing conditions, with half of those surveyed reporting inadequate lodgings. ² 93% of non-camp refugees rent their dwellings, and on average, refugee households reported that 60% of their expenditures went to rental payments; the second largest area of spending was food, at 26%. Over the course of 2013, refugees faced sharply rising rents, with some reporting 25% increases. The situation was worse still in Irbid Governorate, where refugees reported that their rents had risen by an average of more than 27%.³ Table 2 below reveals refugee responses when asked whether or not they receive financial or material aid from international organizations. There is a notable increase in aid received by those living in refugee camps in comparison with those living outside of refugee camps.

Table 2: Syrian Refugee Satisfaction with Aid Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Sufficient to some extent</th>
<th>Insufficient to some extent</th>
<th>Totally insufficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outside camps</td>
<td>Inside camps</td>
<td>Outside camps</td>
<td>Inside camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are also signs of unhappiness in refugee camps. Riots in Za’atari in April 2014 were officially blamed on “Assad sleeper cells,”⁴ but discontent over living conditions and the lack of economic opportunities may also have contributed to the unrest. Oxfam found that refugees were frustrated by long waiting periods for services, shortages of vital NFIs, and especially long distances between refugees’ residences and distribution centers or clinics. Women in particular were concerned about distances and waiting periods, citing an increased risk of harassment.⁵

³-Ibid.
⁵-Oxfam, Refugee Perceptions Study, 15.
Single mothers often send adolescent children to pick up needed items while they stay home caring for infants, which may result in teenaged refugees missing school sessions.

Refugees in both the camps and outside of the camps are financially squeezed by high costs of basic NFIs. Non-camp refugees, according to the UNHCR, “consistently cite basic household items among their greatest unmet needs.” Even in households with multiple working members, outside provision of household items is generally needed to make basic costs of living affordable. Camp refugees, meanwhile, have trouble paying for consumables like fuel and hygiene items.

There also are consistent signs that communication between the UNHCR and refugees is not effective enough. This is particularly troublesome for health issues, as Syrian refugees often spend money on healthcare services that are available for free as part of the humanitarian response. 33% of Syrian refugees polled by the UNHCR and JHAS did not know that persons who cannot access free government health services can get those services from UNHCR clinics, and Oxfam found that 75% of refugees in Za’atari camp would like more information about what healthcare services are available. The information gap is particularly great among refugee women, suggesting that female social spaces are under-connected to official information sharing pathways. Oxfam also found that 57% refugees in Za’atari wished for more information on employment opportunities.

The lack of communication, combined with remaining problems in aid administration, enables harmful rumors to spread. Oxfam found that the long waiting times and overcrowding at UNHCR clinics encouraged some refugees to never even go to the clinics, instead traveling greater distances and paying out-of-pocket to go to private clinics.

One form of aid that almost all refugees, whether in the camps or outside of them, have reviewed positively is cash assistance. Refugees who receive this kind of aid, either in the form of cash or vouchers, have often reported that they enjoy the dignifying effect of being allowed to choose their own priorities.

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1-Ibid.
2-UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 72.
3-Ibid.
4-Ibid, 54.
5-Oxfam, Refugee Perceptions Study, 21.
One form of aid that almost all refugees, whether in the camps or outside of them, have reviewed positively is cash assistance. Refugees who receive this kind of aid, either in the form of cash or vouchers, have often reported that they enjoy the dignifying effect of being allowed to choose their own priorities. Table 3 below reveals the level of importance placed upon various types of assistance by Syrian Refugees. Important to note is that only outside compensation allows for cash assistance and food stamps, whereas internal compensation focuses on basic items necessary for everyday survival.

Table 3: Various Types of Assistance Recieved by Syrian Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What are the most important assistances provided by these organizations?</th>
<th>Inside Camps</th>
<th>Outside camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Stamps</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash assistance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food aid</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning Materials</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Napkins</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blankets</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Meals</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for Children</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattresses and carpets</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health insurance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heating gas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart cards</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Water and sanitation needs are being adequately met, at present, with IRD finding that 84% of non-camp refugees were satisfied with their water services and 87% with their sanitation services.\(^1\) However, refugees in southern Jordan were much more likely to report insufficient water services:

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1-UNHCR, Jordan Operation, Syrian Refugees Living Outside Camps, Executive Summary.
In Karak, 49% of refugees were found to have substandard water.\(^1\) This makes water unique: Refugees who live far from other refugees report having worse water services than those living in refugee-dense governorates do. This suggests that short-term water and sanitation relief programs have done well in addressing the Syrian refugee crisis, but that mid- to long-term changes in the distribution of refugees may catch Jordanian water systems unprepared.

**Host Community Views**

All scholarly literature states that Jordanian citizens were initially very hospitable to the Syrian refugees. However, that hospitality has begun to wear thin as the economic effects of the Syrian refugee crisis weigh more heavily on Jordanian communities. Relations are still not hostile yet, and a CARE poll has found that most Syrians and affected Jordanians continue to have positive relationships with members of the other community.\(^2\)

However, there is a widespread feeling in Jordan that the country is stretched past its limits, and cannot afford to take in more Syrian refugees. There is also an opinion gap on the Syrian refugee question between Jordanian elites and ordinary citizens. A 2012 CSS poll found that most Jordanians (65%) opposed letting more Syrian refugees into the country, while only 39% of “opinion leaders” (such as politicians, academics, and journalists) voiced similar opposition.\(^3\) This opposition to taking more Syrian refugees was observed when there were only 100,000 refugees living in Jordan; that number is now more than six times as high, and the economic pressures that had driven that opposition—strained municipal services and utilities, and a more competitive labor market—have only grown in the two subsequent years. Table 4 below reveals this difference of opinion between Jordanian elites and ordinary citizens. Noteworthy is the gap illustrated in comparing 2012 and 2014 results; both the national samples and the leaders samples reveal a decline in hospitable attitudes towards the idea of Jordan receiving more Syrian refugees.

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1-lbid


Table 4: Attitudes towards for Continuing to Receive Syrian Refugees in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Sample</th>
<th>Leaders Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec-12 (2014)</td>
<td>29 Yes, 66 No</td>
<td>65 Yes, 32 No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-14 (2014)</td>
<td>19 Yes, 79 No</td>
<td>44 Yes, 55 No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CSS current issues polls 2012, 2014

There are serious warning signs that Jordanians feel left out of the international humanitarian response. And April 2014 poll by the NGO REACH found that 50% of Jordanians believed that international aid was not being given to those most in need of it, compared to only 35% who said that it was being properly distributed. Disturbingly, the poll found that Jordanian respondents frequently believed that international aid efforts were unfairly skewed in the Syrians’ favor.\(^1\)

This perceived unfairness is strongest when respondents consider “household-level assistance” (the distribution of necessities and spending power to individual needy households), and weaker when respondents focus on “community-level support,” such as investments in municipal services, healthcare and education.\(^2\) Indeed, Syrians and Jordanians have been found to have the same concerns about community resilience and public services.\(^3\) Projects that focus on solving commonly-recognized problems could be an effective way of bridging the communal gap.

Jordanian citizens’ relationships with their government have also been strained by the crisis. This is most evident at the municipal level, where a study conducted by REACH and the British Embassy in Amman has found that the deteriorating quality of basic public services has “weaken[ed] the social contract between citizen and government.”\(^4\)

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2-Ibid.
4-REACH, Understanding Social Cohesion, 3.
Jordanian Government Views
The predominant concern among the Jordanian Government is that the aid mission is underfunded. Fida Gharaibeh of MOPIC warned that “the situation will just get worse and worse” if the present gaps in funding to the HCSP persist. On a similar note, in a public speech His Majesty King Abdullah II warned that aid money is both insufficient and untimely.1

His Majesty also expressed the opinion that the aid being delivered is not helping Jordan solve its underlying economic and social problems.2 He emphasized that the international community should provide aid in a way that complements pre-existing national development plans, and warned that if Jordan did not receive adequate international support, it might need to act to protect its citizens. While his Majesty did not specify what such actions might entail, they likely would include a tightening of border controls, with dire consequences for Syrians who might try to flee Syria in the future.3

While the UNHCR has moved towards greater internal coordination, there is a consensus that the international response is still not coordinated coherently enough, particularly in its interactions with Jordanian state actors. One Ministry of Health official, speaking anonymously, remarked that “I know the UNHCR well. The improvements [in coordination] are cosmetic. Nothing has really changed.”

Davide Terzi, Jordan’s Chief of Mission to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), echoed this frustration when he told the Jordan Times that “Humanitarian organizations and host countries … always seem to be overtaken by events and never managed to scientifically plan the response to the crisis.”4 His comments reflect a widespread feeling—voiced by almost all Jordanian government personnel interviewed in conducting this study—that joint UN-Jordanian relief planning, while basically effective, is not coordinated enough to constitute an effective strategic plan.

One logistical gap that Jordanian government personnel stressed is the suspected undercounting of displaced Syrians in Jordan. At an informal meeting between Ministry of Health officers and U.S. scholars, numerous officials stated that the actual number of Syrians in Jordan is far higher than the UNHCR estimates. Fida Gharaibeh of MOPIC and Senator Jawad Anani made similar statements. The estimates of the true number of Syrians in Jordan range from 1 million to 1.7 million, with 1.4 million being the most widely-believed figure.

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2-Ibid, 17.
3-Ibid, 11.
4-Ibid, 17.
On a local level, municipal governments in northern Jordan are frustrated with the resources they are being given. The UNDP has found that local governments generally believe that they do not get enough financial support to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis, and that the Jordanian Government does not do enough to include them in the decision-making process. Municipalities and international observers are particularly concerned that inadequate support for local governments could undermine Jordan’s efforts to decentralize municipal governance, by leaving municipalities unable to deliver the promised high quality of services.

**Relief Agency Assessments**

The UNHCR and its partners, like the Jordanian authorities, are deeply concerned about underfunding. We can confidently call funding the UNHCR’s leading concern. Numerous publications, press releases, and official statements from the UNHCR this summer have emphasized that due to budgetary shortfalls, the UNHCR is falling short of its goals in crucial aid categories.

However, a survey of UNHCR Sector leaders found that most believe their individual Sectors have become more effective at providing aid to Syrian refugees. 58% of those polled in 2014 stated that their sector’s performance was “above average” or “excellent” with only 11% calling performance “below average” or “poor.” In 2013, only 43% of respondents graded their performance “above average” or better. However, one should note that in 2013 only 5% of respondents called their performance “below average” or worse.

The UNHCR and its partners also strongly believe that coordination and communication have gotten better since the start of 2014. In January 2014, it was felt that there was no way of knowing what was already being done or studied, leading to redundancies in the humanitarian response. Information sharing and access to secondary data were felt to be lacking. In the same report, there were concerns that relief agencies and Jordanian authorities/local capacities do not engage one another effectively enough. (UNHCR January 29). However, a recent survey found that overall coordination has generally improved in agencies’ eyes.

UNHCR partners like Refugees International have expressed concern that the UNHCR is doing too little to assist refugees living outside of camps. In February 2014, RI warned that as Amman became more crowded, refugees were beginning to diffuse throughout Jordan and that these transplanted refugees were not getting

1-Ibid, 12.
2-Ibid, 54.
3-Ibid.
5-Ibid
adequate aid.\textsuperscript{1} This problem is not new: In mid-2013, the UNHCR officially identified “a need to boost the humanitarian community’s outreach to non-camp refugees.”\textsuperscript{2}

UNHCR Sector leaders surveyed frequently said the UNHCR must do more to engage and cooperate with local authorities. However, they also laid some blame for poor Jordanian-international communication on the Jordanian Government. The same survey also found that leaders frequently felt that national-level Jordanian ministries did not participate regularly enough in relief initiatives.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} Daryl Grisgraber and Jeff Crisp, Beyond Emergency Assistance: Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Northern Iraq, report (Refugees International, 2014), 3.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid
\textsuperscript{3} UNHCR, «Sector Survey June 2014,» 5.
Future Plans

Introduction
The Syrian refugee crisis’ effects will be felt in Jordan for years, if not decades. The country’s population has increased by an estimated 15%, and roughly half of those Syrians are likely to stay in Jordan permanently after the war ends. The current plans are of limited duration, and will need to be replaced as they expire in order to keep up with Jordanian and Syrian needs. The following section reviews what the UNHCR and the HCSP envision for the future, and how the response is likely to evolve.

Future overall plans
The Jordanian government intends to eventually create a unifying authority that will be responsible for both the refugee and host community responses. Currently, the Jordanian government’s interactions with the UNHCR are generally limited to hands-off supervision and approval, with little action in the planning phases of the refugee response.

On a related note, the UNHCR frequently emphasizes in its reports that it hopes to strengthen cooperation with the Jordanian government over the mid-term future in order to provide relief more comprehensively.

One key shift that will concern both the UNHCR and the HCSP is the likely shift in the overall refugee response from relief-provision to resilience-building. As this shift is made, many projects will be shifted from UN to Jordanian authority. Housing is one area in which this is particularly true: The UNHCR states that in 2015, it is likely that the nature of the mission to provide sustainable, affordable housing will shift from meeting emergency demand to a development-based task. This change will entail a shift of much housing work from the UNHCR to the HCSP.1

The Jordanian Government is likely to keep its borders with Syria open to refugees for the foreseeable future.

UNHCR future plans
Going forward, resilience is likely to become a larger focus of the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis. As of mid-2014, the UNHCR aims for the RRP6 to focus more on investing in refugees’ earning capacity in the remaining months of its mandate.2 This growing interest in resilience has precedent, as the RRP6 was distinguished from previous UNHCR plans by its increased focus on supporting

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1-UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Jordan Mid-Year Update, 66.
resilience. The RRP6’s successor plan is likely, in our estimation, to make resilience more central still to the humanitarian response.

Although the UNHCR is looking to focus more intensely on resilience, it is likely to be careful to avoid overlaps with the HCSP. The resilience-building programs that it undertakes are likely to focus mainly on the Syrian refugees themselves, while the HCSP will probably remain the primary authority over host community relief. As the HCSP branches out into resilience-building programs, it will need to communicate closely with the HCSP to ensure that it does not undertake any redundant projects.

Due to the recent improvements in communication and coordination, we expect that the UNHCR will succeed in avoiding overlaps. The UNHCR is also likely to review existing programs, in order to remove existing projects in fields that are already being addressed by HCSP work. It will be especially important for the UNHCR and the Jordanian Government to communicate more closely in the future as the UNHCR takes on more resilience-focused work, since poor communication in that field will certainly lead to numerous unplanned overlaps and redundancies between the HCSP and the UNHCR.

The UNHCR began decentralizing its relief operations with the Jordanian Government’s permission in April 2014, with the goal of getting closer to the Syrian refugees and more effectively providing relief. Decentralization has been well received as a means of connecting programs to refugees who need them in a timely manner, and is likely to be continued.

**HCSP future plans**

During the remaining years of the National Resilience Plan’s mandate, the HCSP hopes to implement NRP development interventions, while continuing the close collaboration with international development partners that characterized the planning phase of 2013. It anticipates “that the NRP will continue to evolve” as a policymaking guide, becoming more effective as it is implemented. The HCSP stresses that donors, international agencies, INGOs and NGOs must extend the high level of support that they showed during the NRP’s planning phase into to the implementing phase. The current funding shortfalls are worrying in this light.

The current draft of the National Resilience Plan is set to expire at the end of 2016. The Jordanian government intends to continue the plan’s work after that date under the framework of a new resilience plan.

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3-Ibid
The NRP has already assumed responsibility for plans in the water, ¹ education, ² and energy ³ sectors that extend into the 2020s. The HCSP also expects to expand its work in Jordan as Syrian refugees diffuse through the country.

This team expects that the next iteration of the National Resilience Plan will strive to continue the HCSP’s work, perhaps at a broader level. However, its task will likely be complicated by current funding shortfalls.

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¹-lbid,55
²-lbid,21
³-lbid,24
Conclusions

Gaps

Underfunding
Underfunding is the first problem to be corrected in the Syrian refugee response. Both the UNHCR and the HCSP lack the funds necessary to accomplish all of their goals. In its Mid-Year Review, the UNHCR reported that despite downward revisions of funding requirements, only 40% of requested funding had been delivered, and that five Sector Working Groups—Food Security, Health, NFI’s, Shelter, and WASH—were on track to come up short for 2014. Food Security, NFI’s and WASH were especially underfunded, with each having gotten less than a third of its required funding (Shelter just barely cleared this mark, with 34% of its required money received). This concurs with earlier warnings from King Abdullah II. Fida Ghaiba of MOPIC blamed “donor fatigue” for the HCSP’s 2014 budgetary shortfall.

According to the UNHCR, the lack of funds threatens severe consequences for refugees’ and Jordanians’ health, may force WASH partners to cease activities in the refugee camps, and threatens to end 83,000 people’s cash assistance.

Central planning not institutionalized
It is widely agreed that while Jordanian-UN communication has gotten better, it is still too ad hoc. In spite of some important steps, like the creation of the IMCG, Jordan and its international partners have not laid the necessary groundwork for focused, long-term synchronization of the relief (UNHCR) and resilience (HCSP) missions. More meetings with a clearer sense of purpose are necessary. Currently, there is a wide perception that the meetings simply create more bureaucratic red tape and do not significantly enhance coordination between the NRP and the RRP.

Lack of long-term water strategy
Although both the UNHCR and the HCSP pay great attention to water and sanitation issues, and they appear to have made great strides in meeting short term water problems, their programs emphasize meeting current demand over addressing long-term supply issues. Jordan is already the fourth-most water-scarce country in the world,
and this scarcity is likely to get worse in the coming years. Current relief programs focus on improving the efficiency of existing water infrastructures and clamping down on waste, but do not focus enough on how to address the overall shortage of water. Jordan needs to combine infrastructure and distribution improvements with solutions to its overall low supply of water. Jordan currently depends mainly on groundwater, and it needs to diversify this source, including exploring for new sources of water through means such as desalination and trade.

Energy sector under-addressed
Among the main categories of aid, energy is the least institutionalized. However, it is perhaps the most necessary development issue for Jordan to address. In an interview with the CSS, Senator Jawad Anani said that the Jordanian energy deficit is the most significant development obstacle facing the kingdom, and the rise in demand caused by the crisis has made the situation even more urgent. Jordan must specifically address: renewable energy supply; overdependence on imported fuels; and inefficient supply and usage.

Undocumented Syrians neglected
Syrians who were stranded in Jordan as guest workers are not treated as refugees by the UNHCR, and therefore do not have fair access to aid. The UNHCR’s publications make scant mention of them, and although Jordanian civil servants generally agree that these people pose a challenge, there is little evidence of any coherent plan — on either the UN’s or the Jordanian Government’s part — to assess their needs or help them.

Housing shortage unresolved
Due to the short supply of housing in Jordan, rents have been rising sharply in most of Jordan’s governorates. This increase has been most pronounced in the northern governorates where most refugees are concentrated. Rising rental prices affect both refugees and Jordanians, and are perhaps the single-greatest cause of wealth depletion.

The shortage of housing also has meant that many refugees outside of the camps are living in undignified, unsafe conditions. Polls have found that refugees housing units are usually unsanitary, overcrowded, unfinished, vulnerable to inclement weather, and in other ways unfit for habitation. The housing crisis is one of the most serious current problems facing Jordan, and resolving it by ensuring that satisfactory housing is available and affordable should be one of the Jordanian Government’s leading priorities.

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Lack of transparency
Information about aid processes is not disseminated publicly enough, by either the UNHCR or the HCSP. This has multiple negative results. One result is that individuals who are eligible for support are sometimes unaware of this fact, and thus spend personal money on services that are provided for free by humanitarian actors. The lack of awareness, combined with real problems in the relief programs, means that rumors and exaggerations can greatly undermine refugees’ and host communities’ confidence in humanitarian programs.
Another result of the lack of transparency is that confusion fuels resentment when groups feel that they are being unfairly passed over for assistance. Even if aid is being delivered to the people who need it the most, it is undesirable for non-recipients to feel that their needs are being ignored.

Refugee livelihoods unaddressed
It is extremely difficult for Syrians to participate fully in the Jordanian economy, thanks to restrictive Jordanian labor regulations. This is to Jordan’s loss: Refugee crises are often less burdensome when refugees are allowed to participate in the economy, and are given the opportunity to generate wealth. This is not to say that economically active refugees will not need direct aid; however, if refugees are allowed to take part in the labor market and are given well-designed, well-regulated opportunities for investment, they can contribute to their host country’s economy. Studies of refugees in Tanzania suggest that while refugees drive up prices, their economic participation can benefit the host country’s fiscal situation and business environment.¹

Women’s livelihoods not part of UNHCR doctrine
Besides not having institutionalized refugee livelihoods and rapid livelihood-generating activities in the RRP6, the UNHCR has not shown sufficient signs of focus on women’s livelihoods and economic engagement. Because women in the Arab world are already economically marginalized, economic shocks like refugee crises have especially serious implications for women’s economic participation.

Too few medical personnel
Refugees in camps often struggle to get important medical care that they are entitled to because clinics are understaffed. This drives refugees away from UNHCR healthcare systems and into Jordanian clinics and hospitals, thus depleting refugees’ wealth, taking up time that could be spent working, in school or socializing, and putting more pressure on Jordanian health services. This condition can become self-sustaining as rumors about long waits and poor service in UNHCR clinics can encourage refugees to avoid camp clinics without even visiting them.

Poor information publication
Both the UNHCR and the HCSP publish too little and too infrequently. The UNHCR data portal makes a list of conducted and planned assessments available through the Needs Assessment Registry, along with summaries of results and findings. The HCSP does not make such detailed information available. The UNHCR also publishes work summaries much more frequently than the HCSP does.

There is a functioning portal for data collection and distribution on the UNHCR website; it was up and running in January 2014, and provides links to brief summaries. However, not all organizations are actively utilizing it, meaning that the information available on the portal is incomplete. Also, summaries should be shown next to the projects where they are listed.

Meanwhile, the HCSP publishes a comprehensive list of projects being conducted by its partners, and unlike the UNHCR, it makes this list publicly available. However, while the UNHCR shows executive summaries of its projects on the IISP, the HCSP is much stingier with detailed information: Many HCSP projects are listed only with their names, the responsible government agencies, and any applicable international partners. Official HCSP funding information in particular is also very difficult to come by.

Recruiting too heavily from Amman
Well-connected Jordanian youth are felt to be the primary employees of relief NGOs, meaning that local youth do not benefit from employment opportunities.\(^1\) This is harmful for relief agencies’ public relations, and does not give targeted communities a sense of ownership in the projects that are meant to benefit them.

Too little Jordanian agency
In an April 2014 statement, Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Dr. Ibrahim Saif warned against foreign actors taking too much authority in the humanitarian response. He called for Jordanian control of relief in areas where the Jordanian state has the capacity to deliver aid itself, and spoke out against “the creation of parallel programs and structures for the delivery of aid.”\(^2\)

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\(^1\) UNDP, Municipal Needs Assessment Report, 29.

Risks

Economic tension between Jordanians and refugees
In rural Jordan, many economic ailments are at least partially due to the Syrian refugee influx. One possible warning sign of trouble is that according to the UNDP, there is some support in rural Jordan for a ban on employing refugees.1 There is some evidence that Syrian refugees are beginning to participate more robustly in the Jordanian labor force,2 and if this trend continues, tensions between refugees and Jordanians could become more pronounced.

Disorder in refugee response may provide cover for extremists
With the self-styled Islamic State publicly threatening Jordan, the movement of refugees from Syria may give terrorists cover to cross into Jordan. While Jordan is better-prepared to fight IS than the Iraqi and Syrian states are, the UNHCR reports that in 2013, Jordan did not improve border security enough.3 IS operatives or sympathizers could still cause widespread fear in Jordan by striking through unconventional tactics, such as bombings. To paraphrase a well-known saying, Jordanian counterterrorism forces need to succeed all the time; terrorists only need to succeed once. In a worst-case scenario, a major security threat could prompt Jordanian authorities to deny entry to further refugees, with dire humanitarian implications.

Jordanian financial strains grow
In June 2013, Moody’s downgraded Jordan’s credit rating to B1, reflecting the sharp rise in uncertainty surrounding the country’s future. While Moody’s has not downgraded Jordan further (to the surprise of some commentators), the credit ratings agency has hinted that until the problems stemming from the refugee crisis are resolved, Jordanian credit will not improve in the near future. A major cause of the downgrade was Jordan’s rising debt-to-GDP ratio (which is predicted to pass 90% by the end of 2014); much of this rise was caused by rising domestic services spending brought on by the refugee influx. If Jordan does not secure more international support, its financial situation may continue to deteriorate.4

Jordanian development milestones are lost
Jordan currently is classified as having “high human development,” according to the UNDP’s 2014 Human Development Report.5 Jordanians enjoy an HDI of 0.745, the third highest among non-GCC Arab League states, behind only Libya and Lebanon.

2-UNHCR, Jordan Operation, Syrian Refugees Living Outside Camps, Executive Summary.
4-“Moody Maintains B1 Credit Rating for Jordan.” Al Bawaba.
However, this accomplishment may be jeopardized if the refugee crisis is not addressed properly. Declines in healthcare and education are particularly worrisome, as these are key variables in the UNDP’s HDI methodology. Large drops in purchasing power would also hurt Jordanian development metrics. The Jordanian Government itself stresses that its previous success accomplishing Millennium Development Goals, particularly in health-related areas like infant mortality and maternal care, may be lost and that “Jordan’s human development trajectory could be jeopardized.”

Recommendations

Solicit more funding from international donors
We recognize that raising money is no easy task, but until Jordan gets out of its current financial situation, a satisfactory response to the refugee crisis will be impossible. To boost funding support, Jordan might do well to highlight its status as one of the most stable countries in the Arab world, and emphasize that this stability will be threatened if its economic situation is allowed to deteriorate. Jordan could also explore for new funding sources: For example, it could seek new South-South partnerships with newly-developing countries.

Institutionalize cooperation between relief and resilience programs
The general consensus, especially in Jordanian Government circles, is that the UNHCR and the HCSP do not communicate closely enough. This problem could be solved by the creation of an institutionalized body devoted to acting as a medium between the two relief tracks. We recognize the widespread concern in Jordan about oversized bureaucracies, but believe that red tape and mission creep can be avoided if the institution’s mandate is properly defined, and limited to connecting the Jordanian government to international aid organizations.

Institutionalize a national energy reform plan
This team has found that energy policy is currently being addressed in too ad hoc a manner. Jordan should publicly commit to goals of developing a more efficient and sustainable power grid, to reducing the energy trade deficit, to meeting the increased demand caused by the refugee influx, and making supply more secure. These tasks need to be addressed in a coherent fashion by an institutionalized governmental task force, working in close conjunction with international partners.
Give refugees more economic opportunities
Syrian refugees who wish to work are often restricted to either under-paying jobs relative to their skill levels, or else are forced to find jobs in the gray and black markets. Jordan should consider changing this with a modest liberalization of labor, property, and business regulations. While giving Syrians the full economic rights of Jordanian citizens would be unwise, Jordan would probably benefit from allowing some degree of entrepreneurship by Syrian refugees and giving some Syrians access to legitimate employment. Research conducted by Sesay\(^1\) suggests that Jordan, as an upper-middle income country, may be able to make net economic gains from the presence of the Syrian refugees. Furthermore, if a sizeable percentage of Syrians stay in Jordan (Fida Gharaibeh estimated that approximately half would remain after the war) and eventually become naturalized citizens, it may be sensible to economically “phase in” the refugees to reduce the potential shock of a wave of new citizens in the future.

Raise and institutionalize support for women’s livelihoods
The intersection of gender and labor demands attention. Jordanian women have extremely low workforce participation rates—85.9% are economically inactive, according to the UNDP\(^2\)—and they depend overwhelmingly on the shrinking public sector for employment. This is especially serious in rural areas that have borne the brunt of the Syrian refugee crisis, where the public sector is an important employer.\(^3\)

We recommend that the UNHCR make gender a central focus as it begins livelihoods support for refugees. Creating an institutionalized women’s economic initiative is important. Women’s economic issues should be addressed by an official, dedicated focal point of experts and development partners working towards concrete, listed goals instead of being addressed by various projects in an unfocused manner.

Boost the capacity of refugee healthcare providers
There are currently too few doctors, nurses, and other healthcare professionals working in Za’atari camp. The long waits and occasionally brusque service that this causes has meant that even refugees who know that they can get free healthcare in-camp sometimes choose to go to non-camp clinics. Relief authorities should seek to draw more healthcare workers to the camps (and to Jordan as a whole).

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3-Ibid
Make more effort to communicate with beneficiaries
The Jordanian government and the UNHCR should seek to address uncertainty and misunderstandings about humanitarian initiatives. These problems are particularly prevalent among marginalized groups like Jordan’s rural poor and women. New arrivals from Syria also are vulnerable to harmful rumors, resulting in lower trust of and support for relief providers.

Oxfam has found that both Jordanians and camp refugees currently depend primarily on word-of-mouth to learn about humanitarian services, and that neither group is pleased about relying on word-of-mouth transmission for information. However, the appropriate methods differ between the two groups. Roughly 33% of camp residents said that billboards would be a useful method, with support for phone calls and SMS messages close behind. Conversely, more than 80% of host community members said that phone calls would be useful with roughly 70% saying that SMS messages would also be helpful.1

Encourage community ownership of the refugee response
Involving Jordanians and refugees as directly as reasonably possible in relief and resilience work cuts across many sectors. Besides enabling those most affected by the crisis to have a say in the response, it would probably boost the legitimacy of response plans in the eyes of their intended beneficiaries, and could have strong psychosocial benefits. These benefits would include giving unemployed and underemployed Syrians and Jordanians the chance to do dignifying, morale-boosting work, encouraging constructive interactions between refugees and host communities, and developing a foundation of participatory civil society that would benefit Jordan long after the end of the refugee crisis.

In general, Syrians and Jordanians should be involved in the UNHCR and HCSP’s work whenever possible. INGOs should be given incentives to employ Syrians and vulnerable Jordanians when they are qualified for key relief positions. Such work could also be combined with skill-training to help meet education sector goals. Some of the UNHCR’s goals—such as to provide community health volunteers with international-standard training—are already well-suited to boosting grassroots participation in the refugee response, and more such goals should be adopted when they can realistically be accomplished.

These problems could be addressed in a way that would complement Jordan’s overall goal of stronger localized governance. By communicating more closely with local authorities, the central government could disseminate knowledge about what kinds of aid are available. Involving communities more directly in the humanitarian

1-Oxfam, Refugee Perceptions Study, 23, 32.
process could also improve understanding of and support for the aid programs’ missions.

One good example of projects involving Syrians and disadvantaged Jordanians is the UNHCR’s “Amani” (“my safety”) protection campaign. The campaign’s core message—that “our sense of safety is everyone’s responsibility”1—is given credibility by the fact that the campaign really does seek to involve everyone. Encouraging mass participation in the Amani initiative lends the campaign more legitimacy than it would have if it were imposed from above on the Syrian refugees and Jordanians that it targets. In the future, UNHCR and HCSP planners should always consider how they can involve communities in relief programs.

Pay attention to areas of Jordan not obviously affected by the crisis
The effects of the crisis on parts of Jordan that do not house large numbers of refugees—primarily the country’s south—are under-studied. What few studies have been conducted suggest that while refugees have not spread south yet, the strain they have placed on national-level resources has had a very real effect on quality of life in southern Jordan. Reports of unrest in southern cities like Ma’an underscore the importance of addressing problems in southern Jordan before they turn into emergencies.

## Appendix

### Major Partners

#### Foreign Private Entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Home country</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>UNHCR Aid types</th>
<th>HCSP Aid types</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>ACT (Action Contre La Faim)</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>Water &amp; Sanitation</td>
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<td>ACTED (Agence d’aide à la cooperation technique et au développement)</td>
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<td>Child Protection, Education</td>
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## Foreign Governmental Agencies

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### Intergovernmental Organizations

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<td>Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization</td>
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<td>Coordination, CRI, Environment, Food Security, Livelihood, Logistics, Protection, Registration</td>
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<td>King Hussein Institute for Biotechnology and Cancer</td>
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<td>Noor Al Hussein Foundation</td>
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### Jordanian Governmental Agencies

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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>UNHCR Aid Types</th>
<th>HCSP Aid types</th>
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